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DEPOSITION OF .EW THOMAS TAKEN ON 1,2009 
1 Q What spending habits are you making 
2 reference to there? 
3 A There would be more details with my 
4 brothers' depositions and other folks that will be coming 
5 through, but the difficulties I seen that I had was there 
6 was a lot of money, exorbitant amount of money, going out 
7 for rent which I believe was used to support -
8 Q I'm sorry, I wasn't listening as well as I 
9 should have. Could you say that again? I apologize. 
10 A The money that Ron was taking as rent 
11 money out of the bUSiness he was supporting other 
12 businesses with, so that was - I mean, it was a very -
13 it was 15 grand a month. It was a very difficult number 
14 to work with, so the difficulties we sustained was that 
15 cash flow could have sure helped us and not sustained to 
16 buy shop and other things. 
17 Q Do you know of any money being taken out 
18 of the Thomas Motors business by Ron or Elaine Thomas 
19 other than that which was used to pay rent? 
'20 A Not to my -- I'd have to find out. I'd 
21 have to look into that. Not at this meeting I wouldn't 
22 be able to say. 
23 Q To tell you the truth, I've asked a few 
24 people this and not one person has identified a cent 
25 being taken out by them other than the rent and I'm just 
29 
1 wondering if you have any reason to disagree at all, 
2 whether ifs a matter of Rob Wilde telling you or your 
3 brothers telling you or you saw something, I don~t know, 
4 whatever. 
5 A I do have reasons to believe. 
6 Q Okay, hit me with it. 
7 A Well, rd have to talk to a few people and 
8 get something thafs more than just my word saying I 
9 think I know. I can try to provide that for you. 
10 Q I don't understand. Do you personal~ 
11 know that Ron or Elaine Thomas took anything out of the 
12 Thomas -- anything finandal out of the Thomas Motors 
13 business, any money out of the Thomas Motors business 
14 other than the amounts that were taken out for rent, that 
15 were paid for rent? 
16 A There were checks cut other than rent. 
t7 There was one for 70,000. I mean, Jan Rowers would be 
l8 the one proba~ that could real~ define that for you. 
.9 Q Would Rob Wilde be somebody that would 
'.0 know something about that? He was maintaining the 
1 company books at the time. . 
2 A Possib~, but Jan and Penny were actually 
3 day to day at the dealership and they were the ones 
~ seeing the checks from upstairs go through Shirley and 
) Ron and checks other than rent would be the ones they 
30 
1 would know. 
2 Q But Rob at that point was doing month~ 
3 financials, wasnt he? 
4 A He was doing the financials on the 
5 information provided by Ron and Shirley to my 
6 knowledge. 
7 Q What was the 70,000 check fori to your 
8 knowledge, or at least whether you've heard it through 
9 the grapevine or otherwise? 
10 A Nol John, I dont know exact~. I just 
11 know it was a check that never carne back into the 
12 dealership checking per Jan. 
13 Q When was it? 
14 A rd have to -- I don't know. I don't 
15 remember, but I remember it was done. 
16 Q You dont have any idea what year it was? 
17 Was it close to the end? 
18 A No, 00, it was probab~, I would guess, 
19 '03ish, '04ish, rtght in that area. 
20 Q You understand in that time frame your dad 
21 was also and your mom were also writing checks going into 
22 Thomas Motors' business? 
23 A Uh-huh. 
24 Q You've seen those checks? 
25 A Uh-huh. 
31 
1 Q Yes? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Were you aware of those at the time they 
4 were being done? 
5 A Maybe not all of them, but I was aware of 
6 some. 
7 (Exhibit No. 9 was marked for 
8 identification by the Notary Public.) 
9 Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whafs been 
10 marked as Exhibit No. 9 - it might be a little confusing 
11 here. The green sticker represents the actual exhibit 
12 number. 
13 A Right 
14 Q I mean, you can see the Exhibit E on the 
15 bottom, it was for a prior affidavit, so we're talking 
16 about Exhibit No. 9 for your deposition. Do you 
17 recognize those as copies of checks that were made out to 
18 Thomas Motors that were from your dad's rental, your mom 
19 and dad's rental, account? 
20 A I believe that would be correct. n looks 
21 right. 
22 Q And are these the checks you were just 
23 talking about that you were aware of that your morn and 
24 dad were writing into Thomas Motors, in other words, 
25 providing money to Thomas Motors from their own personal 
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1 sources? 
2 A I dont recognize all of them, but there's 
3 a couple or three I do recognize. 
4 Q Tell me which ones. Uke the 75/000-
5 page 2 is February of '04/ 75,000, is that one? 
6 A I don't remember, no, tha~s in '04. 
7 Q I went to that one first because the first 
8 page is kind of hard to read, but I can tell you it's 
9 March--
o A -- 28th. 
11 Q Yeah, for 25,000. I have the originals 
12 somewhere, but anyhow, thafs why I went to page 2. 
13 Which ones do you recognize? . 
14 A Irs been awhile, but I think I remember 
15 seeing the 10,000 and maybe one of the 30's, but the rest 
16 I don't remember. 
17 Q Well, what did you understand·· whatever 
18 checks you do recognize, you at least understood back 
19 then factually that your mom and dad were contributing 
monies into Thomas Motors as opposed to taking it out? 
A fts well as spending and taking out, yes, 
new tools, new equipment 
Q There's where I'm going. What do you 
understand was the purpose of these checks, the monies 
they were putting in out of their accounts? 
1 A Well, I would imagine -- it's my 
2 understanding it was money to operate the - working 
3 capital. 
4 Q Did you understand, also, as you'll see if 
5 you tum to page, the cleaner copies, page 3, for 
6 exam~e, June '04, it says in the memo section "Company 
7 Loan"? 
8 A Uh-huh. 
9 Q Next one does the same; next one does the 
10 same; next one does the same. The rest of them basically 
11 do, that they're essentially boiling down to Ron and 
12 Elaine lending the Thomas Motors business money for 
13 working capital purposes? 
14 A Okay, I understand. 
15 Q I mean, is that right? 
16 A That sounds right 
17 Q And did you have any olSCUssions with your 
18 mom and dad back then about what was going on in that 
19 regard? 
20 A Not that I can specifically remember, 
21 no. 
22 Q Okay; so before I leave this subject, this 
23 spending habits reference in your affidavit, I guess I'm 
24 still not sure what you're talking about there. 
25 A Well, as far as the dealership side that I 
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1 seen and, again, there's all kind of facets, but, I mean, 
2 new hoists, new tools, knew machinery, new -- I mean, 
3 just it was a spend, spend. I mean, we needed to rein it 
4 in a little bit and it just seemed like the more harder 
5 we worked to try to get ahead the more he would spend. 
6 Q Well, I'm just looking through the checks, 
7 it looks he writing quite a bit of money into the 
8 business as well. 
9 A Putting it back in, yeah. 
10 Q So when you're talking about spending 
11 habits here in paragraph 19 of Exhibit 8, you're talking 
12 about him causing new eqUipment, buSiness-related things, 
13 being purchased; is that the idea? 
14 A To my knowledge, yes. 
15 Q Let me ask this kind of big picture 
16 question: The agreement that serves as the basis for 
17 this lawsuit, that you're claiming in this lawsuit, okay, 
18 lers say that actually came to fruitionr it happened. 
19 At the time the business would be transferred to you, 
20 iers just call that March of 106 time frame, tell me in 
21 your mind based on that agreement who on each side of the 
22 agreement, that is, you and your mom and dad, who would 
23 do what, who would pay what, who would get what? 
24 A What Ron told me was when he denied he was 
25 selling the dealership -
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1 Q No, forget the actual what happened. I 
2 just want to know your understanding of the agreement. 
3 A Okay. 
4 Q Who was going to get what, who was going 
5 to do what, who was going pay what? 
6 A The way he described it was that when he 
7 retired that him and Mom would take a small check, not 
8 much, but everything would come over to the dealership, 
9 the checkbook. I believe even Aunt Shirley was going to 
10 actually be moving in with us which I had no problem with 
11 because that's his direct connection to the businesses, 
12 so we would be in control of the spending, how the money 
13 was spent, where it was going, that type of thing. 
14 Q So you understood that if the agreement 
15 materialized that they would be getting this small check? 
16 Tha~s the 3 to $5,000 thing we talked about before? 
17 A Uh-huh. 
18 Q Correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And what about the debt of the business 
21 that would exist? It has to have debt at some point that 
22 the transfer is made. 
23 A My dad told me he would stay in the saddle 
24 through the transition until we could get everything 
25 transferred into my name and move on. 
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1 Q I don't understand what - well, it 
2 doesn't matter if I understand it, what do you understand 
3 that to mean? 
4 A I understood that he would still be a 
S guarantor while I seeked financial possibilities to 
6 actually move them completely out, but that he said that 
7 he would stay -- his words were I'll stay in the saddle 
8 with you until we can get that done, everything will be 
9 fine. 
to Q So that would leave open, you know, kind 
t1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
of a bunch of possibilities, then, as one, how long. 
A Huge possibilities. 
Q Right? 
A Yes. 
Q Kind of infinite almost in fact; right? 
A Well, hopefully, get something done so 
they can enjoy their retirement. 
Q So number one that would be left open is 
how long he would have to "stay in the saddle"; right? 
A Correct. 
Q I mean, that could be a short period of 
time, it could be a long period of time? 
A Correct. 
Q But there had been no specific agreement 
as to, like, cutting it off at some point? 
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1 A Not that I remember, no. 
2 Q So basically indefinite and a period of 
3 time that would have to be dealt with down the road? 
4 A I would agree. 
S Q The other thing that you talked about is 
6 that him staying in the saddle would be to provide some 
7 finandal backing while you were trying to obtain your 
8 own personal financing? 
9 A Right, whether it be a partner or 
10 whatever, yes. 
11 Q And I've heard you make reference to that 
12 before and as I prepared for this depo, rm reminded you 
13 testified about this earlier, too, that the prospect 
14 existed that you would have a partner in this bUSiness. 
15 I mean, did you have somebody really in mind? 
16 A Roy Long was one, Ontario Auto Brokers. 
l7 Lanny Berg, I was going to propose something with him, 
l8 but I think if the word would have got out, Don Ovitt 
. 9 would have probab~ been a possibility, but we never got 
~O to that point. 
1 MR. JANIS: Off the record. 
2 (Off the record discussion.) 
3 Q BY MR. JANIS: But in any event, the point 
~ was that you understood under this agreement that you had 
) with your dad that again serves as the basis for this 
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1 lawsuit that at the time of transfer, your dad's 
2 obligation would actually be ongoing for awhile to serve 
3 as financial backing while you dea~ with this question 
4 of obtaining financing yourself? 
5 A I would agree with that. 
6 Q And, again, how long that would take place 
7 is just uncertain? 
8 A Uncertain I would agree with. 
9 Q And there were several things or several 
10 avenues that you could pursue in the way of obtaining 
11 some kind of financing that would cut off your dad's 
12 ongoing responsibility to stay in the saddle; right? 
13 A I agree. 
14 Q One of which would be getting a partner? 
15 A Possible. 
16 Q And you already had some people in your 
17 head. Had you talked to those guys about this? 
18 A We never had got that far, John. 
19 Q Okay, but at least in your head you had 
20 some thoughts as to who might be partners; right? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q And when you said Lanny Berg, by the way, 
23 did you say junior or senior or both? 
24 A I didn't say either one. I would have 
25 talked to both. 
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1 Q Okay, but then, of course, what 
2 arrangement you would have to have with any such partner, 
3 that, too, was up in the air and subject to future 
4 negotiation; right? 
5 A I would agree. 
6 Q Another a~emative that would exist at 
7 the time of transfer and, again, which would dictate when 
8 your dad would be relieved of any ongoing obligation 
9 under the agreement to stay on board with some financing 
10 assistance is for you to obtain a line of credit without 
11 a partner? 
12 A That would be a possibility, probably not 
13 as likely. 
14 Q Well, thaes the question I was having in 
15 my head. Did you have in your mind at some point which 
16 would be the likely avenue you would pursue? 
17 A Ukely with a partner, Dad being a partner 
18 out of the gate and then transfer to another . 
19 Q So in order for the transfer to become 
20 complete and for the time for your dad's performance to 
21 end, it would have to be subject to you working out a 
22 deal with one of these partner types? 
23 A I would agree. 
24 Q And even then, whenever that would take 
25 place, there would have to be some discussion, if you 
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1 will, because even then the business would still have 
2 some debt and some receivables outstanding; right? 
3 A I would agree with that, yeah. 
4 Q I mean, that would always be true. Just 
5 pick out a date at random and there's going to be some 
6 debt and there's going to be some receivables due; 
7 right? 
8 A I would agree. 
9 Q And it is, of course, conceivable that at 
10 the time that transfer took place, in other words, when 
11 you found a partner to help you finance the operation and 
12 so your dad doesn't have to be involved any more, that 
13 the debt at that point could be substantial. 
14 A Possible. 
15 Q And so you'd have to work out who would be 
16 responsible for that debt or do you think you had worked 
17 that out already? 
18 A We'd have to work that out. 
19 Q And had you had any discussions about this 
20 money that I was talking about that were contributed by 
21 your mom and dad for working capital purposes and several 
22 of the checks indicated they were intended as being loans 
23 whether that would be part of the debt that would be paid 
24 back to them? 
25 A Never had that conversation. 
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1 Q So how that part would be treated would 
2 still be subject to future discussion? 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q Then, of course, another part of the debt 
5 that would exist at the time of any particular transfer 
6 would be whatever the existing line of credit is or, 
7 excuse me, what the balance is with the line of credit 
8 with the lending institution that your dad had; right? 
9 A I didn't understand the question. 
10 Q Yeah, because it was a bad question is 
11 why. I was stumbling through it for sure, but all I was 
12 trying to get at is that at any particular point another 
13 debt thafs going to exist for the business is the line 
14 of credit with the bank and whatever the balance is? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q And we knowf for example, because I think 
17 your affidavit says, that at the time it was sold to 
18 Buckner the debt to the bank was approximately $200,000. 
19 Does that sound consistent with your memory? 
20 A It sounds consistent. 
21 Q I could probably find it in this affidavit 
22 if you make me look for it. rm not finding it in the 
23 affidavit right away, so lefs move on and talk about the 
24 second affidavit. 
25 
42 
1 (Exhibit No. 10 was marked for 
2 identifICation by the Notary Public.) 
3 Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whafs marked 
4 as Deposition Exhibit No. 10, that's a second affidavit 
5 you filed in this case; is that right? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q I found it. rm going back to Exhibit No. 
8 8, paragraph No. 24, it's on page 10. 
9 A Uh-huh. 
10 Q You're talking about -- see the very last 
11 sentence there, last two lines? 
12 A Uh-huh. 
13 Q By the time he sold Thomas Motors in 2006, 
14 Thomas Motors owed more than $200,000 on the flooring 
15 line issued by KeyBank? 
16 A I believe thafs correct. 
17 Q So I assume that you said that in an 
18 affidavit that was filed in August of 2007 that at the 
19 time you would have put that you would have been certain 
20 of those facts? 
21 A I believe thafs correct. 
22 Q Lefs go back to this now Exhibit 10. 
23 This is the affidavit you submitted in April of 2008. Do 
24 you see the date on page 3 there? 
25 A Uh-huh. 
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1 Q Let me ask you to tum to paragraph 5 at 
2 page 2. This has to do with this land issue and I know 
3 yo!fve attended a few hearings and you've heard about 
4 this land issue and as I understand what you're saying in 
5 this affidavit is that you understood that part and 
6 parcel of the agreement you had with your mom and dad 
7 about the business being transferred to you was not just 
8 the business and whatever assets the business owned, but 
9 the land on which it was situated? 
10 A Correct. 
11 Q And when you say the land on which it was 
12 situated - I actually said those words. You said "the 
13 real property that Thomas Motors was on," what does that 
14 mean? 
15 A The way I understood it was the complete 
16 amount of land that the dealership sat on on that side of 
17 the street, that the money that we were paying to rent 
18 was paying on the complete property. At one time my dad 
19 told me he was making double payments on all of the 
20 property so when we did expand, we had more room. We 
21 were going to face it to the west. 
22 Q Hopefully, I don't have to drag the 
23 agreements out here. Would that track with the 
24 commerdallease written agreement and what parcels were 
25 being discussed in those documents? Do you see what I'm 
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1 saying? 
2 A The way my dad talked about it was, again, 
3 he was making double payments on the whole property 
4 and-
5 Q I don't know what you mean the whole 
6 property. 
7 A Everything that was encompassed on the 
8 south side of the highway that we owned, all the parcels. 
9 Q That we owned? 
10 A That our family owned or Ron Thomas and 
11 Elaine Thomas owned. 
12 Q So irs my understanding that all they 
13 owned out there on the same side where Thomas Motors is 
14 located is neighborhoodish of eight acres; does that 
15 sound about right? 
16 A Roughly. 
17 Q Maybe it was nine. 
18 A I think it was seven. 
19 Q Oh, maybe it was seven point something. 
20 A I believe thars right. 
21 Q But that Thomas Motors was effectively 
22 using only a part of it. 
23 A We were using a part of it, yes, 
24 correct. 
25 Q So when you're talking about the land 
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1 being part of the deal that was going to be transferred 
2 to you, are you talking the part that Thomas Motors was 
3 using or the entire seven point something acres? 
4 A The entire seven point was what Ron, what 
5 my dad, told me. For the expansion, he talked about a 
6 little Kellogg. He talked about a huge growth and we 
7 would need that property to remodel and change the face 
8 of the dealership which he had me working on somewhat 
9 with ideas. 
10 Q And so your understanding of the agreement 
11 of having the business always contemplated the business 
12 would be located where it actually was located, not 
13 moving it anywhere? 
14 A Correct, the building, right. 
15 Q And so as I understand what you're telling 
t6 me, then, your understanding of the agreement is that the 
l7 land was simply part and parcel of the whole deal? 
1.8 A It was and part of the reasoning if this 
.9 helps was when we had enough inventory which we were 
',0 cramped, the north side of the building, between ~ and 
1 Highway 16, was really small. The east side of the 
2 building was very small. Because of the street, we 
3 couldn't expand that way, so the only thing that made 
t sense was we would take the west side of the building and 
make that the face and thars why he had the new approach 
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1 way put in off of the highway legally so we could use 
2 that as an approach way to the new frontage of the 
3 dealership when we expanded. Thars why that new 
4 entranceway was put in by my dad. 
5 Q So from your perspective, then, the 
6 agreement about getting the business was basically 
7 inextricably interwoven with the land? 
8 A Yes, correct. 
9 Q Otherwise stated, the agreement-that you 
10 had·· in other words, the agreement thars at issue in 
11 this case, your understanding of the agreement you had 
12 with your mom and dad that the business would be 
13 transferred to you at or about retirement at or about 63 
14 based on the terms we've been talking about all morning 
15 was a packaged deal, business and land? 
16 A The way I understood it through the years, 
17 yes. He never had a conversation where he ever said 
18 anything about separating the two, it was all one piece 
19 for expansion in the future for my generation, for my 
20 kids' generation, thars why we needed the land. 
21 Q And I take it from your standpoint irs 
22 kind of like with one comes the other; right? 
23 A The way I understood~. I mean, John, we 
24 walked the property, drove the property talking about the 
25 new ideas and how we were going to do it. 
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1 Q So ~ was never a deal in your mind that 
2 the business was separate or divisible from the land? 
3 A Correct, not the way I understood it with 
4 all of the conversations we had. You couldn' have had 
5 it separated for the plans that he had. You wouldn't 
6 have had any room. 
7 Q So as far as the agreement as far as 
8 you're concerned, the two are indivisible? 
9 A Yes, I would agree. 
10 Q You know from the agreements that are 
11 marked as Exhibits 4,5 and·· no, excuse me, 3, 4 and 5 
12 to your first deposition, actually particularly Exhibit 
13 5, there is in the sale of the business assets, there's a 
14 certain price. We're talking about the written contracts 
15 that were prepared in or around August and September of 
16 2000, okay? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q That as drafted by carl Harder and as 
19 signed by you at one point that the sale of the business 
20 assets had one price and the other part of the deal was 
21 to lease the land with an eventual purchase price. 
22 A Correct, which would all be together. 
23 Q But I mean, there were two separate 
24 written agreements with two different prices, in other 
25 words. 
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1 A Okay, I understand. 
2 Q I mean, thars true, isn't it? . 
3 A I believe thafs right. 
4 Q I mean, we can just look at it and see the 
5 commerdallease has lease terms and the option at the 
6 end amount. The rent term is on page 2 of 10,000 a month 
7 for parcel one. Do you see where I'm at? 
8 A Uh-huh. 
9 Q You know, you can see this. I'm not 
10 hying to be specific, just that it had a specified rent 
11 payment and then an eventual purchase amount; right? 
12 A Agreed. 
13 Q And then the sale of business assets had 
14 an entirely different purchase price for what the assets 
15 would cost or be valued at? 
16 A Agreed. 
17 Q Okay. Now, so when we're talking about 
18 the amount that you agreed to pay your mom and dad of 
19 this uncertain somewhere 3 and $5,000 a month, is that 
20 part of the land, too, or cIo you pay separate for the 
21 land as was clone in the written contract? 
22 A I would say the 3 to 5 would be a separate 
23 check from the bUSiness, not from the land. 
24 Q You lost me there. I understand that 
25 you're saying, in fact these written contracts 
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1 contemplate, that you could assign the obligations to a 
2 corporate entity that you prepare so that if the business 
3 had ultimately been transferred to you, Drew Thomas, you 
4 may have been tumed it into something called Drew Thomas 
5 Motors or something like that. 
6 A Black canyon Dodge was the name I 
7 preferred. 
8 Q Okay; so you were planning on creating a 
9 business entity to serve as the actual owner of the 
10 business? 
11 A I would agree. 
12 Q And that if the payments were going to be 
13 made pursuant to the agreement to your mom and dad of 
14 this somewhere between 3 and $5,000 a month, it would 
15 actually be made by that business entity, albeit you 
16 would be the one authorizing the payments? 
17 A I would agree. 
18 Q Okay; so now what I'm trying to get at 
19 here is would the land based on your understanding of the 
20 agreement reached with your mom and dad, would that be 
21 something dea~ with separately and apart from the 
22 business paying 3 to $5,000 for the transfer of the 
23 business? 
24 A I would agree. 
25 Q It would be something different? 
50 . 
1 A The payment or, say, call it a retirement 
2 payment? 
3 Q No, no. Would you pay separately for the 
4 land is the easier way to ask it? 
5 A Would I pay separately to --
6 Q Have the right to either rent the land or 
7 purchase the land other than this 3 to $5,000 a month 
8 you'd pay your mom and dad? 
9 A I would agree. 
10 Q That you would pay something else? 
11 A I would agree. 
12 Q But you just hadn't worked out how much 
13 you would pay? I mean, you had this commerdallease 
14 agreement, but it's your view that this commercial lease 
15 agreement has no force and effect? 
16 A It never came to fruition at all. 
17 Q Okay; so ifs your view the commerdal 
18 lease agreement has no force and effect; right? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q All right; so you otherwise believe that 
21 there would be an amount that you would pay for either 
22 the renting or purchase of the property, the real 
23 property, aside from the 3 to $5,000 a month you would 
24 pay your mom and dad for the business? 
25 A Okay, I get you. We never discussed 
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1 whether that would be involved together and separated out 
2 or if it would be together. We never discussed that 
3 part. 
4 Q So that was to be another part that would 
5 be negotiated at the time of transfer? 
6 A According to my dad, yeah. 
7 Q And according to you? 
8 A Yeah, would have had to have been talked 
9 about sooner or later. 
10 Q Would you have at least expected - well, 
11 strike that You tell me, what would you have expected 
12 to have happen relative to the real property? Would you 
13 have to pay separate for it something? 
14 A I would imagine. 
15 MR. JANIS: can I have just a couple of 
16 minutes? 
17 (Recess.) 
18 Q BY MR. JANIS: Okay I le~s wrap this up 
19 here. Drew, let me just say this as we wrap this up and 
20 the reason we are here again is at least I thought there 
21 was some apparent confusion on what is it that represents 
22 the terms of this agreement and whether there was a 
23 change from what was the deposition to the affidavits or 
24 whatever and again, I'm not being accusatory here, I'm 
25 just saying thafs what led to this. Thars all I'm 
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1 saying. 
2 A But I'm still a little confused on the 
3 question about this against what I agreed to do with my 
4 dad. Irs like they're intertwined, but this doesn~ 
5 even come into what I agreed to with him, so thars where 
6 I was confused. 
7 Q The record is going to be bad on what 
8 you're saying here, Drew, and let me tell you what I am 
9 understanding because I think I know what you're saying. 
to When you're saying "this," you're talking about the 
11 written contracts that you signed in September of 2000, 
12 you're saying they have nothing to do with this? 
13 A That dea~ separately with the land. What 
14 I'm saying is when I agreed to come overfrom Berg to my 
15 dad and this never came to fruition, this never 
16 happened--
17 Q The written contract? 
18 A -- the written contract never happened, he 
19 said when I retire, the business is yours which included 
20 the land so we could expand and Mom and him would take a 
21 modest check out for retirement. Thars all it was, and 
22 so he goes get back to work, dig in, you're worrying too 
23 much, I've got this taken care of. 
24 Q But I thought before the break you were 
125 telling me besides this modest retirement that they'd be 
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1 "paid" that for the land part you would have expected to 
2 have to pay something else, either in the form of a lease 
3 or an actual purchase price or something besides the 
4 modest--
S A Not according to Ron, no, that was not our 
6 agreement. In this it dea~ with it separately, but this 
7 he never pushed through. This was never done and, again, 
8 I was told why would you want to buy something I'm giving 
9 to you, you're worrying too much, get back to work, so I 
10 did and from this point on to the end of the sale, thaes 
11 exactly what I did. 
12 Q And thiS, again, probably illustrates why 
13 we're having this deposition because now I'm confused 
14 again, but let me try to put this in what I believe you 
t5 are telling me in my words, but what you are telling me 
l6 and you correct me if I'm wrong, how is that? I'm 
.7 understanding that the agreement that you're claiming 
8 that is the basis of this lawsuit had certain terms, 
9 conditions, if you will, that would have happened had it 
o gone to fruition. Are you with me so far? 
1 A Are we talking about this [indicating]? 
2 Q No, I'm talking about the agreement that 
l you're claiming in this lawsuit. Lees close the book on 
I this for the moment. 
A Okay. 
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1 Q I'm going to stand while I think this out. 
2 Okay, you're claiming in this lawsuit that you had an 
3 oral agreement with your mother and father that had 
4 certain terms or conditions. Am I right so far? 
5 A Such as if you -
6 Q Just that it has certain terms and 
7 conditions. 
8 A Okay. 
9 Q We're going to get to what they are in a 
10 minute. 
11 A Okay, I agree. 
12 Q So far you're with me? 
13 A So far rm with you. 
14 Q All right, because before I leave this . 
15 deposition, what I want to understand is exactly what 
16 those terms and conditions are, and here's what I 
17 understand you've told me today or clarified again for me 
18 today that at the time had this deal actually occurred, 
19 materialized, happened -
20 A Upon his retirement. 
21 Q - upon his retirement at or about 63 
22 years old and the transfer of the business took place, 
23 one of the conditions that would have happened is that 
24 you would pay your mom and dad some stream of monthly 
25 income between 3 and $5,000. 
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1 A Correct. 
2 Q Another condition that would have happened 
3 is your dad would have stayed in the saddle, as you put 
4 it or that he put it, that is to say, he would have 
S continued his involvement in the business largely for his 
6 financing reasons while you sought financing elsewhere, 
7 finandng options elsewhere. 
8 A Agreed. 
9 Q And so a condition of the agreement that 
10 serves as the basis of this lawsuit is that Ron Thomas 
11 would have had to stay connected with the business 
12 insofar as a financial commitment? 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q And then in the undetermined future, from 
15 that point you would be able to obtain some kind of 
16 finandng option which would then relieve him of the 
17 obligation to continue staying in the saddle, that is, 
18 staying connected with the business financially? 
19 A For the flooring line. 
20 Q But he'd be out of the business 
21 altogether? 
22 A Right. 
23 Q Other than receMng 3 to $5,000 a 
24 month? 
25 A Right 
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1 Q And that it is impossible to tell at this 
2 point that had the business been transferred to you how 
3 long it would have taken you to obtain this a~emative 
4 financing? 
5 A Correct. It could have been short, it 
6 could have been medium, it could have been long. 
7 Q In fact, there were various options and 
8 irs impossible to predict which of those would have 
9 happened, too? 
10 A Correct. 
11 Q So there really is no telling when Ron 
12 under the agreement that serves as the basis of this 
13 lawsuit that Ron Thomas and by connection Elaine Thomas 
14 would be completely out of the financial commitment 
15 picture; right? 
16 A I didn't understand. 
17 Q Sure. Based on what we just talked about 
18 that one of the conditions of the agreement would be that 
19 while you are paying them through your business the 3 to 
20 $5,000 a month, Ron and by connection Elaine are 
21 continuing their financial commitment to the business to 
22 serve as finandal backing; right? 
23 A Until such time, correct. 
24 Q Right; so based on what was actually going 
25 to happen in your mind as the conditions of this 
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1 agreement, it is impossible to tell how long it would 
2 have taken for them to be completely relieved of any 
3 obligations for finandal backing associated with the 
4 business because you don't know how long it would have 
5 taken you to get your alternative finandngi right? 
6 A Correct. 
7 Q Okay. All right, and another thing that 
8 is basically a condition of the agreement would be that 
9 there would have to be some discussion between you and 
10 your dad and by connection your mother as to what would 
11 happen with the debt that the business had as of the time 
12 he would have been completely relieved of his financial 
13 backing obligation; right? 
14 A The way he stated that on the debt, we 
15 would work out of the debt, whether you reduce inventory, 
16 whatever you do to reduce some debt. 
17 Q But at the time of transfer, as we talked 
18 about before, there's got to be some debt. 
19 A Correct, I would agree. 
20 Q And so the question as to who was going to 
21 pay what part of the debt was still open? 
22 A Was not discussed, correct. 
23 Q And so that was left as a condition of the 
24 deal that would have to be met one way or the other, but 
25 it was left for future negotiation? 
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1 A Correct. 
2 Q And another condition that I can think of 
3 that I don't think we talked about actually so far is 
4 that in order for you to continue with the business, 
5 whether under the name you told me about before or some 
6 other name, you would have to be, you, Drew, would have 
7 to be, approved as an authorized franchise owner by Dodge 
8 Chrysler. 
9 A Or have a partner that could be, but yes, 
10 you would have to be authorized. 
11 Q And W that couldn~ happen, the deal 
12 couldn't happen; correct? 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q And so that, too, was a condition of the 
15 agreement that was left to be dea~ with after the 
16 transfer took place? 
17 A During the transfer and after, yes. 
18 Q During the transfer process, it would have 
19 to be deaft with? 
20 A You would have to discuss it. 
21 Q And one of the possibilities is it may 
22 have been the case that you personally would not have 
23 been solely approved to be a franchise owner by Dodge 
24 Chrysler, that it would have required you to be involved 
25 with somebody else? 
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1 A Possibly, but not impossible either. 
2 You'd have to walk into that water to find out at the 
3 time. 
4 Q Exactly, and thars precisely what rm 
5 understanding is the bottom line is we don' know, we'd 
6 have to try it before you figure out what actually 
7 happened in that regard. 
8 A And like Dad said, he would stay with me 
9 through that transition until we could get that 
10 accomplished. 
11 Q But there's no guarantee it could be 
12 accomplished. Ifs just an open Question is the bottom 
13 line. 
14 A No guarantee ~ couldn', but you could 
15 look at it -
16 Q Either way? 
17 A Either way. 
18 Q Thafs my point is it's a condition of the 
19 agreement that would have to be dealt with one way or the 
20 other and there is no ability to predict what would have 
21 happened either way on that partiCular point. 
22 A Well, we both could predict, but truly, 
23 the outcome we couldn't say. 
24 Q Okay. Now, what I've tried to do after 
25 the break is kind of review with you what I have 
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1 understood you to testify would have been the terms of 
2 the agreement, would have been the conditions in order to 
3 make the agreement complete, who would have had to do 
4 what, who would have had to pay what, and in your mind, 
5 are there any other conditions, terms of the agreement 
6 that we have not discussed that would have had to have 
7 been dealt with at the time of transfer? 
8 A No. 
g MR. JANIS: Okay, thaes all the questions 
10 I have, then. 
'11 MR. WIlKINSON: Thanks. 
i12 (The Deposition conduded at 2:50 p.m.) 
13 
14 (Signature requested.) 
15 
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VERIFICATION 
3 STATE OF ______ _ 
5 
6 
.s. COUNTY OF ______ _ 
I, R. DREH THOMAS, being first duly sworn 
on my oath, depose and say: 
That I am the witness named in the 
9 foregoing deposition taken the 31st day of March, 2009, 
10 consisting of page. numbered 1 to 61, inclusive; that I 
11 have read the said deposition and know the contents 
12 thereof; that the questions contained therein were 
13 propounded to me: that the answers to said questions were 
14 given by me, and that the answers as contained therein 
15 (or as corrected by me on the change sheet) are true and 
16 correct. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
hgnature 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
21 ___ day of _____ , 2009, at ____ , Idaho. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Notary Publ~C for Idaho 
Residing at , Idaho. 
My Commission Expire. ____ _ 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
ss. 
I, CONSTANCE S. BUCY, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Idaho, do hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the witness named 
in the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to 
testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth; 
That said deposition was taken down by me in 
shorthand"at the time and place therein named and 
thereafter reduced to computerized transcription under my 
direction and supervision, and I hereby certify the 
foregoing deposition is a full, true and correct 
transcript of my shorthand notes so taken; 
I further certify that I have no interest in the 
event of the action. 
IN HITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my 
name this 1st day of April, 2009. 
Notary pUblic in and for the State of 
Idaho, residing in Hilder, Idaho. 
My commission expires 8-25-12. CSR .187 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) ) 
CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his 
counsel of record, the law firm of Morrow Dinius, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and hereby files Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This response in opposition to Defendants' second motion for 
summary judgment is supported by the Affidavit of Dennis P. Wilkinson in Opposition to 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment ("Wilkinson Aff. "), together with the file 
and record in this case. The aforementioned affidavit has been filed contemporaneously with 
this memorandum. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The motion before the Court is the Defendants' second attempt at summary judgment. 
Prior to the Court's ruling on the Defendants' first motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff 
had claims for breach of an oral contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
unjust enrichment and fraud. The Court, in its Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, granted the motion as to all claims except for the breach of the oral contract. It is this 
single claim that is yet again being attacked by the Defendants. The argument made by the 
Defendant again focuses on the lack of definiteness as to the terms of the oral contract and the 
statute of frauds. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Idaho law, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); see also Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 
714,718,918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996). In applying this standard, the Court liberally construes all 
disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party, and will draw all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. See McKay v. 
fAt'ens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). If the adverse party sets forth facts 
sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial, the moving party is not entitled to 
summary judgment. See Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000). 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs remaining claim 
asserting they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Defendants argue that the oral 
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contract lacks essential material terms rendering the contract unenforceable. In so arguing the 
Defendants claim that the price of the business had not been specifically agreed to, nor had the 
manner in which the parties would deal with the business debts and receivables. The second 
argument focuses on the statute of frauds. In this memorandum the Plaintiff will first address the 
indefiniteness issue and then the statute of frauds issue. As established by the record, the 
arguments set forth herein, and the Court's prior ruling on these issues, the Defendants are still 
not entitled to summary judgment. 
A. THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED 
ON THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE CONTRACT LACKS MATERIAL 
TERMS 
The argument made by the defense is virtually identical to the argument made in their 
first motion for summary judgment. The Defendants argued unsuccessfully that the absence of 
any agreed upon price term in the oral agreement rendered the contract unenforceable. This 
Court held that "in consideration of Plaintiff leaving his employment at Lanny Berg and 
contributing his efforts and experience to building Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to 
transfer Thomas Motors upon the retirement of Ronald Thomas is supported by sufficient 
evidence in the record to preclude summary judgment dismissing the claim for breach of that 
contract." Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9-10, entered November 26, 
The trier of fact's inquiry into an oral agreement is three-fold; first, to determine whether 
an agreement exists; second, interpreting the terms of the agreement; and third, construing the 
agreement for its intended legal effect. R.D. Bischoffv. Quong-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 
826, 828 (Ct.App.1987). The question as to whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds 
is to be determined by the trier of fact. Jd at 412. Whether an oral contract exists is a question of 
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fact and thus is a question for the jury in this case. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P. 2d 
714. The issues related to this alleged oral agreement are questions of fact for a jury to 
determine and not ripe for summary judgment. 
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has held there was an issue of material fact as to the 
existence of an oral contract under circumstances which were strikingly similar to the 
circumstances in this case. In Harbaugh v. Myron Harbaugh Alotor, Jnc., 100 Idaho 295, 597 
P.2d 18 (1979), the Supreme Court found that in a factual situation virtually identical to this 
case, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether two sons entered into an agreement for 
the transfer of an automobile business from their father. 
In Harbaugh, it was alleged by two sons that they had entered into an agreement with 
their father for the purchase of their father's business. Jd. They left promising careers in other 
fields and took control of their father's business upon the promise that the business would 
ultimately be transferred to them. Jd. The defense denied that such a contract existed and 
claimed that the parties could never reach a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations for the 
sale. Jd. 
The Court relied heavily on the testimony of the only non-interested person to testify 
regarding the existence of the contract. Jd. That person testified that the father acted 
consistently with the existence of a contract. Jd. The Court ruled in a unanimous decision that it 
was wholly unable to say that as a matter of law no contract was entered into between the parties. 
Id. 
In the present case we are dealing with almost an identical factual situation; a situation 
where an affidavit was submitted by a non-interested party, Jan Flowers. In paragraph 9 of the 
Affidavit of Janis Flowers in Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Aff. Flowers Opp. Summ. 
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Jdgmt."), filed August 13, 2007, Ms. Flowers stated that "Throughout my employment at 
Thomas Motors, I heard Ron state to various Thomas Motors employees that Thomas Motors 
was going to be Drew's business when Ron retired. I heard Ron make such statements on 
numerous occasions." 
There is no doubt that an agreement existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
This is a case where a factual determination must be made regarding the existence and terms of 
that agreement. That factual determination should be left to the jury and summary judgment is 
wholly inappropriate given the legal standards and strength of the case law in favor of the 
Plaintiff. 
1. The Price Issue. 
It appears that although the Plaintiff and Defendant discussed whether the Plaintiff would 
provide the Defendants with retirement income from Thomas Motors, the parties never agreed 
that the Plaintiff receiving Thomas Motors was contingent on him providing the retirement 
inc6me to Defendants. The following deposition excerpt is illustrative of the agreement that 
existed between the Plaintiff and Defendant: 
Q: (by Mr. Janis) The depo excerpts, if will, that you just 
read, would you agree with me that they basically boil down to you 
testifying to the effect that you always understood that if and when 
there was going to be a transfer of Thomas Motors business to you 
that you would never get it for free, but there would be some-
you'd have to pay something for it: 
A: (by Drew Thomas) It all comes back to we had an 
agreement that if I left Lanny Berg Chevrolet, came to Emmett, ran 
the store until he retired that it would be mine to take on to the next 
generation and, if so, to the next generation. When you say "free," 
I expected as I stated, that they should-I had no problem with 
them having something of a retirement check out of it and it would 
have been healthy for all of us, but it comes back to one simple 
thing for me: If I leave Lanny Berg, go to Emmett and work the 
dealership, at the end of the day, which was around 63, he always 
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said that it would be mine to take on for my lifetime and then my 
kids' lifetime. 
Deposition Transcript of Drew Thomas ("D. Thomas Aff."), p. 10 1113-25, p.ll111-6. 
The Plaintiff was clear throughout his deposition testimony that he was willing to pay the 
Defendant something by way of a retirement income. The agreement to transfer the business 
however was not dependent on him making these payments. As has been established in the 
record and in the Court's prior ruling, the Plaintiff left the security of his job at Lanny Berg and 
went to work at the dealership in Emmett based on the promise that he would receive the 
business at the retirement of the Defendant. The deposition goes on: 
Q: (by Mr. Janis) Let's put it this way: At no point during 
the timeframes you ever talked about the transfer of the business to 
you or this agreement that serves as the basis of this lawsuit did 
you dad ever say to you you'll get it for free; is that fair to say? 
A: (by Drew Thomas) His statement was this place will be 
yours. 
Q: He never said -
A: He never said the word "free." 
Q: He never indicated to you in any way that the 
business would be given to you for free, did he? 
A: It would be-if you use that whole sentence and 
dropped off the word "free," that would be more accurate. It will 
be yours. That's the agreement we had. 
D. Thomas Aff., p. 13 1123-25, p. 14111-12. 
The evidence unquestionably establishes the terms of the agreement between the Plaintiff 
and Defendant: the Plaintiff would leave his employment at Lanny Berg to devote his time and 
energy to building and operating Thomas Motors, and, in exchange, the Defendant agreed to give 
him Thomas Motors upon his retirement. The deposition excerpts above remain consistent with 
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Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas in Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Aff. R. 
Drew Thomas Opp. Summ. Jdgmt."), filed August 13,2007. Paragraph 12 of the Affidavit reads 
as follows: 
Throughout the nearly nine and half year period, from when Ron 
proposed that I come to work with him to establish Thomas Motors 
until he sold the business in March of 2006, Ron never stated I 
would pay any purchase price for the business. Our agreement was 
that I would leave Lanny Berg and give my efforts and experience 
in building Thomas Motors in exchange for his "giving" me the 
business whenever her retired. While I felt it would be fair and 
wanted to ensure that Ron and my mother received some 
retirement income from the business, I need to clarify that my 
receiving the business was not contingent upon my paying them 
retirement income. The retirement income might have been in the 
form of rental payments or a return for financial or other assistance 
my father would provide. The amount of the retirement income 
that was discussed was to be $3,000 to $5,000. 
This issue of paying the Defendant some retirement income was considered during the 
Defendant's first attempt at summary judgment and the price issue was determined to be 
immaterial. It was clearly discussed in the Plaintiffs affidavit and relied upon by this Court in 
making the determination that the price issue was immaterial to the formation of the contract. 
The issue of price remains immaterial and the Defendant presents no persuasive 
information or case law that should affect the Court's prior ruling on this issue. The fact of the 
matter is that there is no "price." The Defendant has offered nothing to show that there was a 
purchase price somehow connected with the transfer of the business only that the parties 
discussed the payment of some retirement income which the Plaintiff was happy to provide. 
While, the parties clearly discussed whether the Plaintiff would provide the Defendants 
with retirement income from Thomas Motors, the parties never agreed that the Plaintiff's 
receiving Thomas Motors would be contingent upon his providing the Defendants with income 
during their retirement. The record shows, the Plaintiff simply wanted to ensure his parents were 
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provided for during their retirement with income from the family business. The amount of 
payments to the Defendants, if any, was to be determined after Thomas Motors had been 
transferred. 
2. The Accounts ReceivablelDebts Issue. 
There is absolutely no evidence that suggests that the issue of accounts receivable or 
debts is somehow a material term to the agreement. The defense uses deposition excerpts in an 
attempt to illustrate that the manner in which the parties would deal with this issue was a 
condition of the agreement. The promise by the Defendant was plain, concise and simple. If the 
Plaintiff left his job with Lanny Berg and helped establish the Thomas Motors dealership, the 
Defendant would transfer the business to Plaintiff upon Defendant's retirement. Transferring the 
business would clearly include its assets and liabilities. 
This was in fact an issue that was discussed by the parties. The following excerpt is an 
expression of the agreement between the parties: 
Q. (by Mr. Janis) Who was going to get what, who was 
going to do what, who was going to pay what? 
A. The way he described it was that when he retired that 
him and Mom would take a small check, not much, but everything 
would come over to the dealership, the checkbook. I believe even 
Aunt Shirley was going to actually be moving in with us which I 
had no problem with because that's his direct connection to the 
business, so we would be in control of the spending, how the 
money was spent, where it was going, that type of thing. 
Q. So you understood that if the agreement materialized 
that they would be getting this small check? That's the $3 to 
$5,000 that we talked about before? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Correct? 
A. Yes, 
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Q. And what about the debt of the business that would 
exist? It has to have debt at some point that the transfer is made. 
A. My dad told me that he would stay in the saddle 
through the transition until we could get everything transferred into 
my name and move on. 
D. Thomas Aff., p. 36 11 4-25 
The agreement was to transfer the business which would encompass everything within 
the business, including debts and receivables. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant may have 
to "stay in the saddle" until the transition was accomplished but that does not change the nature 
of what is being transferred. When the Defendant first approached the Plaintiff about him 
managing the car lot in Emmett in 1997, the Defendant said that he wouldn't even purchase the 
dealership if the Plaintiff wouldn't agree to come and manage the business. Aff. R. Drew 
Thomas Opp. Summ. Jdgmt., Paragraph 3. The Plaintiff fulfilled his end of the bargain only to 
have the business sold out from under him. 
This issue regarding debts and accounts receivable is a concoction of the defense. 
Simply because it is argued that this issue is clearly material to the formation of the contract does 
not make it so. In almost any transaction some unexpected event could occur and there are a 
myriad of ways that an agreement can change or be breached. This agreement was presented to 
the Plaintiff in a very simple manner. Whether this alleged contract by the Plaintiff exists is a 
question for the trier of fact. The terms of that contract are also questions for the trier of fact. 
The law is black and white on this point - it is clearly in the province of the jury. 
For these reasons, Plaintiff and Defendant's contract was definite and certain in all its 
material terms. However, to the extent there are any doubts concerning the terms of the parties' 
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contract, the record clearly contains sufficient evidence concerning the parties' intent to allow 
the matter to be decided by a jury. 
B. THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED 
ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The evidence establishes that the oral contract was for the transfer of a business, Thomas 
Motors, not a contract for the transfer of real property. The Plaintiff has argued throughout and 
testified via affidavit and deposition that it was his understanding that the real property was part 
of the agreement. This Court specifically found in its Order on Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, entered May 19, 2008, that there was no evidence in the record indicating 
that Thomas Motors owned the real estate that the business was on and that there was evidence, 
suggested by Plaintiffs affidavit that the business would continue to pay rent, indicating that 
Ron Thomas would continue to own the property after the business was transferred. By making 
that ruling the Court specifically found that the real property is not part of the agreement between 
the parties. Thjs, in and of itself, makes the contract divisible. 
The evidence presented in prior hearings and relied upon by this Court clearly indicates 
that the business could be transferred without the need for the real property to go with it. The 
Defendant makes the argument that the agreement, as alleged by the Plaintiff, is indivisible. In 
so arguing the defense relies on Coppedge v. Leiser, 71 Idaho 248, 229 P.2d 977 (1951). The 
Coppedge Court held that "a contract may both in its nature and by its terms be severable, and 
yet rendered entire by intention of parties and best test is whether all of things as a whole are of 
essence of contract and if it appears that purpose was to take whole or none, then contract is 
entire, otherwise it is severable." In the present case the promise was for the business. There is 
no evidence submitted in the record that indicates that it was the parties' intention that the 
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Plaintiff take "whole or none." Quite the opposite, it was entirely possible for the Plaintiff to 
own and operate the business without owning the real property. They are completely severable. 
The agreement, as has been argued in prior submissions, was primarily for the transfer of 
the business. The agreement between the parties was not strictly a real estate agreement. The 
transfer of the business was not dependent upon the transfer of the real property. The transfer of 
the real property was merely incidental to the agreement to transfer the business which takes the 
transfer out of the statute of frauds. 
Clearly, the evidence establishes that the oral contract was for the transfer of a business, 
Thomas Motors, not the transfer of real property. Even if real estate on which the business was 
located, or onto which the business might expand, was also to become the Plaintiffs upon the 
Defendant's retirement, the transaction involving the real estate would have been incidental to 
the Defendant's oral contract to transfer Thomas Motors to Plaintiff. In other words, the oral 
agreement concerning Thomas Motors did not depend upon transfer of land. See Spence v. 
Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 771, 890 P.2d 714, 722 (1995). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the 
Plaintiffs claim should be denied. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2009. 
By: __ ~~~ ________________ __ 
De IS P. Wilkinson 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, ID 83617-0188 
)( 
I 
x.. , 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 342-2927 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 365-4196 
d(()\JUM. rvW~ 
for MORROW DINIUS 
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William A. Morrow 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
MORROW DINIUS 
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 22() 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475·2201 
ISB No. 2451, 6023 
wmorrow@mofl"Owdinius.com 
dwilkinsotz@morrowdinius.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAlNB K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Coxporation, ) 
Defendants. 
-----------------------------
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV. 2006-492 
PLAINTIFF'S PRETRIAL 
MEMORANDUM 
~ 002/006 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, by and through his attorneys of record, the law finn of 
Morrow Dinius, and as and for Plaintiff's Pretrial Memorandum prepared in confonnance with 
the Court's Scheduling Order, und hereby states and discloses the following: 
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A. PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF RECOVERY 
This is an action to recoveJ' damages on a breach of an oral contract. The Plaintiff has 
alleged that sometime during July or early August of 1997, he and the Defendant, Ron Thomas, 
fonned an oral contract whereby the Defendant would purchase Johannesen Motors for the 
purpose of establishing a Chrysler dealership on those premises, the Plaintiff would leave his 
employment with Lanny Berg and contribute his knowledge, experience, and all necessary 
effortsJ at below-market compensation if necessary, in order to establish a new car dealership, 
Thomas Motors, which the Defendant would then give to the Plaintiff upon the retirement of the 
Defendant. 
Sometime in or around March of 2006, the Defendant sold the business to a third party 
and did not honor his agreement with the Plaintiff. Initially, the Plaintiff filed causes of action 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealingJ quasi contract and fraud. Those 
causes of action have been dismi "isM through summary judgment leaving only the breach of 
contract action. The trial has been bifurcated. The trial scheduled for June of2009, deals solely 
with whether there was an oral contract and whether the defendant breached that contract. The 
issue of damages will be tried at a future date. 
B. STIPULATED FACTS, WITNESSES, AND EXHIBITS 
1. Stipulated Facts. 
The parties have not yet stipulated to any facts. 
2. Witnesses. 
a. R. Drew Thomas, 
b. Monte Thomas, 
c. Rick Thomas, 
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d. Ronald O. Thomas, 
e. Elaine K. Thomas, 
f. J. Robin Wilde, 
g. Jan Flowers. 
h. Penny Hulb{rt, 
i. Shirley Youngstrom. 
j. Katie Peters< ln, 
k. Kyle Thomas, 
1. Sandy Mills. 
m. Doug Mills. 
n. Vaughn Waggoner, Washington Trust Bank, 
o. John NwtJe). Chrysler Financial 
p. Erling Johannesen, 
q. Don Rogers. 
r. Tracy Lankford, 
s. Richard Nunn, 
t. KaryOamer, 
u. Cory Thomes, 
v. D. Spillett, 
w. John Cales, 
x. Heather Strand. 
The Plaintiff also specifically reserves the right to call any vvitness disclosed by the 
Defendant. 
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3. Exhibits 
a. September I, 2000 Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets 
between Thomas Motors, Inc., R. Drew Thomas, and Ronald O. and 
Elaine K. Thomas; 
b. September 1 2000 Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement between 
Ronald O. and Elaine K. Thomas, Thomas Motors, Inc, and R. Drew 
Thomas; 
c. September 1 , 2000 Management Contract between Ronald O. and Elaine 
K. Thomas, Thomas Motors, Inc., and R. Drew Thomas; 
d. 2006 Federal and State tax returns for Thomas Motors, Inc.; 
e. 2006 Federal and State tax returns for Ronald O. Thomas Enterprises, Inc.; 
f. 2006 Federal and State tax returns for Ronald O. and Elaine K. Thomas; 
g. Documents pertaining to the sale of Thomas Motors, Inc. to Bill Buckner 
Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc.; 
h. January 18, ~006 Agreement for the Sale of Assets of Thomas Motors, 
Inc. between Ronald O. Thomas, Thomas Motors, Inc. and Quality 
Investments, Inc.; 
i. Daimler Chrysler 2006 Dealer Financial Statement for Thomas Motors, 
Inc.; 
j. 2006 Federal tax return for Bill Buckner Chrysler Jeep Dodge. Inc.; 
k. 1997·2005 h~deral and State tax returns for Thomas Motors, Inc. 
The Plaintiff reserves the right to use any exhibits listed or provided by the Defendant. 
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C. SETTLEMENT DISCUS~IONS 
The parties have not participated in any extra-judicial procedures in an effort to resolve 
this dispute. The parties have not discussed settlement or exchanged any settlement offers. 
DATED this V day of April, 2009. 
CI!:RTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & Brody 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise.ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, ID 83617-0188 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 342-2927 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 365-4196 
~~mj~ 
for MORROW DINIUS ( 
Imtl'r:ICJi;nlll\'JiThomn •• R Drvw 2J971\Thonllll Motor!!. IIlC,OOO\Plcading..~\Pn:tri81 Memo.doll 
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise,ID 83701-2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109N, Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
***** 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV 2006-492 
) 
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) STATEMENT 
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) 
) 
) 
***** 
DEFENDANTS' PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT - ) 
COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their 
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & Brody. and submit the foUowing as their Pre-Trial Statement. 
A. The Legal Elements of the Defense. 
The defendants have recently filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment which 
specifies in detail the legal defenses the defendants have to the plaintiff's singular clam of breach 
of oral contract in this case. While there are some factual disagreements over whether any kind of 
an agreement was actually made, the legal theories of the defense can be summarized as follows: 
1, It is absolutely undisputed and undeniable that whatever agreement was or was 
not reached between the parties here, there were a number of material and essential terms that were 
never agreed upon, thus rendering any agreement here unenforceable as a matter of clear Idaho law. 
2. It is also undisputed that the alleged agreement being claimed by the plaintiff 
involved the transfer of land which was "indivisible" from the transfer of the business, Since the 
Statute of Frauds has already been held to bar any claim associated with a land transfer. the entire 
agreement is void and unenforceable since the land portion of the deal is indivisible flom the non-
land portion of the al1eged deal. 
3. The written contracts entered into between the parties in September of 2000 
superceded any prior oral agreements, and there is no doubt the plaintiff did not comply with any of 
the obligations required under the written contracts. 
B. WitnesseslExhibits/StipiuJations. 
The trial of this case has now been bifurcated, such that if it occurs it will involve 
only the liability issues, which in tum will require much less testimony. The defendants feel very 
strongly, however, that there should be no trial, as the issues at this point have become very clear" that 
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the plaintiff's singular cause of action shou1d be dismissed as a matter of law. The facts Iegarding 
these legal issues are undisputed and frankly undeniable, as is the applicable Jaw. In any event, 
counsel for the defendants would anticipate that the parties would largely agree on exhibits being 
admitted and at least agtee on the authenticity and relevance of such documents, although no formal 
agreement has been reached at this point The anticipated witnesses and exhibits by the defense are 
as follows: 
A. Possible Defense Witnesses, in alphabetical order: 
Mark Bottles 
Kent Corbett 
Jan Flowers 
Sandy Mills 
Elaine Thomas 
Drew Thomas 
Monte Thomas 
Rick Thomas 
Ron Thomas 
Vaughn Waggonner 
Rob Wilde 
Shirley Youngstrom 
B. Possible Defense Exbibits: 
- Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets - dated 9/1/00 
- Management Contract - dated 9/1/00 
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- Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement - dated 911/00 
- Tax returns for Thomas Motors - 1997 - 2005, inclusive (each marked 
separately) 
-Advertisements for auction sale of Thomas Motors through Corbett Auctions 
- Closing documents re: sale of Thomas Motors and surrounding land to 
Buckner Group 
- Ron Thomas Promissory Note to Mark Bottles for commission on sale of 
Thomas Motors 
- Closing documents for sale of property adjacent to Thomas MOtOIS business 
- Checks from Ron and Elaine Thomas to Thomas Motors business 
- Social Security earnings statement - Drew Thomas 
- Affidavits of Drew Thomas 
- Affidavit of Monte Thomas 
- Affidavit of Rick Thomas 
- Affidavits of Rob Wilde 
- Affidavit of Jan Flowers 
- Affidavit of John Nunley 
C. Settlement Discussions. 
Counsel for the parties have on a number of occasions discussed the subject of 
settlement in ways in which this family dispute could be resolved, without success. 
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DATED this:2 0 day of April, 2009. 
Atto 
? ,-r---
DATED this ~ day of April, 2009. 
Byl{~t~ 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney for Defend ts 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 20th day of April, 2009, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A Morrow 
Dennis R. Wilkinson 
MORROW DlNTIJS 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 8.3687 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
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[x] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[x] E-mail 
[ x] U.S. Mail 
[ J Hand Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ J Telecopy (Fax) 
[xl E-mail 
OOl03J.. 
William A. Morrow 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
MORROW DINIUS 
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201 
ISB No. 2451, 6023 
wmorrow@morrowdinius.com 
dwilkinson@morrowdinius.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. 
---------------------------------
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS 
WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DENNIS WILKINSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
.':-( I 
~~ ~ ~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS WILKINSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 'y':::",,"\l f 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I "--tJ (J 1 U tl ~ 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, 
and make this Affidavit on the basis of my own personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference as if set 
forth in full is a true and correct copy of the transcript from the March 31, 2009 continued 
deposition of R. Drew Thomas. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2009. 
Dennis Wilkinson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Dennis Wilkinson this 23rd day of April, 
2009. 
(SEAL) 
0(~m0~¥4: 
Notary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 01-19-2013 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise,ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
l09N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emrnett,ID 83617-0188 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 342-2927 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 365-4196 
cr&w..m:i~ 
for MORROW DINIUS 
ImtlT:\Clients\TIThomas, R Drew 2'1 9711Tbomas Motors, Inc,OOO\PleadingslAff of DPW.Response to 2nd SJdoc 
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SHEET 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. Case No. CV 2006-492 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEPOSITION OF R. DREW THOMAS 
March 31, 2009 
Boise, Idaho 
DEPOSITION OF R. DREW THOMAS, taken 
at the instance of the Defendants at the law offices of 
Morrow Dinius, 5680 East Franklin Road, in the City of 
Nampa, state of Idaho l commencing at 1: 30 p.m., on 
Tuesday, March ::n, 2009 1 before CONSTANCE S. SUey, CSR 
8187, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, 
pursuant to Notice and in accordan~e with the Idaho Rules 
of Clvil Procedure. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: MORROW DINIUS 
by Dennis P. Wilkinson, Esq. 
5680'East franklin Road 
suite 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
For the Defendants: HEPWORTH, JANIS , BRODY 
by John J. Janis, Esq. 
Post Office Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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NAMPA, IDAHO, TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 2009, 1:30 P. M. 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
produced as a witness at the instance of the Defendants, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows: 
EXAMINA nON 
BY MR. JANIS: 
Q Let the record reflect this is the time 
and place set for the continued, I guess, deposition of 
Drew Thomas which was first taken on June 26, 2007. 
15 Today is being taken pursuant to Notice and to be 
16 govemed by the Idaho Rules of CMI Procedure. 
17 Mr. Thomas, you are·· have you read the first deposition 
18 you took? 
19 A I have not. 
20 Q I mean ever? 
21 A Not completely, 
22 Q Because I meant to kind of ask it in two 
23 steps: Have you read it to kind of prepare for this 
24 deposition? 
25 A I have not. 
4 
CSB REPORTING 
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1 Q And then, secondly, I was going to ask you 1 Q Okay, and are you seeking employment, 
2 if you read it ever. 2 part-time employment or doing anything work-wise? 
3 A I have not read it completely ever. 3 A I'm on unemployment at the moment. I'm 
4 Q Okay; so at some point you read parts of 4 speaking with my prior employers, Lanny Berg, about a 
5 it, but more recently you haven't read any of it? 5 possible job with them when the weather changes, possibly 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
A Correct. 
Q Okay, but did you read anything else to 
kind of prepare for this deposition? 
A Briefly just some affidavit stuff. 
Q Yeah, that's good because that's what 
we're going to be talking about today. Before we get to 
that, though, are you currently working? 
A No. 
Q When did you stop working? 
A I was laid off from Bill Buckner Chrylser 
Jeep Dodge October 1st of '08 after the owner passed 
away. 
Q I'm sorry, after what? 
A After Don Ovitt passed away. 
Q So October I, 2008, that's about five or 
six months ago, I guess--
A Yes. 
Q _. is when you were laid off? 
A Yes. 
Q And so it wasn't a matter of you quitting 
5 
or a matter of you getting fired, it was, what would you 
call that, a reduction in force-type thing? 
A Yeah, they were reducing staff. 
Q And you were one of the casualties, I 
guess? 
A Yes. 
Q How much staff did they reduce other than 
8 you? 
9 A I don't know the exact number. I think, 
10 if I was guessing, probably four or fIVe people. 
11 Q And that was before the, I'll call it the, 
t2 Buckner agency or Buckner car company folded; r~ht? 
3 A This was prior to them, yes, closing the 
4 doors. 
5 Q The closing of the doors thing, I'm trying 
; to put in my head as to when it happened. I heard about 
I it when it happened, but was it a month ago or two? 
A I believe it was -- I want to say December 
sounds right. 
Q Oh, so it was only about two months before 
you were laid off? 
A After. 
Q You were laid off about two months before 
it happened? 
A Yes. 
6 
6 May, but we have not done anything in concrete. 
7 Q And would that be over here - we're not 
8 in caldwell. Would that be over there in caldwell? 
9 A Yeah. 
10 Q And are they running a new car business 
11 over there still or just a used car? 
12 A No, just a used car. Lanny sold the new 
13 car franchise. 
14 Q Lanny senior did? 
15 A Uh-huh. 
16 Q So when you say you're talking to Lanny, 
17 you're talking about Lanny junior? 
18 A Both senior and junior. 
19 Q Oh, both senior and junior still run the 
20 used car lot? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q I see, and, you know, I'm hearing, of 
23 course, you know what's going on in the car industry as 
24 we speak on a national level at least, I'm hearing at 
25 least that locally the dealerships, both used and new, 
7 
1 are, what's the word, having troubles, if you will. 
2 A Some of them. 
3 Q Do you know of ones that are doing well? 
4 I don't know of any that are doing well is the reason I'm 
5 asking. 
6 A My cousin works at Sundance, larry Miller 
7 Sundance Dodge, they're not breaking the bank by any 
8 means, but they're seeing a resurgence in profitability 
9 and in unit sales. 
10 Q You mean like this month-type thing, very 
11 recent? 
12 A Last month, this month. I talk to him 
13 periodically. 
14 Q But generally speaking, I mean, you 
15 probably know more about the car industry than I do --
16 A It's hurting. 
17 Q locally? I mean, it's consistent with the 
18 economic crisis we're dealing with and .-
19 A I would agree. 
20 Q Yeah. 
21 (Exhibit No.8 was marked for 
22 identification by the Notary Public.) 
23 Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you what's been 
24 marked as Exhibit No.8, do you recognize that as an 
25 affidavit you s~ned in the summer of 200n 
8 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And you understood that when you were 
3 signing this affidavit as it kind of says on the first 
4 page that it amounted to swom testimony on your 
5 behalf? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Or, excuse me, sworn testimony by you, not 
8 on your behalf. 
9 A Okay, yes. 
10 Q Let me ask you to turn to paragraph 12 
11 which is on page 5 and 6 and what I'll ask you to do 
12 right now is just to read it so you familiarize yourself. 
13 Are you there? 
14 A Uh-huh. 
Q Now, going over these affidavits is 
largely the reason we're here and I want to ask you some 
follow-up questions here. In the first deposition, which 
I can show you where I'm talking about if you likel you 
testified to me or you testifiedl not to mel several 
times that you never understood that you were going to 
21 get the Thomas Motors business for freel that you always 
22 understood you were going to pay something for it. Do 
you remember testifying to that effect? 
A Yes. 
Q Againl I have this all highlighted with 
1 stickies and the like. I could show you the excerpts 
2 because I know you told me earlier you had not read the 
3 deposition, do you want to do that? 
4 A Yeah. 
5 Q The ones I'm talking about here -- this is 
6 not going to be very good on the record -- are the green 
7 stickies, not the yellow onesl and ifs just the 
8 highlighted onesl not the non-highlighted ones. I should 
9 also tell you thafs not all of them. Thafs just places 
10 that I have it. Irs going to be a bit of reading, so 
11 we're going to go off the record for a second. 
12 (Pause in proceedings.) 
13 Q BY MR. JANIS: The depo excerpts, if you 
14 will, that you just read, would you agree with me that 
15 they baSically boil down to you testifying to the effect 
16 that you always understood that if and when there was 
17 going to be a transfer of the Thomas Motors business to 
18 you that you would never get it for free, but there would 
19 be some·· you'd have to pay something for it? 
120 A It all comes back to we had an agreement 
21 that if I left lanny Berg Chevrolet, came to Emmett, ran 
22 the store until he retired that it would be mine to take 
23 on to the next generation and, if sci, to the next 
24 generation. When you say "free,.' I expected, as I 
25 stated, that they should •• I had no problem with them 
10 
1 having something of a retirement check out of it and it 
2 would have been healthy for aU of us, but it comes back 
3 to one simple thing for me: If I leave Lanny Berg, go to 
4 Emmett and work the dealership, at the end of the day, 
5 which was around 63, he always said that it would be mine 
6 to take on for my lifetime and then my kids' lifetime. 
7 Q I'm asking a different question. 
8 A Okay. 
9 Q I was just looking at these depo excerpts 
10 and would you agree with me, for example, this first one 
11 says, this is you, "I never thought I was going to get 
12 this place for free. That never crossed my mind that I 
13 would ever get it for free." From that, I'm 
14 understanding that your understanding was you were always 
15 going to pay something for the business. 
16 A I was going to -- my labor and my time was 
17 a lot of what I figured was paying for the dealership. 
18 At the end when Dad got tired or wanted to retire or him 
19 and Mom wanted to travel that they would receive a small 
20 check. He always said I don't need much to live on, 
21 between 3 and 5,000, so I would take that as my labor and 
22 my time through the eight years probably in my opinion 
23 paid for the majority of the dealership, but I never 
24 wanted to have them not have anything or be involved. If 
25 they were still involved, that would have been great, 
11 
1 too. 
2 Q We're getting aside from my question here. 
3 I'm only trying to figure out when you testify that you 
4 never understood you were going to get the place for 
5 free, are you changing that testimony? Were you 
6 intending to change that testimony with this affidavit? 
7 A No, I can't say that I was. 
8 Q So it would be also true today as you said 
9 June of '07 that you always understood that regardless of 
10 how much it was going to be, you were going to pay your 
11 mom and dad something for the business? 
12 A I would agree. 
13 Q Okay, and that you did in fact have 
14 conversations with your dad about the amount over the 
15 years and that he said words to the effect that the 
16 amount would have something to do with how much he and 
17 your mom would need to live on; right? 
18 A No, it never was related to how much they 
19 would need to live on. It was related to they don't need 
20 much to live on and he proposed the amounts. I never 
21 proposed the amounts. 
22 Q Okay, but did you disagree with it? 
23 A I thought it was fair at the time. 
24 Q Okay, but the point of what I was trying 
25 to get at, and rm not trying to twist the words around 
12 
CSB REPORTING 
(208) 890-5198 OOl03J 
DEPOSITION 'REW THOMAS TAKEN ON lY.Lru"",,, 31,2009 
1 to something that they're not, I'm just trying to get 
2 that in the big picture of things that one, you 
3 understood at all times that you were going to pay 
4 something for it when it was transferred to you; right? 
5 A Again, John, I fett at the time when I 
6 left Berg my efforts and my time was worth something •• 
7 Q I got that, but you •• 
8 A •• but at the end of the day when he 
9 retired that if they needed some money to live on, Mom 
10 and him, I didn't have a problem with that at the time. 
11 Q Well, it wasn't an "if," tha~s my point. 
12 You said that you never understood you were going to get 
13 it for free. 
14 A That's correct. 
15 Q And you also said that you were going to 
16 pay them something at the end when it was transferred. 
17 A I had no problem with that. 
18 Q But thars what I'm telling you, that was 
19 your understanding? 
20 A It was my father's statement to me and I 
21 had not a problem with his statement. I never proposed 
22 it. He proposed it, I did not disagree with it. 
23 Q Lers put it this way: At no point during 
24 the time frames you ever talked about the transfer of the 
25 business to you or this agreement that serves as the 
13 
1 basis of this lawsuit did your dad ever say to you you'll 
2 get it for free; is that fair to say? 
3 A His statement was this place will be 
4 yours. 
5 Q But he never said •• 
6 A He never said the word "free." 
7 Q He never indicated to you in any way that 
8 the bUSiness would be given to you for free, did he? 
9 A It would be •• if you use that whole 
to sentence and dropped off the word IIfree," that would be 
J more accurate. It will be yours. Tha~s the agreement 
2 we had. 
3 Q The record is not going to do this well. 
; Is it correct to say that your dad never said to you that 
you would get this business for free; is that right? Is 
I that correct? 
A Okay, repeat it for me. 
Q Is it correct that your dad never said to 
you that you would be given this business for free? 
A He said when I retire, this business will 
be yours. 
Q Ifs a yes or no question. Did he ever 
say to you that he would give you •• 
A I don't remember him saying that exactly, 
no. 
14 
1 Q Okay; so the agreement that you are •• 
2 that you have filed this lawsuit against your mom and dad 
3 which has this oral agreement as its primary basis is not 
4 an agreement that you're claiming your mom or dad said or 
5 agreed that they would give you this business for free; 
6 is that fair? 
7 A Okay, our agreement was if you leave and 
8 come and do this, I will do this. 1-
9 Q Drew, you keep •• 
10 A Can I finish? I left. I did exactly what 
11 I said I would do all the way to the very last day that I 
12 said I would do it when the transfer of the ownership 
13 went to Bill Buckner. I held up my end of the bargain. 
14 I did what I said I would do. I did more than I said I 
15 would do and he never did one thing on his side that he 
16 agreed to do when I started there, so I mean, if we're 
17 trying to focus on the word "free," I don't know how to 
18 answer that. 
19 Q I'm trying to focus on getting an answer 
20 to my question which hasn't been answered yet. You have 
21 a lawsuit here against your mom and dad. 
22 A Right. 
23 Q You're claiming you had an oral agreement 
24 with them; right? 
25 A That's why I left Lanny Berg, yes. 
15 
1 Q You're claiming you had an oral agreement 
2 with them? Yes? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q I'm asking you now if that oral agreement, 
5 the substance of it was that they would give you the 
6 business for free? Yes or no? 
7 A I cannot remember him saying the word 
8 "free, II but I do remember him saying the rest of the 
9 sentence, I'll give you the business. 
10 Q Okay, I've heard you say that,like, seven 
11 or eight times. 
12 A And I've agreed that I have not heard him 
13 say the word 'Yree. II 
14 Q Okay, fine; so you agree with me at least 
15 that the agreement that you're suing on the basiS of in 
16 this lawsuit is not an agreement that you would get this 
17 business for free; right? 
18 A The word "free" I don~ ever remember 
19 being talked about. I'm not trying to be difficult. I 
20 don't remember him saying it's for free. He said for 
21 you, for your kids, for that, but he never maybe tattooed 
22 it with the word "free" at the end. 
23 Q Well, you know, the reason I had these 
24 deposition excerpts read by you is because it's you 
25 repeatedly saying that you never thought you would get 
16 
CSB REPORTING 
(208) 890-5198 0010 J 
ON OF R. DREW THOMAS T ~ MARCH 31, 2009 
SHEET 3 ___ -=-_______ ----, ,--_____________ _ 
1 the business for free. You knew that you would have to 
2 pay something for it. 
3 A I did not have a problem with that and his 
4 proposal·· 
5 Q No, hold on. 
6 A Okay. 
7 Q So my point of this is, does that 
8 testimony still represent the truth; that is, that you 
9 understood that under this agreement you were going to 
10 pay something for the business when it was transferred? 
11 A The business •• my understanding was if I 
12 fulfilled my end of the bargain that the business would 
13 pay them a check from 3 to 5,000 was his proposed number, 
14 that it wasn't free, I guess, is the answer you're 
15 looking for. 
16 Q Yeah, I just •• 
17 A I lived it. I know how it was, but ... 
18 Q Well, I didn't. 
19 A I know and I'm trying to get •• 
20 Q And you have a lawsuit thafs claiming as 
21 the primary thing we're talking about here is an oral 
22 agreement. 
23 A An agreement. 
24 Q What I've been trying to get now for quite 
25 some time is I want to know exactly what the terms of 
17 
1 that agreement are and so thafs why I'm asking a lot 
2 more questions about it and so specifically, today I'm 
3 dealing w~h the prior deposition and with this 
4 affidavit, that's where I'm going with all this. 
5 A Okay. 
6 Q And so what I'm reading in the deposition 
7 is you previously telling me quite a number of times that 
8 at the time the bUSiness was going to be taken over by 
9 you that there was going -- that through you that 
10 business would pay some kind of money to your mom and dad 
11 under the agreement. 
12 A I would agree with that. 
13 Q Okay, and that throughout the time frames 
14 we're talking about here, which I guess boil down to kind 
15 of '96 through 2004 or '5 or whatever -. 
16 A '6. 
17 Q _. 2006, I mean, it sold in January of 
18 2006; right? 
19 A Uh-huh. 
20 Q Yes? 
21 A I believe that is right. 
22 Q We'll just call it early 2006. 
23 A Okay. 
24 Q And throughout that time frame from when 
25 you first started talking about going to work there, 
18 
1 actually working there through the time it was sold, I 
2 understand that you did have a number of conversations 
3 with your dad wherein the subject of the amount that 
4 would be paid by the business through you was discussed. 
5 A Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of 
6 us. 
7 Q And the thrust of those conversations was 
8 him telling you that it had to do with the fact that they 
9 didn't need that much to live on, but it was amounts that 
10 they would be using to live on? 
11 A I would agree. 
12 Q And that while there had never been a 
13 specific agreement between you and your mom and dad as to 
14 whether ~ would be 3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere in 
15 between, that was the general range? 
16 A I agree. 
17 Q Okay; so then I am understanding that the 
18 agreement that is at the heart of this lawsuit is that in 
19 exchange for you going to do what you did, he would, that 
20 is your parents would, in exchange have the business 
21 transferred to you and you would in tum pay them through 
22 the business a stream of income somewhere in the range of 
23 3 to 5,000 a month? 
24 A I would agree with that. 
25 Q Okay, that's the agreement we're talking 
19 
1 about? 
2 A Okay. 
3 Q Correct? 
4 A Uh-huh. 
5 Q Yes? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Okay, that's the agreement that you're 
8 testifying is what's at issue in this lawsuit? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Okay. Now, I read •• can you use this 
11 deposition so I don't have to hover over your shoulder? 
12 MR. WIlKINSON: Sure. 
13 MR. JANIS: Just one more point on this 
14 one. Let me ask you to tum to page 87, line 18 to 19. 
15 Actually, read just 14 to 21. You'll see where I 
16 highlighted that part there. 
17 MR. WIlKINSON: Starting with "when"? 
18 MR. JANIS: Yeah. 
19 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
20 Q BY MR. JANIS: The one thing I had there 
21 that I was thinking of is the last part which I think 
22 you're quoting your dad. Yeah, it is, him saying that 
23 all I, "l" referring to Ron Thomas, want; right? 
24 A What line are you on? 
25 Q Three - well, 16. 
20 
CSB REPORTING 
(208) 890-5198 
DEPOSITION REW THOMAS TAKEN ON 31,2009 
1 A That all I want is a modest check out of 
2 the place when your mom and I retire. 
3 Q The "!,I in that sentence is Ron Thomas? 
4 A Uh-huh. 
5 Q Right? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And Ron then going on to tell you words to 
8 the effect of it donlt take me much to live, that I, Ron 
9 Thomas, don1t have to have a lot to live on, but I do 
10 want something out of the business; right? 
11 A Uh-huh. 
12 Q Is that a yes? 
13 A Yes, I read that. 
14 Q I mean, that's you telling me what your 
15 dad had told you? 
16 A And I believe he used the word Ifwell once 
17 in awhile, but at the time, I, we, my mom and dad, all 
18 and the same. 
19 Q Sure, and the only point that I was trying 
20 to get at, Drew, is in these conversations which you had 
21 over the years with your dad wherein there was a 
22 discussion about how much you would pay your mom and dad 
23 after the business was transferred that he was telling 
24 you that he wants something out of the business? 
25 A Yes. 
21 
1 Q And basically you were saying in effect, 
2 okay, I agree with that? 
3 A It was reasonable, yes, I agreed with 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
r.O 
1 
2 
3 
~ 
that. 
Q But there was just never a particular 
agreement reached on whether it would be 3,000, 5,000 or 
some particular number in between? 
A Correct. 
Q All right. Now, the next thing I wanted 
to ask you about this -- before I do that, it sounds like 
you had a number of conversations wherein this discussion 
about how much you would pay when the business 
transferred to you and it turned out to be something in 
the range of 3 to $5,000 that there were a number of 
those conversations, not just one of those. 
A Correct. 
Q Can you give me an estimate of how many 
times you had a conversation along those lines? 
A Throughout the years, at least once or 
twice a year, you know, so as many as 16, as few as 10. 
Q But it was always the same content it 
sounds like. 
A In that conversation, it was the same 
content, that when he retired that him and Mom would like 
:0 have a check or something from the business when it 
22 
1 moved on to my generation and then when I went on to 
2 retirement, my kids' generation and on and on is what he 
3 talked about. 
4 Q And the only point I was getting at is --
5 well, a couple of points, I guess. One, it was talked 
6 about whatever number of times you just said; in other 
7 words, a number of times over the years; correct? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And secondly, it sounds like the 
10 conversation went Similarly each time. 
11 A Basically. 
12 Q And so this notion that the agreement here 
13 is such that you agreed with your mom and dad that in 
14 exchange for your work and doing what you were doing that 
15 they would transfer the business to you and you in turn 
16 would pay them somewhere between 3 and $5,000, that was 
17 the substance of this conversation that took place once 
18 or twice a year for almost 10 years? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q All right, and did that include 
21 conversations that took place, in other words, is that 
22 conversations that took place before you actually went to 
23 work for Thomas Motors or what turned out to be Thomas 
24 Motors? I mean, I know it was Johannesen to start off 
25 with. 
23 
1 A rd have to think. I don't remember prior 
2 to me leaving Berg that specific conversation happening, 
3 but I can't say that it didn't. I do remember it at the 
4 dealership. 
5 Q Back to the affidavit which is Exhibit 8, 
6 paragraph 18, I just have some specific questions now 
7 about a couple of things in the affidavit. Paragraph 18 
8 makes reference to the fact that Thomas Motors was out of 
9 trust, if you will, for $300,000 somewhere in 2000, the 
10 year 2000. Do you see that? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Do you have a knowledge of how that 
13 300,000 was taken care of? There was a debt, basically, 
14 to Wells Fargo for the line of credit for $300,000. 
15 A Right we were out of trust by that 
16 much. 
17 Q And do you have a memory of how the 300--
18 how Wells Fargo was paid off? 
19 A We struggled -. we worked through _. Rob 
20 Wilde and I worked together through a gal named Vicky 
21 Perkins with Wells Fargo for a period of time and I don't 
22 exactly remember exactly how much time, but Rob, myself 
23 and even Dad, I think, was involved a little bit in 
24 having another bank come in and take out the Wells Fargo 
25 flooring line and pay everything current. 
24 
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1 Q So it was KeyBank that paid off Wells 1 this management contract is the amount that it talked 
2 Fargo? 2 about as your compensation. You were paid that amount 
3 A I believe that's right. 3 thereafter? 
4 Q And your dad you understood was signing 4 A My salary? 
5 off for the personal guarantee with KeyBank for the line 5 Q Right. 
6 of credit? 6 A Yes. 
7 A I would say that's correct. 7 Q So at least that part of the management 
8 Q So you understood, then, that your -- I'm 8 contract was continuing, ongoing, agreed to and followed 
9 not actually sure if it's your mom and dad or just your 9 up with? 
dad, but at least your dad started off the financing 10 A I believe that was in the same time frame, 
relationship with KeyBank 300,000 in the hole? 11 but by the time that carl Harder was no longer with us 
A Possibly. 12 and this never came back to me in any way, shape or form 
13 Q I mean, this thing, 300,000. 13 as far as copies and _. 
14 A That makes sense. Well, I'd have to look 14 Q All I'm asking about is one of the things 
15 back on the paperwork, maybe get with Rob and find out 15 this management contract says is what your salary is 
16 for sure, review it and see how much, if any, was paid 16 going to be from that date forward? 
17 down while we tried to operate through the transference 17 A Yes. 
18 of Wells Fargo to KeyBank. 18 Q And that was in fact your salary from that 
19 Q But at the very least, the lion's share of 19 date forward? 
the 300,000 was paid off by KeyBank? 20 A I believe that's right. 
A I would say that's correct. 21 Q And there was also in fact a commitment by 
Q And one of the reasons I ask about that is 22 your mom and dad to get the $300,000 that was -- the 
if you look at the management contract which is Exhibit 23 corporation was brought into compliance with its flooring 
4, if you turn to page 2 of it, section 5 it's called, do 24 line of credit with the bank at that point with the new 
you see it, working capital? 25 lending arrangements with KeyBank; right? 
1 A Uh-huh. 
2 Q It talks about the shareholders. That 
3 would be defined as Ron _. your mom and dad would loan to 
4 the corporation up to $300,000. Now, this is in the same 
5 time frame that your 300,000 -- that Thomas Motors, I 
6 mean, is $300,000 out of trust and this agreement which 
7 is being made at the same time is talking about Ron and 
8 Elaine lending 300,000 to the corporation. Did you 
9 understand that was for the purpose of dealing with this 
10 out-of-trust issue? 
11 A I did not. 
12 Q What was this for, then? 
13 A Working capital, as I understood it. 
14 Q And so did this agreement at all deal with 
15 this 300,000 out-of-trust·issue? 
16 A Not to my knowledge, no, it was 
17 separate. 
18 Q Kind of look at subsection "a" there. It 
19 says the 300,000 is •• its number one purpose is to 
20 "bringing corporation into compliance with its flooring 
21 line of credit with the bank." 
22 A That could be, but again, this agreement 
23 never came to fruition. I never had a way to make it 
24 enacted. 
25 Q Well, one thing that was enacted under 
26 
27 
1 A I don't understand your question. 
2 Q The new financial arrangement was made 
3 with KeyBank to arrange for a line of credit which in 
4 fact satisfied the 300,000 that was out of trust with 
5 Wells Fargo? 
6 A I believe, if I remember correctly, when 
7 KeyBank came into play and take Wells Fargo out that 
8 that, yes, was all covered. Now, again, I dont know how 
9 much we worked through exactly dollar amount-wise, but it 
10 was taken care of. 
11 Q It was your mother and father who were the 
12 persons that were personally responsible for that 
13 out-of-trust amount, whatever it was, at the time KeyBank 
14 took over? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And my point there, of course, is no one 
17 else was personally responsible for that money? 
18 A Not to my knowledge. 
19 Q Paragraph 19 of this affidavit, the first 
20 sentence, are you with me? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Basically, I'm looking at the part where 
23 it says "finandal difficulties, which had been caused by 
24 Ron's spending habits," do you see that? 
25 A Yes. 
28 
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1 Q What spending habits are you making 
2 reference to there? 
3 A There would be more details with my 
4 brothers' depositions and other folks that will be coming 
5 through, but the difficulties I seen that I had was there 
6 was a lot of money, exorbitant amount of money, going out 
7 for rent which I believe was used to support --
8 Q I'm sorry, I wasn't listening as well as I 
9 should have. Could you say that again? I apologize. 
10 A The money that Ron was taking as rent 
11 money out of the business he was supporting other 
12 businesses with, so that was -- I mean, it was a very --
13 it was 15 grand a month. It was a very difficult number 
14 to work with, so the difficulties we sustained was that 
15 cash flow could have sure helped us and not sustained to 
16 buy shop and other things. 
17 Q Do you know of any money being taken out 
18 of the Thomas Motors business by Ron or Elaine Thomas 
19 other than that which was used to pay rent? 
20 A Not to my -- I'd have to find out. I'd 
21 have to look into that. Not at this meeting I wouldn't 
22 be able to say. 
23 Q To tell you the truth, I've asked a few 
24 people this and not one person has identified a cent 
25 being taken out by them other than the rent and I'm just 
29 
1 wondering if you have any reason to disagree at all, 
2 whether it's a matter of Rob Wilde telling you or your 
3 brothers telling you or you saw something, I don't know, 
4 whatever. 
5 A I do have reasons to believe. 
6 Q Okay, hit me with it. 
7 A Well, I'd have to talk to a few people and 
8 get something thafs more than just my word saying I 
9 think I know. I can try to provide that for you. 
to Q I don't understand. Do you personally 
1 know that Ron or Elaine Thomas took anything out of the 
2 Thomas -- anything financial out of the Thomas Motors 
3 business, any money out of the Thomas Motors business 
l other than the amounts that were taken out for rent, that 
, were paid for rent? 
A There were checks cut other than rent. 
There was one for 70,000. I mean, Jan Rowers would be 
the one probably that could really define that for you. 
Q Would Rob Wilde be somebody that would 
know something about that? He was maintaining the 
company books at the time. 
A Possibly, but Jan and Penny were actually 
day to day at the dealership and they were the ones 
seeing the checks from upstairs go through Shirley and 
~on and checks other than rent would be the ones they 
30 
1 would know. 
2 Q But Rob at that point was doing monthly 
3 financials, wasn't he? 
4 A He was doing the financials on the 
5 information provided by Ron and Shirley to my 
6 knowledge. 
7 Q What was the 70,000 check for, to your 
8 knowledge, or at least whether you've heard it through 
9 the grapevine or otherwise? 
10 A No; John, I don't know exactly. I just 
11 know it was a check that never came back into the 
12 dealership checking per Jan. 
13 Q When was it? 
14 A I'd have to -- I don't know. I don't 
15 remember, but I remember it was done. 
16 Q You don't have any idea what year it was? 
17 . Was it close to the end? 
18 A No, no, it was probably, I would guess, 
19 '03ish, '04ish, right in that area. 
20 Q You understand in that time frame your dad 
21 was also and your mom were also writing checks going into 
22 Thomas Motors' business? 
23 A Uh-huh. 
24 Q You've seen those checks? 
25 A Uh-huh. 
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1 Q Yes? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Were you aware of those at the time they 
4 were being done? 
5 A Maybe not all of them, but I was aware of 
6 some. 
7 (Exhibit No. 9 was marked for 
8 identification by the Notary Public.) 
9 Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whafs been 
10 marked as Exhibit No. 9 - it might be a little confusing 
11 here. The green sticker represents the actual exhibit 
12 number. 
13 A Right. 
14 Q I mean, you can see the Exhibit E on the 
15 bottom, it was for a prior affidavit, so we're talking 
16 about Exhibit No. 9 for your deposition. Do you 
17 recognize those as copies of checks that were made out to 
18 Thomas Motors that were from your dad's rental, your mom 
19 and dad's rental, account? 
20 A I believe that would be correct. It looks 
21 right. 
22 Q And are these the checks you were just 
23 talking about that you were aware of that your mom and 
24 dad were writing into Thomas Motors, in other words, 
25 providing money to Thomas Motors from their own personal 
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I sources? 
2 A I don't recognize all of them, but there's 
3 a couple or three I do recognize. 
4 Q Tell me which ones. Uke the 75,000--
5 page 2 is February of '04,75,000, is that one? 
6 A I don't remember, no, thafs in '04. 
7 Q I went to that one first because the first 
8 page is kind of hard to read, but I can tell you it's 
9 March--
A -- 28th. 
Q Yeah, for 25,000. I have the originals 
somewhere, but anyhow, that's why I went to page 2. 
Which ones do you recognize? 
A It's been awhile, but I think I remember 
seeing the 10,000 and maybe one of the 30's, but the rest 
I don't remember. 
17 Q Well, what did you understand .- whatever 
18 checks you do recognize, you at least understood back 
19 then factually that your mom and dad were contributing 
20 monies into Thomas Motors as opposed to taking it out? 
21 A As well as spending and taking out, yes, 
new tools, new equipment. 
Q There's where I'm going. What do you 
understand was the purpose of these checks, the monies 
they were putting in out of their personal accounts? 
1 A Well, I would imagine -- it's my 
2 understanding it was money to operate the _. working 
3 capital. 
4 Q Did you understand, also, as you'll see if 
5 you tum to page, the cleaner copies, page 3, for 
6 exam~e, June '04, it says in the memo section "Company 
7 Loan"? 
8 A Uh-huh. 
9 Q Next one does the same; next one does the 
10 same; next one does the same. The rest of them basically 
11 do, that they're essentially boiling down to Ron and 
12 Elaine lending the Thomas Motors business money for 
13 working capital purposes? 
14 A Okay, I understand. 
15 Q I mean, is that right? 
16 A That sounds right. 
17 Q And did you have any diSCUSSions with your 
18 mom and dad back then about what was going on in that 
19 regard? 
20 A Not that I can specifically remember, 
21 no. 
22 Q Okay; so before I leave this subject, this 
23 spending habits reference in your affidavit, I guess I'm 
24 still not sure what you're talking about there. 
25 A Well, as far as the dealership side that I 
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1 seen and, again, there's all kind of facets, but, I mean, 
2 new hoists, new tools, knew machinery, new·- I mean, 
3 just it was a spend, spend. I mean, we needed to rein it 
4 in a little bit and it just seemed like the more harder 
5 we worked to try to get ahead the more he would spend. 
6 Q Well, I'm just lOOking through the checks, 
7 it looks he writing quite a bit of money into the 
8 business as well. 
9 A Putting it back in, yeah. 
10 Q So when you're talking about spending 
11 habits here in paragraph 19 of Exhibit 8, you're talking 
12 about him causing new equipment, business-related things, 
13 being purchased; is that the idea? 
14 A To my knowledge, yes .. 
15 Q Let me ask this kind of big picture 
16 question: The agreement that serves as the baSis for 
17 this lawsuit, that you're claiming in this lawsuit, okay, 
18 let's say that actually came to fruition, it happened. 
19 At the time the business would be transferred to you, 
20 lefs just call that March of '06 time frame, tell me in 
21 your mind based on that agreement who on each side of the 
22 agreement, that is, you and your mom and dad, who would 
23 do what, who would pay what, who would get what? 
24 A What Ron told me was when he denied he was 
25 selling the dealership •• 
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1 Q No, forget the actual what happened. I 
2 just want to know your understanding of the agreement. 
3 A Okay. 
4 Q Who was going to get what, who was going 
5 to do what, who was going pay what? 
6 A The way he described it was that when he 
7 retired that him and Mom would take a small check, not 
8 much, but everything would come over to the dealership, 
9 the checkbook. I believe even Aunt Shirley was going to 
10 actually be moving in with us which I had no problem with 
11 because that's his direct connection to the bUSinesses, 
12 so we would be in control of the spending, how the money 
13 was spent, where it was going, that type of thing. 
14 Q So you understood that if the agreement 
15 materialized that they would be getting this small check? 
16 That's the 3 to $5,000 thing we talked about before? 
17 A Uh-huh. 
18 Q Correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And what about the debt of the business 
21 that would exist? It has to have debt at some point that 
22 the transfer is made. 
23 A My dad told me he would stay in the saddle 
24 through the transition until we could get everything 
25 transferred into my name and move on. 
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1 Q I don't understand what -- well, it 
2 doesn't matter if I understand it, what do you understand 
3 that to mean? 
4 A I understood that he would still be a 
5 guarantor while I seeked financial possibilities to 
6 actually move them complete~ out, but that he said that 
7 he would stay _. his words were I'll stay in the saddle 
8 with you until we can get that done, everything will be 
9 fine. 
10 Q So that would leave open, you know1 kind 
of a bunch of possibilities, then, as one, how long. 
A Huge possibilities. 
Q Right? 
A Yes. 
Q Kind of infinite almost in fact; right? 
A Well, hopeful~, get something done so 
they can enjoy their retirement. 
Q So number one that would be left open is 
how long he would have to "stay in the saddle"; right? 
A Correct. 
Q I mean, that could be a short period of 
time, it could be a long period of time? 
A Correct. 
Q But there had been no specific agreement 
as to, like, cutting it off at some 
1 A Not that I remember, no. 
2 Q So basical~ indefintte and a period of 
3 time that would have to be dealt wtth down the road? 
4 A I would agree. 
S Q The other thing that you talked about is 
6 that him staying in the saddle would be to provide some 
7 financial backing while you were trying to obtain your 
8 own personal financing? 
9 A Right, whether it be a partner or 
o whatever, yes. 
1 Q And rve heard you make reference to that 
~ before and as I prepared for this depo, I'm reminded you 
I testified about this eanier, too, that the prospect 
existed that you would have a partner in this business. 
I mean, did you have somebody real~ in mind? 
A Roy Long was one, Ontario Auto Brokers. 
lanny Berg, I was going to propose something with him, 
but I think if the word would have got out, Don Ovttt 
would have probably been a poSSibility, but we never got 
to that point. 
MR. JANIS: Off the record. 
(Off the record discussion.) 
Q BY MR. JANIS: But in any event, the point 
'las that you understood under this agreement that you had 
vith your dad that again serves as the basis for this 
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1 lawsuit that at the time of transfer, your dad's 
2 obligation would actual~ be ongoing for awhile to serve 
3 as financial backing while you dea~ with this question 
4 of obtaining finanCing yourself? 
5 A I would agree with that. 
6 Q And, again, how long that would take place 
7 is just uncertain? 
8 A Uncertain I would agree with. 
9 Q And there were several things or several 
10 avenues that you could pursue in the way of obtaining 
11 some kind of financing that would cut off your dad's 
12 ongoing responsibility to stay in the saddle; right? 
13 A I agree. 
14 Q One of which would be getting a partner? 
15 A Possible. 
16 Q And you already had some people in your 
17 head. Had you talked to those guys about this? 
18 A We never had got that far, John. 
19 Q Okay, but at least in your head you had 
20 some thoughts as to who might be partners; right? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q And when you said Lanny Berg, by the waYI 
23 did you say junior or senior or both? 
24 A I didn't say either one. I would have 
25 talked to both. 
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1 Q Okay, but then, of course, what 
2 arrangement you would have to have with any such partner, 
3 that, too, was up in the air and subject to future 
4 negotiation; right? 
5 A I would agree. 
6 Q Another altemative that would exist at 
7 the time of transfer and, again, which would dictate when 
8 your dad would be relieved of any ongoing obligation 
9 under the agreement to stay on board with some financing 
10 assistance is for you to obtain a line of credit without 
11 a partner? 
12 A That would be a possibility, probab~ not 
13 as Iike~. 
14 Q Well, thafs the question I was having in 
15 my head. Did you have in your mind at some point which 
16 would be the like~ avenue you would pursue? 
17 A Uke~ with a partner, Dad being a partner 
18 out of the gate and then transfer to another. 
19 Q So in order for the transfer to become 
20 complete and for the time for your dad's performance to 
21 end, it would have to be subject to you working out a 
22 deal with one of these partner types? 
23 A I would agree. 
24 Q And even then, whenever that would take 
25 ~ace, there would have to be some discussion, if you 
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1 will, because even then the would still have 
2 some debt and some receivables outstanding; right? 
3 A I would agree with that, yeah. 
4 Q I mean, that would always be true. Just 
5 pick out a date at random and there's going to be some 
6 debt and there's going to be some receivables due; 
7 right? 
8 A I would agree. 
9 Q And it is, of course, conceivable that at 
10 the time that transfer took place, in other words, when 
11 you found a partner to help you finance the operation and 
12 so your dad doesn't have to be involved any more, that 
13 the debt at that point could be substantial. 
14 A Possible. 
15 Q And so you1d have to work out who would be 
16 responsible for that debt or do you think you had worked 
17 that out already? 
18 A We'd have to work that out. 
Q And had you had any discussions about this 
money that I was talking about that were contributed by 
your mom and dad for working capital purposes and several 
of the checks indicated they were intended as being loans 
whether that would be part of the debt that would be paid 
back to them? 
A Never had that conversation. 
1 Q So how that part would be treated would 
2 still be subject to future discussion? 
3 A Correct. 
4 Q Then, of course, another part of the debt 
5 that would exist at the time of any particular transfer 
6 would be whatever the existing line of credit is or, 
7 excuse me, what the balance is with the line of credit 
8 with the lending instttution that your dad had; right? 
9 A I didn't understand the question. 
10 Q Yeah, because it was a bad question is 
11 why. I was stumbling through it for sure, but all I was 
12 trying to get at is that at any particular point another 
13 debt tha~s going to exist for the business is the line 
14 of credit with the bank and whatever the balance is? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q And we know, for example, because I think 
17 your affidavit says, that at the time it was sold to 
18 Buckner the debt to the bank was approximate~ $200,000. 
r19 that sound consistent with your memory? 
20 A It sounds consistent. 
21 Q I could proba~ find it in this affidavit 
22 if you make me look for it. I'm not finding it in the 
23 affidavit right away, so let's move on and talk about the 
24 second affidavit. 
25 
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1 (Exhibit No. 10 was marked for 
2 identification by the Notary Public.) 
3 Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you whats marked 
4 as Deposition Exhibit No. 10, that's a second affidavit 
5 you filed in this case; is that right? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q I found it. I'm going back to Exhibit No. 
8 8, paragraph No. 24, its on page 10. 
9 A Uh-huh. 
10 Q You're talking about -- see the very last 
11 sentence there, last two lines? 
12 A Uh-huh. 
13 Q By the time he sold Thomas Motors in 2006, 
14 Thomas Motors owed more than $200,000 on the flooring 
15 line issued by KeyBank? 
16 A I believe that's correct. 
17 Q So I assume that you said that in an 
18 affidavit that was filed in August of 2007 that at the 
19 time you would have put that you would have been certain 
20 of those facts? 
21 A I believe that's correct. 
22 Q Let's go back to this now Exhibit 10. 
23 This is the affidavit you submitted in April of 2008. Do 
24 you see the date on page 3 there? 
25 A Uh-huh. 
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1 Q Let me ask you to tum to paragraph 5 at 
2 page 2. This has to do with this land issue and I know 
3 you've attended a few hearings and you've heard about 
4 this land issue and as I understand what you're saying in 
5 this affidavit is that you understood that part and 
6 parcel of the agreement you had with your mom and dad 
7 about the bUSiness being transferred to you was not just 
8 the business and whatever assets the business owned, but 
9 the land on which it was situated? 
10 A Correct. 
11 Q And when you say the land on which it was 
12 situated - I actual~ said those words. You said "the 
13 real property that Thomas Motors was on," what does that 
14 mean? 
15 A The way I understood it was the complete 
16 amount of land that the dealership sat on on that side of 
17 the street, that the money that we were paying to rent 
18 was paying on the complete property. At one time my dad 
19 told me he was making double payments on all of the 
20 property so when we did expand, we had more room. We 
21 were going to face it to the west. 
22 Q Hopeful~, I don't have to drag the 
23 agreements out here. Would that track with the 
24 commerdallease written agreement and what parcels were 
25 being discussed in those documents? Do you see what I'm 
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·1 saying? 
2 A The way my dad talked about it was, again, 
3 he was making double payments on the whole property 
4 and·-
S Q I don't know what you mean the whole 
6 property. 
7 A Everything that was encompassed on the 
8 south side of the highway that we owned, all the parcels. 
9 Q That we owned? 
10 A That our family owned or Ron Thomas and 
11 Elaine Thomas owned. 
12 Q So it's my understanding that all they 
13 owned out there on the same side where Thomas Motors is 
14 located is neighborhoodish of eight acres; does that 
15 sound about right? 
16 A Roughly. 
17 Q Maybe it was nine. 
18 A I think it was seven. 
19 Q Oh, maybe it was seven point something. 
20 A I believe that's right. 
21 Q But that Thomas Motors was effectively 
22 using only a part of it. 
23 A We were using a part of it, yes, 
24 correct. 
25 Q So when you're talking about the land 
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1 being part of the deal that was going to be transferred 
2 to you, are you talking the part that Thomas Motors was 
3 using or the entire seven point something acres? 
4 A The entire seven point was what Ron, what 
5 my dad, told me. For the expansion, he talked about a 
6 little Kellogg. He talked about a huge growth and we 
7 would need that property to remodel and change the face 
8 of the dealership which he had me working on somewhat 
9 with ideas. 
o Q And so your understanding of the agreement 
1 of having the business always contemplated the business 
? would be located where it actually was located, not 
l moving it anywhere? 
I A Correct, the building, right. 
Q And so as I understand what you're telling 
me, then, your understanding of the agreement is that the 
land was simply part and parcel of the whole deal? 
A It was and part of the reasoning if this 
helps was when we had enough inventory which we were 
cramped, the north side of the building, between it and 
Highway 16, was really small. The east side of the 
building was very small. Because of the street, we 
:ouldn't expand that way, so the only thing that made 
ense was we would take the west side of the building and 
lake that the face and that's why he had the new approach 
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1 way put in off of the highway legally so we could use 
2 that as an approach way to the new frontage of the 
3 dealership when we expanded. Tha~s why that new 
4 entranceway was put in by my dad. 
5 Q So from your perspective, then, the 
6 agreement about getting the business was basically 
7 inextricably interwoven with the land? 
8 A Yes, correct. 
9 Q Otherwise stated, the agreement that you 
10 had·· in other words, the agreement tha~s at issue in 
11 this case, your understanding of the agreement you had 
12 with your mom and dad that the business would be 
13 transferred to you at or about retirement at or about 63 
14 based on the terms we've been talking about all morning 
15 was a packaged deal, bUSiness and land? 
16 A The way I understood it through the years, 
17 yes. He never had a conversation where he ever said 
18 anything about separating the two, it was all one piece 
19 for expansion in the future for my generation, for my 
20 kids' generation, tha~s why we needed the land. 
21 Q And I take it from your standpoint it's 
22 kind of like with one comes the other; right? 
23 A The way I understood it. I mean, John, we 
24 walked the property, drove the property talking about the 
25 new ideas and how we were going to do it. 
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1 Q So it was never a deal in your mind that 
2 the business was separate or divisible from the land? 
3 A Correct, not the way I understood it with 
4 all of the conversations we had. You couldn't have had 
5 it separated for the plans that he had. You wouldn't 
6 have had any room. 
7 Q So as far as the agreement as far as 
8 you're concerned, the two are indivisible? 
9 A Yes, I would agree. 
10 Q You know from the agreements that are 
11 marked as Exhibits 4,5 and .- no, excuse me, 3, 4 and 5 
12 to your first deposition, actually particularly Exhibit 
13 5, there is in the sale of the business assets, there's a 
14 certain price. We're talking about the written contracts 
15 that were prepared in or around August and September of 
16 2000, okay? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q That as drafted by Carl Harder and as 
19 signed by you at one point that the sale of the business 
20 assets had one price and the other part of the deal was 
21 to lease the land with an eventual purchase price. 
22 A Correct, which would all be together. 
23 Q But I mean, there were two separate 
24 written agreements with two different prices, in other 
25 words. 
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1 A Okay, I understand. 
2 Q I mean! thafs true, isn't it? 
3 A I believe thafs right. 
4 Q I mean, we can just look at it and see the 
5 commercial lease has lease terms and the option at the 
6 end amount. The rent term is on page 2 of 10,000 a month 
7 for parcel one. Do you see where I'm at? 
8 A Uh-huh. 
9 Q You know! you can see this. I'm not 
10 trying to be specifIC, just that it had a specified rent 
payment and then an eventual purchase amount~ right? 
A Agreed. 
Q And then the sale of bUSiness assets had 
an entirely different purchase price for what the assets 
15 would cost or be valued at? 
16 A Agreed. 
17 Q Okay. Now, so when we're talking about 
18 the amount that you agreed to pay your mom and dad of 
19 this uncertain somewhere 3 and $5,000 a month, is that 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
part of the land, too, or do you pay separate for the 
land as was done in the written contract? 
A I would say the 3 to 5 would be a separate 
check from the business, not from the land. 
Q You lost me there. I understand that 
you're saying, in fact these written contracts 
contemplate, that you could assign the obligations to a 
corporate entity that you prepare so that if the business 
had ultimately been transferred to you, Drew Thomas, you 
may have been turned it into something called Drew Thomas 
Motors or something like that. 
A Black canyon Dodge was the name I 
preferred. 
Q Okay; so you were planning on creating a 
business entity to serve as the actual owner of the 
business? 
A I would agree. 
Q And that if the payments were going to be 
made pursuant to the agreement to your mom and dad of 
14 this somewhere between 3 and $5,000 a month, it would 
15 actually be made by that business entity, albeit you 
16 would be the one authorizing the payments? 
17 A I would agree. 
18 Q Okay; so now what I'm trying to get at 
19 here is would the land based on your understanding of the 
20 agreement reached with your mom and dad, would that be 
21 something dea~ with separately and apart from the 
22 business paying 3 to $5,000 for the transfer of the 
23 business? 
24 A I would agree. 
25 Q It would be something different? 
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1 A The payment or, say, call it a retirement 
2 payment? 
3 Q No, no. Would you pay separately for the 
4 land is the easier way to ask it? 
5 A Would I pay separately to --
6 Q Have the right to either rent the land or 
7 purchase the land other than this 3 to $5/000 a month 
8 you'd pay your mom and dad? 
9 A I would agree. 
10 Q That you would pay something else? 
11 A I would agree. 
12 Q But you just hadn't worked out how much 
13 you would pay? I mean, you had this commercial lease 
14 agreement, but it's your view that this commercial lease 
15 agreement has no force and effect? 
16 A It never came to fruition at all. 
17 Q Okay; so ~'s your view the commercial 
18 lease agreement has no force and effect; right? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q All right; so you otherwise believe that 
21 there would be an amount that you would pay for either 
22 the renting or purchase of the property, the real 
23 property, aside from the 3 to $5/000 a month you would 
24 pay your mom and dad for the business? 
25 A Okay, I get you. We never diSCUssed 
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1 whether that would be involved together and separated out 
2 or if it would be together. We never discussed that 
3 part. 
4 Q So that was to be another part that would 
5 be negotiated at the time of transfer? 
6 A According to my dad, yeah. 
7 Q And according to you? 
8 A Yeah, would have had to have been talked 
9 about sooner or later. 
10 Q Would you have at least expected _. well, 
11 strike that. You tell me, what would you have expected 
12 to have happen relatiVe to the real property? Would you 
13 have to pay separate for it something? 
14 A I would imagine. 
15 MR. JANIS: can I have just a couple of 
16 minutes? 
17 (Recess.) 
18 Q BY MR. JANIS: Okay, lefs wrap this up 
19 here. Drew, let me just say this as we wrap this up and 
20 the reason we are here again is at least I thought there 
21 was some apparent confUSion on what is it that represents 
22 the terms of this agreement and whether there was a 
23 change from what was the deposition to the affidavits or 
24 whatever and again, I'm not being accusatory here, rm 
25 just saying thafs what led to this. That's all I'm 
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1 saying. 
2 A But I'm still a little confused on the 
3 question about this against what I agreed to do with my 
4 dad. It's like they're intertwined, but this doesn't 
5 even come into what I agreed to with him, so that's where 
6 I was confused. 
7 Q The record is going to be bad on what 
8 you're saying herel Drew, and let me tell you what I am 
9 understanding because I think I know what you're saying. 
10 When you're saying "this," you're talking about the 
11 written contracts that you signed in September of 2000, 
12 you're saying they have nothing to do with this? 
13 A That dealt separately with the land. What 
14 I'm saying is when I agreed to come over from Berg to my 
15 dad and this never came to fruition, this never 
16 happened _. 
17 Q The written contract? 
18 A .- the written contract never happened, he 
19 said when I retire, the business is yours which included 
20 the land so we could expand and Mom and him would take a 
21 modest check out for retirement. Thafs all it was, and 
22 so he goes get back to work, dig in, you're worrying too 
23 much, I've got this taken care of. 
24 Q But I thought before the break you were 
25 telling me besides this modest retirement that they'd be 
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1 "paid" that for the land part you would have expected to 
2 have to pay something else, either in the form of a lease 
3 or an actual purchase price or something besides the 
4 modest-· 
5 A Not according to Ron, no, that was not our 
6 agreement. In this it dealt with it separately, but this 
7 he never pushed through. This was never done and, again, 
8 I was told why would you want to buy something I'm giving 
9 to you, you're worrying too much, get back to work, so I 
.0 did and from this point on to the end of the sale, that's 
1 exactly what I did. 
2 Q And this, again, probably illustrates Why 
3 we're having this deposition because now I'm confused 
~ again, but let me try to put this in what I believe you 
. are telling me in my words, but what you are telling me 
and you correct me if I'm wrong, how is that? I'm 
understanding that the agreement that you're claiming 
that is the basis of this lawsuit had certain terms, 
conditions, if you will, that would have happened had it 
gone to fruition. Are you with me so far? . 
A Are we talking about this [indicating]? 
Q No, I'm talking about the agreement that 
you're claiming in this lawsuit. Let's dose the book on 
this for the moment. 
A Okay. 
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1 Q I'm going to stand while I think this out. 
2 Okay, you're claiming in this lawsuit that you had an 
3 oral agreement with your mother and father that had 
4 certain terms or conditions. Am I right so far? 
5 A Such as if you -
6 Q Just that it has certain terms and 
7 conditions. 
8 A Okay. 
9 Q We're going to get to what they are in a 
10 minute. 
11 A Okay, I agree. 
12 Q So far you're with me? 
13 A So far I'm with you. 
14 Q All right, because before I leave this 
15 deposition, what I want to understand is exactly what 
16 those terms and conditions are, and here's what I 
17 understand you've told me today or clarified again for me 
18 today that at the time had this deal actually occurred, 
19 materialized, happened _. 
20 A Upon his retirement 
21 Q -- upon his retirement at or about 63 
22 years old and the transfer of the business took place, 
23 one of the conditions that would have happened is that 
24 you would pay your mom and dad some stream of monthly 
25 income between 3 and $5,000. 
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1 A Correct. 
2 Q Another condition that would have happened 
3 is your dad would have stayed in the saddle, as you put 
4 it or that he put it, that is to say, he would have 
5 continued his involvement in the buSiness largely for his 
6 financing reasons while you sought financing elsewhere, 
7 financing options elsewhere. 
8 A Agreed. 
9 Q And so a condition of the agreement that 
10 serves as the basis of this lawsuit is that Ron Thomas 
11 would have had to stay connected with the business 
12 insofar as a financial commitment? 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q And then in the undetermined future, from 
15 that point you would be able to obtain some kind of 
16 finandng option which would then relieve him of the 
17 obligation to continue staying in the saddle, that is, 
18 staying connected with the business financially? 
19 A For the flooring line. 
20 Q But he'd be out of the business 
21 a~ogether? 
22 A Right. 
23 Q Other than receiving 3 to $5,000 a 
24 month? 
25 A Right. 
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1 Q And that it is impossible to tell at this 
2 point that had the business been transferred to you how 
3 long it would have taken you to obtain this alternative 
4 financing? 
5 A Correct. It could have been short, it 
6 could have been medium, it could have been long. 
7 Q In fact, there were various options and 
8 it's impossible to predict which of those would have 
9 happened, too? 
10 A Correct. 
11 Q So there really is no telling when Ron 
12 under the agreement that serves as the basis of this 
13 lawsuit that Ron Thomas and by connection Elaine Thomas 
14 would be completely out of the financial commitment 
15 picture; right? 
16 A I didn't understand. 
17 Q Sure. Based on what we just talked about 
18 that one of the conditions of the agreement would be that 
19 while you are paying them through your bUSiness the 3 to 
20 $5,000 a month, Ron and by connection Elaine are 
21 continuing their financial commitment to the business to 
22 serve as financial backing; right? 
23 A Until such time, correct. 
24 Q Right; so based on what was actually going 
25 to happen in your mind as the conditions of this 
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1 agreement, it is impossible to tell how long it would 
2 have taken for them to be completely relieved of any 
3 obligations for financial backing associated with the 
4 business because you don't know how long it would have 
5 taken you to get your alternative financing; right? 
6 A Correct. 
7 Q Okay. All right, and another thing that 
8 is basically a condition of the agreement would be that 
9 there would have to be some diSCUSSion between you and 
10 your dad and by connection your mother as to what would 
11 happen with the debt that the business had as of the time 
12 he would have been completely relieved of his financial 
13 backing obligation; right? 
14 A The way he stated that on the debt, we 
15 would work out of the debt, whether you reduce inventory, 
16 whatever you do to reduce some debt. 
17 Q But at the time of transfer, as we talked 
18 about before, there's got to be some debt. 
19 A Correct, I would agree. 
20 Q And so the question as to who was going to 
21 pay what part of the debt was still open? 
22 A Was not discussed, correct. 
23 Q And so that was left as a condition of the 
24 deal that would have to be met one way or the other, but 
25 it was left for future negotiation? 
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1 A Correct. 
2 Q And another condition that I can think of 
3 that I don~ think we talked about actually so far is 
4 that in order for you to continue with the business, 
5 whether under the name you told me about before or some 
6 other name, you would have to be, you, Drew, would have 
7 to bel approved as an authorized franchise owner by Dodge 
8 Chrysler. 
9 A Or have a partner that could bel but yesl 
10 you would have to be authorized. 
11 Q And if that couldn't happen, the deal 
12 couldn't happen; correct? 
13 A Correct. 
14 Q And so that, too, was a condition of the 
15 agreement that was left to be dealt with after the 
16 transfer took place? 
17 A During the transfer and afterl yes. 
18 Q During the transfer process, it would have 
19 to be dea~ with? 
20 A You would have to discuss it. 
21 Q And one of the possibilities is it may 
22 have been the case that you personally would not have 
23 been solely approved to be a franchise owner by Dodge 
24 Chrysler, that it would have required you to be involved 
25 with somebody else? 
59 
1 A Possibly, but not impossible either. 
2 You'd have to walk into that water to find out at the 
3 time. 
4 Q Exactly, and thafs precisely what I'm 
5 understanding is the bottom line is we don't know, we'd 
6 have to try it before you figure out what actually 
7 happened in that regard. 
8 A And like Dad said, he would stay with me 
9 through that transition until we could get that 
10 accomplished. 
11 Q But there's no guarantee it could be 
12 accomplished. Ifs just an open question is the bottom 
13 line. 
14 A No guarantee it couldn't, but you could 
15 look at it --
16 Q Either way? 
17 A Either way. 
18 Q That's my point is ifs a condition of the 
19 agreement that would have to be dea~ with one way or the 
20 other and there is no ability to predict what would have 
21 happened either way on that particular point. 
22 A Well, we both could predict, but truly, 
23 the outcome we couldn't say. 
24 Q Okay. Now, what rve tried to do after 
25 the break is kind of review with you what I have 
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,------------------------------------, understood you to testify would have been the terms of 1 REPORTER' S CERTIFICATE 
the agreement, would have been the conditions in order to : 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
make the agreement complete, who would have had to do 
what, who would have had to pay what, and in your mind, 
are there any other conditions, terms of the agreement 
that we have not discussed that would have had to have 
been dealt with at the time of transfer? 
A No. 
MR. JANIS: Okay, that's all the questions 
I have, then. 
MR. WIlKINSON: Thanks. 
(The Deposition concluded at 2:50 p.m.) 
(Signature requested.) 
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3 STATE OF _______ : 
5 
6 
ss. 
COUNTY ~,. _______ , 
I, R. DREW THOMAS, being first duly sworn 
on my oath, depose and say: 
That I am the witness named in the 
9 foregoing deposition taken the 31st day of March, 2009, 
10 ccn~isting of pages numbered 1 to 61J inclusive; that I 
11 have read the said deposition and know the contents 
12 thereof; that the questions contained therein were 
13 propounded to me; that the answers to said questions were 
14 given by me, and that the answers as contained therein 
15 (or as corrected by me on the change sheet) are true and 
16 correct. 
17 
18 
19 
S~gnature 
70 Subscribed and sworn to before me th1S 
21 ___ day of _____ , 2009, at ____ , Idaho. 
22 
23 
24 
15 
Notary PUbl~c for Idaho 
Residing at , Idaho. 
My Comnuss1on Exp1res ____ _ 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
55. 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
5 
6 I, CONSTANCE S. BUCY, a Notary Public in and for 
the State of Idaho, do hereby certify: 
That prior to being examined, the witness named 
9 in the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to 
10 testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
11 truth; 
12 That said depOSition was taken down by me in 
13 shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
14 thereafter reduced to computerized transcription under my 
15 direction and supervision, and I hereby certify the 
16 foregoing deposition is a full, true and correct 
17 transcript of my shorthand notes so taken; 
18 I fUrther certify that I have no interest in the 
19 event of the action. 
20 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my 
21 name this 1st day of April, 2009. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Notary Public in and for the State of 
Idaho, residing in Wilder, Idaho. 
My commission expires 8-25-12. CSR ~lB7 
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INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff's response to the defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
largely boils down to avoiding the applicable facts and law which serves as the basis of the Motion 
to begin with. This includes the plaintiff ignoring his own clear and unequivocal sworn testimony, 
as well as the basic principles of contract law that apply to such testimony. This does not amount 
to a serious opposi tion to the Motion, and certainly does not raise a genuine issue of triable fact here. 
The questions presented on this Summary Judgment Motion involve the application of pure legal 
principles to undisputed fact, and it is frankly clearer than ever at this point that summary judgment 
is warranted. 
THE HARBAUGH CASE IS IRRELEVANT HERE 
The plaintiff inexplicably begins its response to the defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment with a discussion of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Harbaugh v.Myron Harbaugh 
"10(01', Inc, 100 Idaho 295,597 Pld 18 (1979). In Harbaugh, the two plaintiffs claimed they had 
an agreement with their father that in addition to their salary, they would receive a credit of 25% and 
30% respectively ofthe net profits of the business, which would be used toward the purchase of the 
business, After the father died, their stepmother "denied that such a contract existed." Harbaugh. 
100 Idaho al 298 That was the basic dispute, and the Supreme COUlt properly recognized they could 
not as a matter of law say no contract was entered into between appellants and their deceased father. 
Harbaugh, 100 Idaho al 298 The case was accordingly remanded. Id The bottom line is the 
Harbaugh case deals with a question of whether there was enough evidence to give rise to a triable 
issue of fact over whether a contract was ever made to begin with. It was not a dispute over the 
specific terms of an agreement, or whether it was legally enforceable, but a question about whether 
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the contract was agreed to or not. 
That has absolutely nothing to do with the issues presented in this case. The defense 
frankly thought this was quite obvious. But, if it needs to be said, the defendants would offer the 
following - they are not arguing on this motion that this Court should rule as a matter of law there 
as no actual agreement of any kind reached between these parties. For all pwposes connected with 
this Motion, and based on the standards applicable to summary judgment motions, the defendants 
are assuming the plaintiff's claim that there was an agreement reached is true and accurate. 
What is being argued here, however, is that the agreement the plaintiff'is claiming 
was reached with the defendants is legally unenforceable as a matter of very clear Idaho law, for a 
number of reasons. All of this is based on accepting the plaintiffs allegations as true. Even 
accepting the plaintiff's claim as to what agreement was reached with the defendants, it is basically 
undisputed at this point that there were material and essential tenus of the agreement that were never 
agreed upon between the parties, according to the plaintiff himself. In addition, there is a legally 
unenforceable part of the contract based on the application of the Statute of Frauds that is entirely 
"indivisible" from the remaining part of the contract, again according to the plaintiff himself, thus 
rendering the agreement unenfolceable under Idaho law for that reason as well. 
In short, the Harbaugh case has nothing to do with the arguments being made on this 
Motion. 
THE PRICE ISSUE 
On this issue about whether price was 01 was not a term of the claimed oral 
agreement, the plaintiff either misses or ignores the basic point made by the defense. The plaintiff 
actually argues the situation today is the same as it was when the Court ruled on the first Motion for 
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Summary Judgment some 16 months ago. This ignores the plaintiff's more recent deposition 
testimony given just weeks ago that served as the basis of this part of the defendants' Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
In fact, as the defendants stated in their opening submittals, one of the basic reasons 
to take the continued deposition of the plaintiff was the confusion caused by this price issue and 
whether or not the plaintiff was claiming that price was or was not a term of the subject oral 
agreement. The primary point made by the defense on this particular issue is that the plaintiff's most 
recent deposition undeniably indicated that the price was in fact a term of the agreement, but that no 
specific amount had been agreed upon. To this end, the defense provided the Court in its brief with 
numerous excerpts of the plaintiff's most recent deposition that clearly established this now 
undisputed fact. Examples of how clear this was established by the p!aintifr s own testimony are as 
follows: 
- The plaintiff openly acknowledges that at no point did the defendant Ron Thomas 
ever indicate, infer, suggest or agree that the plaintiff would !!Q1 have to pay some form of 
compensation for getting the business at and/or after the transfer. That never happened, ever, The 
plaintiff is thus not claiming the defendants ever agreed the plaintiff could or would get the business 
without paying some price - some form of additional compensation. See Drew Thomas depo, pp 
13-15 
- On the contrary, literalJy every single time the matter was addressed, before or after 
agreement was reached, the plaintiff openly acknowledges and agrees the defendant Ron Thomas 
consistently and without exception indicated that he needed to get something financial out of the 
business in order for him and his wife to live on during their retirement years. The plaintiff's 
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testimony on this subject could hardly be clearer: 
Q. And throughout that time frame from when you first starteg 
talking about going to work there, actually working there 
through the time it was sold, I understand that you did have a 
number of conversations with your dad wherein the subject of 
the amount that would be paid by the business through you 
was discussed. 
A. Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of us. 
Q. And the thrust of those conversations was him telling you that 
it had to do with the fact that they didn't need that much to 
live on, but it was amounts that they would be using to live 
on? ' 
A. I would agree. 
Q. And that while there had never been a specific agreement 
between you and your mom and dad as to whether it would be 
3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere in between. that was the general 
range? 
A. 1 agree. 
Depo oj Drew Thomas /aken March 3], 2009 at p 18, II. 24-2.5; p 19, l. 1-16(emphasis added) The 
plaintiff thus openly acknowledges in his sworn testimony that throughout the time frames that 
matter here, specifically inel uding before the time he actually reached agreement with his father, that 
his father had proposed terms they both discussed that involved the payment of monies from the 
business to the mom and dad for them to Jive on, once the business would be transferred. This was 
the "thrust" of literally every discussion between the parties on what was being "proposed" by the 
defendants at any point.. It was, in other words, always the discussion that some form of 
compensation would be paid by the plaintiff at and/or after the time of transfer. 
The plaintiff then acknowledges that part of the "exchange" involved in the 
"agreement that is at the heart of this lawsuit" is this term which required him to pay some form of 
monthly retirement income to his parents after the business was transferred" Again, this is taken 
directly from his sworn deposition testimony: 
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Q. Okay; so then I am understanding that the agreement that is at 
the heart of this lawsuit is that in exchange for you going to 
do what you did, he would, that is your parents would. in 
exchange have the business transferred to you and you would 
in tum pay them through the business a stream of income 
somewhere in the range of 3 to 5,000 a month? 
A. I would agree with that. 
*** Q. Okay, that's the agreement that you're testifYing is what's at 
issue in this lawsuit? 
A. .Y.§. 
Depo olDrew Thomas taken March 31. 2009. at p 19, ll, 17-2.5, P. 20, ll. 1-9 (emphasis added). 
As if that were not clear enough, the plaintiff ended the deposition by acknowledging 
that his having to arrange for the business to pay his mother and father a monthly stream of income 
for them to live on during retirement years, was a "term and condition" of the agreement at issue in 
this lawsui t: 
Q. All right, because before I leave this deposition, what I want 
to understand is exactly what those term~ and conditions are, 
and here's what I understand you 've told me today or clarified 
again for me today that at the time had this deal actually 
occurred, materialized. happened - -
A. Upon his retirement. 
Q. - - upon his retirement at or about 63 years old and the 
transfer of the business took place, one of the conditions is 
that you would pay your mom and dad some stream of 
monthly income between 3 and $5.000. 
A. Con'ect 
Dre'w Thomas depo taken A1arch 31, 2009, alp 55, II 14-25, p. 56, 11 (emphasis added) 
All of the above are direct quotes from the plaintiff's clear and unequivocal sworn 
testimony in his continued deposition, and which were quoted verbatim by the defense in their brief 
initially supporting the instant Motion. Yet, the plaintiffdoes not address any of these excerpts from 
his testimony where he clearly admitted beyond any question at all that part of the agreement that's 
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at issue in this lawsuit required him to pay a stream of income to his mother and father in some 
amount between $3,000 and $5,000 
Based upon the plaintiff's own testimony, it is simply undeniable at this point there 
was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding this alleged oral agreement on the 
necessary, essential, and material terms. It is of course one of the most fundamental principles of 
contract law that in order to have a legally enforceable agreement, the evidence must clearly establish 
the parties had a "meeting of the minds" on all of the pertinent and material terms: 
To be enforceable, the contract must embody a distinct understanding 
of the parties, showing a meeting of the minds as to a1l necessary 
terms of the contract 
Dursteler v, Dursteler. 108 Idaho 230. 697 P 2d 1244 (Ct, App, 1985), Heritage Excavation. Inc 
\I, Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40,105 P. 3d 700 (2005).' Potts Canst, Co, v. North Kootenai Water Disl . 141 
Idaho 678, 116 P3d 8 (2005), Bany v Pacific West Canst, inc,. 140 Idaho 827, 103 P 3d 440 
(2004) The proof necessary to establish the requisite meeting of the minds is equally well settled 
Idaho law: 
Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence that the parties had 
a mutual understanding of aU of the terms of their agreement. and that 
they mutually assented to be bound by each of those terms. 
Thomas v Schmelzer, 1 J 8 Idaho 353, 356796 P 2d 1026(1990)(emphasis added). In this case it is 
absolutely undisputed at this point that, according to the plaintiff himself, the parties did not have 
a "mutual understanding" as to the terms under which the business would be transfened to him, and 
one of the un-negotiated terms is the most fundamental term to every contract - the price. Price is 
always a material and essential term to a contract. 
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Price or compensation is an essential ingredient of ~ contract for 
the transfer of property, or rights therein, or for the rendering of 
services. 
I7A AmJur 2d, Contracts § 195 (emphasi.y added). The plaintiff must produce some kind of 
evidence establishing a meeting of the minds on this essential term, meaning evidence establishing 
a mutual understanding of the price term and a mutual assent by both parties to that amount. As 
pointedly stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
To be enforceable by a coun, a contract must provide for a definite 
price or for a means of determining the price. 
Garnto v Clan/on. 97 Idaho 696,699,551 P2d 1332 (l976)(emphasisadded) It is also noted with 
some significance that the Garmo court references how it is a Court function to determine the 
enforceability of the contract, and whether the agreement provided for a definite price or not. 
The plaintiff then has the clear burden of establishing the parties to the alleged 
agreement both understood what they were agreeing to on the subject of what compensation needed 
to be paid for the business at the time oftransfer, and that they "mutually assented" to that term. It 
is beyond dispute in this case that the plaintiff can not possibly meet this burden, and there is no 
issue of fact about it. His own testimony establishes that Ron Thomas never "assented" to transfer 
the business without some additional compensation. On the contrary, the plaintiff acknowledges that 
at all times, including the discussion leading to the agreement itself, the defendant always indicated 
some form of compensation would be required at or after the transfer took place, and that the 
plaintiff"agreed with that" Drew Thomas depo taken March 31, 2009, alp 22, II. 3-4 The bottom 
line is the parties never reached the point of "mutually assenting" to exactly how much that 
additional compensation would be. 
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In summary, it is undisputed at this point, established by the plaintiff's own 
testimony, that the agreement that serves as the basis of this lawsuit required the plaintiff to pay 
compensation to this mother and father after the business was transferred to him. That was, in his 
words, part of "terms ofthe agreement" that is at issue in this lawsuit, that he specifically "agreed 
with that" and that this represented one of the "terms and conditions" of this alleged oral agreement.. 
It is equally undisputed that the parties did not negotiate the specific price term other than discussing 
it being somewhere between monthly payments of $3,000 to $5,000. It is simply beyond any 
reasonable debate at this point that this agreement is unenforceable as a matter oflaw for this reason. 
THE BUSINESS DEBTS ISSUE 
Besides the lack of a price issue referenced above, the defense also argues on this 
Motion that there were a substantial number of other material and essential terms that had not yet 
been negotiated according to the plaintiff, which also and further renders this alleged oral agreement 
legally unenforceable under Idaho law. One of these other terms is the fact that the business would 
have substantial debt at the time of the transfer, and the parties had not yet, according to the plaintiff, 
negotiated who would be responsible for that debt. 
In his response brief, the plaintiff inexplicably claims that it was a term already 
included as part of the agreement being alleged by the plaintiffhere. In fact, plaintiff's counsel goes 
to the length of claiming this is "clearly" the case: "Transferring the business would clearly include 
its assets and liabilities." Plaintiff's Brie/at p. 8 (emphasis added). The plaintiff is thus arguing that 
it either was or should have been "clearly" understood by the parties under the terms of the alleged 
agreement how the business debt would have been handled at the time ofthe transfer of the business. 
That is a very interesting argument to be made by plaintiff's attorney to the Court, since the plaintiff 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRlEF ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT - 9 
himself testified to the exact opposite thing just several weeks ago. 
In fact, the plaintiff was point blank asked whether or not he felt this question of how 
the business debt would be handled at the time of transfer was something that had been worked out 
already, as part of the alleged agreement, or something that would have to be worked out in the 
future. Contrary to what plaintiff's counsel asserts on this subject in response to this Motion, the 
plaintiff himself clearly testified it was something that had not yet been worked out, but would have 
to be in the future: 
Q. And so you'd have to work out who would be responsible for 
that [business J debt or do you think you had worked that out 
already? 
A. We'd have to work that out. 
Depo of Drew Thomas taken March 31, 2009. at p. 41, II. 15-18 (emphasis added). Later on in the 
same deposition, the plaintiff himself again made this point clear that there had never been any 
agreement reached on how the business debt issue would be handled at the time of transfer, but it 
was "a condition of the deal. . , left to future negotiation": 
Q. Okay. All right. And another thing that is basically B 
condition of the agreement would be that there would have to 
be some discussion between you and your dad and by 
connection your mother as to what would happen with the 
debt that the business had as of the time he would have been 
completely relieved of his financial backing obligations; 
right? 
A The way he stated that on the debt, we would work out of the 
debt, whether you reduce inventory, whether you do to reduce 
some debt. 
Q. But at the time of transfer, as we talked about before, there's 
got to be some debt. 
A. Correct, I would agree. 
Q.. And so the question as to who Was going to pay what part of 
the debt was still open? 
A Was not discussed, correct 
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Q.. And so that was left as a condition. as a condition of the deal 
that would have to be met one way or the other, but it was left 
for future negotiation? 
A Correct. 
Depo of Drew Thomas taken March 31.2009, at p 58, It 7-2.5; p. 59. I J(emphasis added} It is 
thus entirely disingenuous for anyone to argue this question of how the business debt would be 
handled at the time of transfer was "cleatlf' something that was already dealt with. according to the 
plaintiff. As the quoted testimony above undeniably indicates, the plaintiff himself testifies to the 
exact opposite thing, and does so several times. 
Moreover, the plainti:f:r s testimony further establishes that this question of how the 
business debt would be handled was a "condition" that would "have to" be dealt with one way or 
the other, but that it was left for future negotiation. Id That only makes sense, of course, since this 
business debt issue involves a huge financial consideration in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
In other words, the plainti:f:r s own testimony establishes this was a material and essential term of the 
agreement that was left open for future negotiation. Leaving material terms unsettled and 
unprovided for is by definition a legally unenforceable contract: 
In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct 
understanding common to both parties. The minds of the parties must 
meet as to all of its terms, and, jf any portion of the proposed terms 
ill unsettled and unprovided fot there is no contract. 
C H Leavell and Co v Grafe and Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 511. 414 P2d 873 
(1 966)(emphasis added). See also, e g Matheson v Harris. 96 Idaho 759. 536 P ld 754 (1975)("A 
contract does not exist if any portion of the proposed terms is unsettled" Id at 760) This is 
basically an expression of the general rule that there must be a meeting of the minds on all material 
terms in order to constitute a legally enforceable contract, as well as an expression of the more 
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specific rule that "an agreement to agree" does not constitute a legally enforceable agreement: 
Generally, an agreement to agree is unenforceable as its terms are so 
indefinite that it fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable 
obligation, No enforceable contract comes into being when parties 
leave a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere 
agreement to agree. 
Maroun v Wyreless Systems, Inc, 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P3d 974 (2005) See also, e.g" 
Dursleler v Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230. 697 P2d /244 (1985) ("ljterms necessary to a contract are 
left for (uture negotiation, the contract cannot be enforced .. Id). 
The application of these clear and fundamental principles of contract law in Idaho to 
this debt issue alone is sufficient all by itselfto render this agreement as legally unenforceable based 
on the undisputed facts. As quoted earlier, the plaintiffs own testimony establishes that a 
"condition" of the agreement involving the transfer of the business to him from his parents that 
would "have to" be dealt with one way or the other, was something that had not yet been dealt with, 
but was instead "left for future negotiation," Idaho law thus clearly dictates this is an unenforceable 
contract as a matter oflaw beyond any question for this singular reason alone. 
OTHER MATERIAL TERMS NOT AGREED TO 
The plaintiff also fails to address all the various other terms that were argued by the 
defendants as being material and essential terms that were also unsettled, thus rendering the alleged 
agreement unenforceable for those reasons as well. For example, the defense pointed out that the 
plaintiff claims that under this agreement with his father when the time for transfer came, he was 
going to need to secure a partner to assist in financing the business. In the meantime, while he was 
busy trying to locate such a partner, and reach some kind of agreement with that partner, his father 
would have to "stay in the saddle" by continuing to provide financing for the business, The plaintiff 
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also openly acknowledges that part of the agreement would have required him to become an 
approved franchise owner by the Dodge/Chrysler Corporation, and it is very much an open question 
as to whether he could have in fact so qualified. If he had not so qualified, there would be no deal, 
again according to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also acknowledged the clear uncertainties involved 
with aU this and the fact that under these incredible amount of uncertainties, there is and was never 
any set time that this Court or anyone else can determine as to when the defendants' time for 
performance would end. 
Q. Okay, but then, of course, what arrangement you would have 
to have with any such partner. that. too was up in the air and 
subject to future negotiation; right? 
A. 1 would agree. 
Q. Another alternative that would exist at the time of transfer 
and, again, which would dictate when your dad would be 
relieved of any ongoing obligation under the agreement to 
stay on board with some financing assistance is for you to 
obtain a line of credit without a partner? 
A That would be a possibility, probably not as likely. 
Q. Well, that's the question I was having in my head. Did you 
have in your mind at some point which would be the likely 
avenue you would pursue? 
A Likely with a partner, dad being a partner out of the gate and 
then transferred to another. 
Q. SO in order for the transfer to become complete and for the 
time for your dad's performance to end. it would have to be 
subject to you working out a deal with one of these partner 
~? 
A. I would agree. 
Q. And even then, whenever that would take place, there would 
have to be some discussion, if you will, because even then the 
business would still have some debt and some receivables 
outstanding; right? 
A. I would agree with that, yeah. 
"''''* Q. And so you'd have to work out who would be responsible for 
that debt or do you think you had worked that out already? 
A. We'd have to work that out. 
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Q. And had you had any discussions about this money that I was 
talking about were contributed by your mom and dad for 
working capital purposes and several of the checks indicated 
they were intended as being loans whether that would be part 
of the debt and that would be paid back to them? 
A. Never had that conversation. 
Q. SO how that pad would be treated would still be subject to 
future discussion? 
A Correct. 
Drew Thomas depo taken March 31, 2009, al pp. 40-42 (emphasis added) This testimony likewise 
dictates that the alleged agreement is legally unenforceable, because it too establishes there were 
material terms that were not yet agreed, and according to the plaintiff there was no agreement from 
which it can be determined when performance was complete. Idaho law on this subject is also clear: 
An agreement must be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms 
and requirements so that it can be determined what acts are to be 
performed and when performance is complete. 
Bharektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 892, 155 P.3d 691 (2007) The 
defense argued these same points in the original moving submittals and the plaintiff offers no 
response at all to this. The bottom line is the alleged oral agreement is filled with future 
uncertainties all over the place, leaving many obviously "essential" terms for future agreement, 
which again is the definition of an unenforceable agreement as a matter of law. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS - INDIVISIBLE ISSUE 
The defendants next argue on this Motion that according to the plaintiff, the land part 
of the oral agreement he alleges to have reached with the defendants was "indivisible" from any 
other part of the deal, which thus renders the entirety ofthe agreement legally unenforceable as well. 
In response, the plaintiff rather incredibly states that: "The evidence establishes that 
the oral contract was for the transfer of a business, Thomas Motors, not a contract for the transfer 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14 
(J() " n ""(' lUbJ 
of real property." Plaintiff's Brief at p lOIn fact, the plaintiff says this same thing again on the 
very next page. This is a rather remarkable thing to be claiming at this stage of the proceeding, since 
the only actual "evidence" on this subject is provided by the plaintiff himself, and, once again, the 
plaintiff has repeatedly testified to the exact opposite thing. 
In fact, this point was not onJy addressed repeatedly in the recent deposition by the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff has been alleging he understood the agreement he reached with his father 
involved both the transfer of the business and the transfer of real property for quite some time. Over 
a year ago, the plaintiff submitted an Affidavit to this Court wherein he attested: 
The business, as I understand it, included the real property that 
Thomas Motors was on. 
Affidavit of Drew Thomas in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants 11401[011 for Partial 
SummaJJ' Judgment, at p. 2 ~ 5, dated April 24, 2008 The only other "evidence" on this subject 
was the deposition testimony by the plaintiffhimself, again given just several weeks ago, in which 
he again confirmed that his understanding is now, and always has been, that the oral contract he 
claims to have reached with the defendants and is the subject of this lawsuit always involved not 
just a transfer of a business entity, but also the transfer of real property on which the business was 
located. 
The defense has already provided the Court with the deposition itself, as well as 
quoted at length from that deposition on this exact point in the first brief submitted in support of 
this Motion, specificaJIy at page 26 of that brief Rather than just repeating the lengthy quote from 
the deposition here, the defense would instead just summarize the specific ways in which the 
plaintiffunequivocally acknowledged he always understood the agreement in question involved the 
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transfer of business and land together as one indivisible package together: 
He understood that both the land and the business were simply "part and 
parcel of the whole deal." 
He understood that the business part of the deal was "inextricably 
interwoven with the land!' 
He understood that the agreement that he is claiming to be at issue in this 
case that he claims to have had with the defendants was "a package deal" 
involving both "business and land." 
He specifically acknowledges that the deal that he claims to have had with 
the defendants was "never" a deal that in his mind could mean that "the 
business was separate or divisible from the land" - he never understood that 
to be the case. 
Based on all the conversations he had surrounding the agreement at issue in 
this lawsuit in his mind you could not possibly "separate" the business from 
the land parts of the deal based upon "the plans that he had .. " 
As far as he is concerned, the land and the business parts of the agreement 
were "indivisible." 
Depo oj Drew Thomas laken March 31, 2009, pp. 46-48 The Affidavit of the plaintiff filed over 
a year ago that is quoted above, and the above-referenced sworn deposition testimony by the 
plaintiff just several weeks ago, represent the only "evidence" there is on the subject of whether the 
agreement in question here involves both the land and the business assets. There simply is no other 
evidence in this case on this subject, other than that provided by the plaintiff himself, all of which 
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has him adamantly claiming under oath that he always understood the land part of this deal was 
indivisible from the business part of this deal. It is thus completely inexplicable for the response 
for this Motion to indicate on behalf of the plaintiff • twice - that the "evidence" in this case 
somehow establishes the oral contract at issue only involves the transfer of a business, and not any 
land. The actual and only evidence on this subject is precisely and directly contrary. 
Along these same lines, the response briefindicates: "There is no evidence submitted 
in the record that indicates that it was the parties' intention that the Plaintiff take whole or none." 
Plaintiff's Brief al pp. 10-11. This once again needs to be compared with the actual testimony of 
the plaintiff, which obviously stands in stark contrast: 
Q. So it was never a deal in your mind that the business was 
separate or divisible from the land? 
A. Correct, not the way I understood it with all the 
conversations we had. You couldn't have had it separated 
for the plans that we had. You wouldn't have had any room. 
Q. SO as fru as the agreement as far as you're concerned, the 
two are indivisible? 
A Yes, I would agree. 
Depo of Drew Thomas taken March 31. 2009, at p. 48, II. 1-9 The plaintiff himself thus openly 
testifies in his words that the way he understood it, and based on all the conversations he had, you 
could not have separated the business part of the deal from the land part of the deal. They were part 
and parcel of the same deal, "inextricably interwoven" with each other, and indivisible from each 
other, all according to the plaintiff himself. Again, this represents the only "evidence" there is on 
this subject, thus reflecting exactly what the plaintiff claims were the "intentions of the parties" on 
this particular point. 
Under Idaho law, it does not matter if it appears in the abstract that one prul of an 
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agreement could theoretically be considered "severable" from another part of the agreement that 
is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The onty thing that matters, as the Idaho Appellate 
Courts have said repeatedly and without exception is "the intentions of the parties": 
A contract may be in its nature and by its terms be severable and yet 
rendered entire by the intention of the parties. 
Boesiger v DeModena, 881daho 337,347,399 P,2d 635 (1965) (emphasis added). The question 
of whether a contract is indivisible or severable depends totally and entirely upon the intentions of 
the parties. See, e g, Vance v. Connell, 96 Idaho 417,529 P.2d 1289 (1974),' Coppedge v Leiser. 
7J Idaho 248,229 P 2d 977 (1951),' Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506201 
P ld 976 (1948) If it is the intentions of the parties that both parts of an alleged agreement are 
"indivisible" from each other, and one part of the deal is unenforceable as a matter of law, such as 
for reasons covered by the Idaho Statute of Frauds, the entire agreement is legally unenforceable. 
There is simply no escaping the fact that the plaintiff's testimony establishes beyond any doubt 
whatsoever that the intent of the agreement he is alleging as the basis for this lawsuit was to include 
both land and a business together as one deal, and that both parts of the alleged agreement were 
"indivisible" from each other. Since the land part of the deal has already been ruled unenforceable 
due to the Idaho Statute of Frauds, the entire agreement is absolutely and undeniably unenforceable 
for this reason as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully request that the Court enter 
summary judgment on the remaining clam in this case. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
) 
R. DREW TIIOMASt ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS, ) 
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
INTRODUCTION 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CV .. 2006-492 
PAGE 132/14 
In this action. Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged breach by Defendants, his parents, 
of an oral contract to transfer an automobile dealership, on a date certain or to be determined, in 
consideration of Plaintiff undertaking to manage operation of that dealership in the interim 
period. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
- 1 ~ 
OOl07G 
CANYON CO PAGE 03/14 
In addition to denying the material allegations of the complaint, Defendants assert a 
number of defenses including two defenses based upon the existence of a 'Written agreement 
between the parties that superseded any oral agreement between the parties. 
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in part on 
the basis that the alleged contract was not sufficiently definite to be enforceable and that Plaintiff 
was barred from adducing evidence of the contract by the statute offrauds. The court filed an 
order on November 26, 2007 denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect 
to Plaintiff s Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Claims (Counts I & II of the Complaint). 
In denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the breach of 
contract claim, the court found: 
That the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff leaving his 
employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to building 
Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Th.omas Motors upon the retirement of 
Ronald Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary 
judgment dismissing the claim for breach of that contract. Order on MSJ, pp. 9~10. 
Defendants then moved for partial summary judgment dismissing "any claim by the 
plaintiff that his alleged oral agreement with the defendants includes any real property or land." 
By Order filed May 19,2008, the court granted Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The court found that Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence for the trier of fact 
to conclude either: (1) that the alleged agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors included 
real property or (2) that the parties had entered into a separate enforceable agreement for the 
transfer of any real property. In making this determination, the court found that the Plaintiff's 
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evidence established) at most, a subjective expectation on his part that the alleged agreement for 
the transfer of Thomas Motors included real. property. 
Defendants then conducted a further or continued deposition of Plaintiff on or about 
March 31,2009. 
DEFENDANTS' PRESENT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants now move for partial summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's remaining 
claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing asserting 
that, based upon Plaintiffs own testimony at the Match 31, 2009 continued deposition, he 
cannot establish the requisites for a valid, enforceable contract for the transfer of Thomas 
Motors. This Second Motion for Summary Judgment; filed April 6, 2009, came before the 
Court for hearing on May 7, 2009. Plaintiff was represented by Mr. William Morrow and 
Defendants were represented by Mr. John Janis. The Court heard the arguments of counsel and 
reserved ruling pending further review and consideration of the file and record in this matter. 
I. Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings. depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c), The 
burden of proving the absence of material facts is on the moving party, P.o. Ventures, Inc. v. 
Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233~ 237 (2007). The court must construe all 
disputed facts liberally and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co .. 119 Idaho 514, 517 (1991). The court is limited to 
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detcrmiuing: (1) whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact and, ifno issue of material 
fact exists, (2) whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lawrence v. 
Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 750 (Ct. App. 1993). 
When the moving party supports a motion for summary judgment with competent 
admissible evidence, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere alJegations or denials 
contained in that party's pleadings in order to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact 
for trial, but must set forth specific facts, in admissible form. I.R.C.P.56(e). The moving party 
is therefore entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an el.ement essential to that party's case upon which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial. P.o. Ventures, 144 Idaho at 237. 
D. Defendants' Motion 
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing claims must be dismissed because, based upon Plaintiff's own evidence, 
the alleged agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors is not sufficiently defmite as to the 
purchase price Plainti.ff was to pay for the business, how the existing business debt and 
receivables of Thomas Motors would be handled upon transfer of the business, and Plaintiff's 
qualification by Dodge/Chrysler Corporation as an authorized franchise owner. Defendants also 
claim that, in light ofPJaintifi"'s deposition testimony, the sale of the real. property upon which 
Thomas Motors was located was an indispensable part of the alleged agreement and) therefore, 
the lack of any memorandum memorializing the agreement renders it unenforceable pursuant to 
the statute of frauds. 
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A. Applicable Law 
A contract is a promise or set of promises the performance of which the law recognizes 
as a duty. Atwoodv. Western Construction, Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 238 (Ct. App. 1996). A 
promise is a. manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made 
as to justify the person to whom it is made in understanding that a commitment has been made. 
Id 
In order for a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds. Barry v. 
Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831 (2004). A meeting of the minds is 
evidenced by a manifestation of the parties' intent to contract, which takes the fonn of an offer 
and acceptance. Id The meeting of the minds must occur on all teons material to the contract. 
ld Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the tenns 
of the agreement and the assent of both parties. Pott$ Construction Co. v. North Kootenai Water 
District, 141 Idaho 678, 681 (2005). In a dispute involving contract fonnation. the plaintiff 
must prove a distinct and common understanding between the parties. P. O. Ventures. 144 Idaho 
at 238. 
The material tenns of the contract must be sufficiently definite and certain in order for 
the contract to be enforceable. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National 
Banlc, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 173 (l991). If a. contract is so vague and indefinite that the intent of 
the parties cannot be ascertained, it is unenforceable. Barnes v. Huck. 97 Idaho 173, 178 
(1975). To be enforceable, a contract for the transfer of property or rights therein. must provide 
for a deftnite price or a means by which a court may determine the price objectiveJy without any 
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new expression by the parties. Garmo v. Clanton, 97 Idaho 696, 699 (1976) (quoting 1 Corbin 
on Contracts, §§ 97, 98); 17 A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 195. 
As a general rule, the question of whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to 
form an express agreement is for the trier of fact. R.D. Bischoffv. Quong-Watkins Properties, 
113 Idaho 826. 828 (Ct. App. 1987). The trier of fact's inquiry into an alleged oral agreement is 
three-fold: First, detennining whether an agreement exists; second, interpreting the terms of the 
agreement; and third, construing the agreement for its intended legal effect Id 
B. Absence of Price Term 
1. Prior Evidence 
In its November 2007 Order denying Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiir s 
breach of contract claims, this court found: 
That the agreement as alleged by Plaintiff in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in 
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment - in consideration of Plaintiff leaving 
his employment at Lanny Berg and contributing his efforts and experience to building 
Thomas Motors, Defendants promised to transfer Thom.as Motors upon the retirement of 
Ronald Thomas - is supported by sufficient evidence in the record to preclude summary 
judgment dismiSSing the claim for breach of that contract. Order on MSJ, pp. 9-10. 
Based upon this ftnding; the court concluded that Defendants had not established that the 
parties had set any additional "price" for transfer of the dealership so as to render the alleged 
agreement too indefinite to be enforceable or that such a price was a material or essential term 
for such a contract to be enforceable. As the court noted in its May 2008 Order, Plaintiff also 
stated in Paragraph 12 of his Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' first motion for summary 
judgment: 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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While I felt jt would be fair and wanted to ensl..lte that Ron and my mother received some 
retirement income from the business, I need to clarify that my receiving the business was 
not contingent upon my paying them retirement income. 
2. Present Evidence 
As noted previously, Defendants base their present motion on Plaintiff's testimony at his 
continued deposition on March 31, 2009. Specifically, Defendants rely on Plaintiffs testimony 
to establish: (1) that Plaintiff was to pay a monetary price for Thomas Motors in addition to his 
agreeing to go to work for the dealership as part of the alleged agreement; (2) the monetary 
compensation was a material part oftbe contract; and (3) the parties never reached a meeting of 
the minds on the monetary price Plaintiff was to pay for the transfer of Thomas Motors. 
B. Monetary Price 
Plaintiff's March 31, 2009 testimony indicates that Defendants' offer to transfer Thomas 
Motors and Plaintiff's acceptance ofthst offer involved a monetary price in addition to 
Plaintiff's agreement to leave Lanny Berg Chevrolet and run Thomas Motors: 
Q. Now, going over these affidavits is largely the reason we're here and I 
want to ask you some followwup questions here. In the first deposition, which I can 
show you where I'm talking about if you like, you testified to me or you testified, not to 
me, several times that you never understood that you were going to get the Thomas 
Motors business for free, that you always understood that you were going to pay 
something for it. Do you remember testifying to that effect? 
A. Yes. 
*"' .... 
A. .It all comes back to we had an agreement that if I left Lanny Berg 
Chevrolet, came to Emmett, ran the store until he retired that it would be mine to take on 
to the next generation and, if so, to the next generation. When you say "free," I 
expected, as I stated, that they should - I had no problem with them having something of 
a retirement check out of it and it would have been healthy for all of us. but it comes 
back to one simple thing for me: If I leave Lanny Berg, go to Emmett and work the 
dealership, at the end of the day, which was around 63, he always said that it would be 
mine to take for my lifetime and then my kids' lifetime. 
**** 
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A. I was going to - my labor and my time was a lot of what J figured was 
paying for the dealership. At the end when Dad got tired or wanted to retire or him and 
Mom wanted to travel that they would receive a small check. He always said I don't 
need much to live on. between 3 and 5,000, so I would take that as my labor and my 
time through the eight years probably in my opinion paid for the m~jority of the 
dealership, but I never wanted to have them not have anything or be involved: If they 
were still involved, that would have been great, too. 
",tII ... * 
Q. So it would be also true today as you said June of '07 that you always 
understood that regardless of how much it was going to be, you were going to pay your 
mom and dad something for the business? 
A. I would agree. 
A. Again, John, I felt at the time when I left Berg my efforts and my time 
was worth something -
Q. I got that, but you -
A. - but at the end of the day when he retired that if they needed some 
money to live on, Mom and him, I didn't have a problem with that at the time. 
Q. Well, it wasn't an "if," that's my point. You said that you never 
understood you were going to get it for free. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you also said that you were going to pay them something at the end 
when it was transferred. 
A. I had no problem with that. 
Q. But that's what I'm telling you, that was your understanding? 
A. It was my father~s statement to me and I had Ilot a problem with his 
statement. I never proposed it. He proposed it, I did not disagree with it. 
(Tr., pp. 9-13). 
Viewing this, and the remainder of Plaintiff s March 31, 2009 testimony in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, leads to only two possible con.clusions. The first alternative is th.at the 
offer by Ronald O. Thomas to transfer Thomas Motors, which Plaintiff accepted, included 
payment of a monetary price in addition to Plaintiff agreeing to manage Thomas Motors. The 
second alternative is that the alleged offer by Ro.nald O. Thomas, or Plaintiff's understanding of 
the offer, was too indefinite for the court or the trier of fact to determine whether or not it 
included a price term. If the second alternative is true, there is no basis upon which a reasonable 
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trier of fact could determine that a valid, enforceable contract was fanned on the basis of the 
alleged offer. 
b. Materiality of Price Term 
If. viewing the above testimony in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff.. the court 
presumes that Ronald O. Thomas made a defInite offer which jncluded Plaintiff's payment of a 
monetary price for Thomas Motors, in addition to his services, Plaintiff's testimony also 
establishes that the monetary price was material: 
Q. And throughout that time frame from when you first started talking about 
going to work there, actually working there through the time it was sold, I understand 
that you did have a number of conversations with your dad wherein the subject of the 
amount that would be paid by the business through you was discussed. 
A. Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of us. 
Q. And the thrust of those conversations was him telling you that it had to do 
with the fact that they didn't need much to live on, but it was amounts that they would be 
using to live on? 
A. I would agree. 
"''''*''' Q. Okay; so then I am understanding that the agreement that is at the heart of 
this lawsuit is that in exchange for you going to do what you did, he would, that is your 
parents would, in exchange have the business transferred to you and yOll would in turn 
pay them through the business a stream of income somewhere in the range of 3 to 5,000 
a month? 
A. I would agree with that. 
"' ... 
Q. The one thing I had there that I was thinking of is the last part which I 
think you're quoting your dad. Yeah, it is, him saying that all I. "r' referring to Ron 
Thomas, want; right? 
A. What Hne are you on? 
Q. Th.ree - well, 16. 
A. That all I want is a modest check out of the place when your mom and I 
retire. 
Q. The "I" in that sentence is Ron Thomas? 
A. Ub-huh. 
Q. Right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And Ron then going on to tell you words to the effect of it don't take me 
much to live, that I, Ron Thomas, don't have to have a lot to live on, but 1 do want 
something out of the business; right? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes, I read that. 
Q. I mean, that's you telling me what your dad had told you? 
A. And I believe he used the word "we" once in a while, but at the time, I, 
we, my mom and dad, all and the same. 
Q. Sure, and the only point that I was trying to get at, Drew, is in these 
conversations which you had over the years with your dad wherein there was a 
discussion about how much you would pay your mom and dad after the business was 
transferred that he was telling you that he wants something out of the business? 
A. Yes 
Q. And basically you were saying in effect, okay, I agree with that? 
A. It was reasonable, yes, I agreed with. that. 
(Tr., pp. 18-22). 
t.':. Failure to Agree on Price 
Finally, Plaintiff's March 31, 2009 testimony establishes that the parties failed to agree 
on the monetary amount he was to pay for the transfer of Thomas Motors at the time he 
accepted Defendants; offer by leaving Lanny Berg and going to work at Thomas Motors, or at 
any subsequent time: 
Q. And that while there had never been a specific agreement between you 
and your mom and dad as to whether it would be 3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere in 
between, that was the general range? 
A. I agree. 
Q. But there was just never a particular agreement reached on whether it 
would be 3,000,5,000 or some particular number in between? 
A Correct. 
** •• 
Q. And so this notion that the agreement here is such that you agreed with 
your mom and dad that in exchange for your work and doing what you were doing that 
they would transfer the business to you and you in turn would pay them somewhere 
betwcen 3 and 5,000 that was the substance of this conversation that took place once or 
twice a year for almost 10 years? 
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A. Correct. 
(Tr., pp. 19-23). 
Based upon the foregoing, and viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 
Defendants have established by evidence in admissible fonn that: (1) a material part of the 
alleged agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors was that Plaintiff would pay a monetary 
price to Defendants for the business; and (2) the parties n.ever reached an agreement on the 
amount of that price and did not agree on an objective means for the determination of the price. 
Plaintiff failed to adduce any admissible evidence on this motion contradicting Defendants' 
evidence. Therefore, the court finds that Defendants have made a prima facie showing that 
Plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to support a finding by a reasonable mind that the parties 
entered into a valid, enforceable contract for the transfer of Thomas Motors. Plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in 
Defendant's favor. l 
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims 
for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
ORDER 
TIIEREFORE, Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing 
Plaintiff's remaining claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is GRANTED. 
f In light of this determination, the court declines to addres$ the other grounds raised by Defendants in support of 
their summary judgment motion. However. it is important to note that Plaintiff's March 31, 2009 deposition 
testimony, when viewed in its entirety, Jeads the court to the conclusion that, at the time Plaintiff left his 
employment with Lanny 'Berg to work at Thomas Motors, the parties, at most, had an agreement to agree with 
respect to the transfer of Thomas Motors from Defendants to Plaintiff at the time Defendant Ronald Thomas retired 
from Thomas Motors. That agreement to agree also appears to have been devoid of any agreement on a number of 
very important tenns. See Maroun v. Wireless SystemJ. Inc., 141 Idaho 604,614 (2005). 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
I~r' Dated this &-day of May, 2009. 
CANYON CO 
Juneal C. Kerrick 
District Judge 
C'RKS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the 
following, either by U.S. Mail~ first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse 
basket; or by facsimile copy: 
William Morrow 
Morrow & Fischer 
5680 East Franklin Road. Suite 220 
Namp~ Idaho 83687 
John J. Janis 
Hepworth, Janis & Brody, Chtd. 
537 W. Bannock St. 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
Dated this _,f-/-looI!5----day of May, 2009. 
SHELLY GANNON 
___ ----...clerk of the Court 
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
p.o. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
T eJephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald f3jorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IF ~ l ~ lO)*"~ 
MAl 2 8 2009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE 8T ATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R DREW THOMAS. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., 
an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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i I 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
JOHN 1. JANIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a pattner in the law firm of Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and the primary 
attorney in my firm responsible for representing the defendants in the above-entitled matter, 
2. This Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs is based upon my 
personal knowledge and is also verified by the books and records of my law fiml kept in the above 
matter in the normal and ordinary course of its business. 
3. Costs The following represents actual costs incurred by the defendants which 
related to the defense of this action: 
A. IRCP S4(d)(1)(C) Costs as a matter of right: 
- Filing fee - IRe P. 54(d)(l )(C)(l): 
- Cost of Reporting/transcIibing depositions 
taken by defense - I R CP 54(d)(J)(C)(9) 
1. Drew Thomas Volume I -
Videographer 
2. Drew Thomas Volume II 
(Reporter only) 
- Costs of copy of depositions taken by plaintiff 
IRe P 54(d)(1)(C)(JO) 
1. Elaine Thomas 
2. Ron Thomas 
3. Shirley Youngstrom 
TOTAL 
$ 58.00 
$860.30 
553.85 
$386.50 
$22016 
$468.79 
$341.06 
$2,888.66 
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B. Discretionary Costs: 
The defendants also request that the following costs be awarded as discretionary costs 
under IRe P 54(d)(l)(D) 
- Expert witness costs: 
l. James Warr, CPA 
2.. Hooper, Cornell Accounting firm -
Dennis Reinstein, Peter Butler 
3. John Moulton - Banking Expert 
TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL 
$ 120.00 
$14,663.75 
$ 1,075.00 
$15,858.75 
$18,747.41 
In further support of this request to be awarded these expert witness costs as 
discretionary costs, the defendants submit each of said costs were necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred by the defense in this lawsuit, and should in the interests of justice be assessed 
against the plaintiff In further explanation of these three experts, and the role they played, the 
following is offered: 
- Mr. James Wan was the accountant for the defendants Ron and Elaine Thomas during 
some of the Thomas Motors years, and afterward. He was retained to write a report about his opinion 
concerning the value of the Thomas Motors business at the time it was sold, based upon his own 
personal knowledge and experience. He wrote a letter for that purpose which was shared with 
plaintiffs counsel 
- The accounting firm of Hooper. CornelI, specifically experts Dennis Reinstein and 
Peter Butler, were hired for the forensic/litigation purpose of addressing expert opinions on the value 
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of the Thomas Motors business at the time it was sold. At the time these business valuation experts 
were hired, the defendants were anticipating the possibility of trial, and that the trial at that point would 
have included the damages aspect. In other words, they were hired long before the case was 
bifurcated. The costs associated with having these experts to become fully knowledgeable on the 
subject of this valuation of the Thomas Motors business was very time intensive and required review 
by such experts of extensive documentation. as well as review of deposition testimony. They also 
prepared reports for purposes connected with the expert disclosures required by the Court's Scheduling 
Order. 
- Mr. John Moulton is an expert in the banking industry from California, who was 
originally retained to address the subject of what requirements would have been imposed upon Drew 
Thomas if he were to actual1y take over a new car dealership, such as the Dodge/Chrysler franchise 
dealership that had previously been owned by the defendants. He was retained to address questions 
like how much of a line of credit could the plaintiff have obtained from a reputable lending institution, 
if any, and various other financial requirements that would have to have been met by the plaintiff in 
order to successfully transition taking over such a new car dealership. 
Given the claims that were being made by the plaintiff in this case, all of these experts 
were costs of an "exceptional" nature not normally attendant to contract litigation, but which were 
reasonably and necessariJy required to defend plaintiffs claims in this particular case. As such, the 
defendants submit that the interest of justice would be subserved by having such discretionary costs 
be as::essed against the plaintiff. 
Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto are a page from our firm's cost transaction list 
identifYing each of the costs referenced above, along with copies of the actual bills received for each 
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of the costs claimed above, 
4. Attorney Fees Attached as Exhibit "B" hereto is the more detailed fee 
transaction list and statement, generated by my law firm in the regular and ordinary course of business. 
This document details billing entries made by lawyers in the firm who performed services on a 
particular case, and each such entry indicates a description ofthe work done, the pertinent time entry, 
the applicable hourly rate, and the corresponding costs, along with the running totals. Exhibit "B" 
hereto is a transaction list for work performed by my law firm in defense of this case and tracks with 
bills that were scnt to the clients through this case, su~ject to the redactions referenced below. The 
hourly rate charged by my law firm to the defendants throughout this case for my services or t hat of 
other attorneys in my office are the rates normally and usually charged by my firm for such services. 
I understand and believe these hourly rates are consistent with such rates charged in Boise for attorneys 
with commensurate levels of experience .. 
On the original of Exhibit "B" hereto, I have redacted a number of entries by other 
lawyers in the firm, to serve the purpose of trying to be conservative in the amount of reasonable 
attorney's fees being requested in defense of this case. I have, for example, redacted all of the entries 
of my long-time partner Charlie Hepworth who knew the case and knew the defendants, both very 
well. Charlie and I often confer with each other over issues and strategies and we did so in this case 
on many occasions. We view this as very valuable and clients are billed for such services, as was done 
here. We have agreed to redact his time entries to this request for attorney fees since his entries would 
mostly relate to things I was already doing. 
The detailed time and billing entries listed on Exhibit "B" hereto reflect actual time 
spent by the lawyers in my law firm in defense of this case, and were incorporated into bills sent by 
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my law finn for such services to the defendants. All such bills were either actually paid by said 
defendant or are in the process of being billed and paid. In other words, the attorney's fees reflected 
in Exhibit "B" are actual amounts which have been billed to the defendants by my law firm for 
professional services rendered on this case, and are paid in full aheady, or will be in the future 1 
believe all the professional services reflected in Exhibit "B" were reasonably and necessarily incurred 
in the defense of this lawsuit 
An additional page is added to Exhibit "B" which identifies the amounts paid the 
WestLaw Research Group for computerized legal research purposes in the total amount of $66020. 
LR.C.P. 54(e}(3)(K) indicates this is recoverable as attorney fees rather than costs. As reflected in 
Exhibit "B" the total amount of attorney's fees being requested is $115,749.20 
5. Total Attorney's Fees/Costs, Total Costs requested is $18,747.41; total 
Attorney's Fees requested is $115,749.20 for a total of$134,496.61-
.p... 
Dated this JJ:... day of May, 2009. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
~l 
SUBSCRlBED and SWORN to before me thisd,L day of May, 2009. 
~~.hG",-l\ d-xJ-~/;Y/ 
NOTARY PlJ~LIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: b!9-;:Ci.-G 
My Commission Expires: hi: I f I' ?--...-
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DA TED this 1 ~+'day of May, 2009 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this2!.th day of May, 2009, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
foHowing: 
William A. Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
[ x] u.s. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ J E-mail 
[ x] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ I E-mail 
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John Glenn Hall Company 
Litigation Technology 
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John J. Janis 
Hepworth Lezamiz & Janis CHTD 
PO Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
-Descl!iption 
1.00 First hour video deposition of Ronald Drew Thomas (06/26101) 
3.70 Additional hours video deposition of Thomas 
1 - DVD copy set of the video deposition of Thomas 
.. / •. 
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"Your Personal Court Reporter" 
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email: info@associatedreportinginc.com/Fed ID #82-0436903 
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John J. Janis 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Hohnhorst 
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Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
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Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et 31. 
Case No: CV 2006-492 
Date Taken: 1211/06 
Location: Boise, Idaho 
DepoDent: ElaiDe K. Thomas 
Reporter: Pamela J. Leaton,CSR #200, RPR 
ReportiDg services reDdered in the above-entitled matter: 
Transcript - Copy 
Exhibits 
State Sales Tax 
We Appreciate Your Businessl 
PLEASE I?EFERENCE THIS INVOICE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK 
TOTAL 
I TERMS ARE NFl' 30 • LATE CHARGES WIll BE ASSESSED ON AU. PAST DUE ACCOUNTS I 
\3~ - 0..0 -d - oJ2> 
AMOUNT 
194.00T 
13.70T 
12.46 
$220.16 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I\SSOC'I \'1'''-1) ~FP()R1T\(;. l".C. -
"Your Personal Court Reporter" 
1618 w. Jefferson, Boise. Idaho 8~02 
(208) 343-4004 • (800) 588--3370 • Fax (208) 343-4002 
email: iDfo@assOciatedrepo~c.com/Fed 10 182·D436903 
BUTO, 
John J. Janis 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Bohnhorst 
537 West Bannock 
Post Office Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
DESCR1Pl10N 
Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et al. 
Case No: CV 2006-492 
Date Taken: 6/20/07 
Location: Boise, Idaho 
Deponent: Ronald O. Thomas 
Reporter: Pame)~ J. Leaton,CSR #200, RPR 
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter: 
Transcript - Copy 
Exhibits 
State Sales Tax 
We Appreciate Your Businessl 
PLEA,SE REFERENCE TIDS,lNYOlCE NUMBER ON YOUR GEJi1CK 
:ERMS ARE NEr 30 • LATE CHARGES'WlU BE ASSFSsED ON AU PAST DlIEAOO>UNTS I 
TOTAL 
INVOICE 
DATE 
7/5/2007 
iA4 
INVOICEti 
2700589 
AMOUNT 
432.00T 
to.25T 
26.54 
$468.79 
AS+H;PSP, 
(J OIOS ~ 
I 
I 
l'~SS()C I, , ','J':I) 
I{LI'ORTJ~( ;. I\C . .. 
II 
"Your Persqnai Court Reporter" 
1618 W. Jdferson, Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 3434004 • (SOD) 588-3370 • Fax (208) 343-4002 
email: in.fo@assOciatedrepo~c.com/Fed ID '82·0436903 
BllLTOI 
John J. Janis 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis 
537 West Bannock 
Post Office Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
DESCRlPl10N 
Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et aJ. 
Case No: CV 2006-492 
Date Taken: 6/26/07 
Location: Nampa, Idaho 
Deponent: R Drew Thomas 
Reporter: Amy E. Menlove, CSR No. 685, RPR, eRR 
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter: 
Appearance 
Transcript - Original 
Exhibits 
State Sales Tax 
We Appreciat.e Your Businessl 
;~~~ - 'Ot.D d. -0 :f~ 
PLEt4,SE REFERENCE TlHS. .llVVOlCE NUMBER ON YOUR cliECK 
TOTAL 
INVOICE 
DATE INVOICE 1/ 
7/9/2007 2700595 
AMOUNT 
105.00 
728.00 
27.30 
0.00 
riFririeSSEseG3 
$860.30 
Ese;:::! 
OOl lGlJ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
''Your Personal Court Reporter" 
1618 w. Jefferson, Boise, Idaho 8~702 
(208) 343-4004 • (SOO) 588-3370 • Fax (208) 343-4002 
email;info@assdciated.reportin~c..com/Fed ID #82-0436903 
BllLTO: 
John J. Janis 
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis 
537 West Bannock 
Post Office Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
DESCRIPTION 
Case: Thomas vs. Thomas, et aJ. 
Case No: CV 2006-492 
Date Taken: 8117/07 
Location: Emmett, Idaho 
Deponent: Shirley Youngstrom 
Reporter: Pamela J. Leaton,CSR #200, RPR 
Reporting services rendered in the above-entided matter: 
Transcript - Copy 
Exhibits 
State Sales Tax 
~. ~We Appreciate Your Businessl 
O(p-d- ~ Dto 3> 
PLEA,SE REFERENCE THIS,lNYOlCE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK 
RMS ARE NET 30 - I.A:r.E CHARGES WIll. BE ASSESSED ON AU. PAST DUE ACCOUNm I 
TOTAL 
INVOICE 
DATE 
812712007 
;;g 
INVOICE # 
2700797 
AMOUNf 
306.00T 
15.7ST 
19.31 
$341.06 
, 
.. 
OOllOi 
I 
I 
I 
I 
CSB REPORTING 
CONSTANCE S. BUCY, CSR 
23876 APPLEWOOD WAY 
WILDER, IDAHO 83676 
890-519B 337-4807 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
ATTN: JOHN J. JANIS, ESQ. 
POST OFFICE BOX 2582 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-2582 
DATE: 04/02/09 
CAPTION: 
CASE NO.: 
DREW THOMAS v. RONALD & ELAINE THOMAS, et al. 
CV 2006-492 
LOCATION: NAMPA, IDAHO 
DATE TAKEN: 03/31/09 
I N V 0 I C I N GIN FOR MAT ION 
CHARGE DESCRIPTION 
0+1 OF DEPOSITION OF R. DREW 
THOMAS 2-DAY EXPEDITE (63 PAGES) 
COpy OF EXHIBITS (26 PAGES) 
HALF-DAY APPEARANCE FEE 
P LEA S ERE MIT - - - TOTAL DUE: 
THANK YOU 
TAX IO NO.  
AMOUNT 
$315.00 
$ 6.50 
$ 65.00 
$386.50 
00110:::' 
I WILSOl'i, HARRIS & COIllI'I'lIW 
CERTifIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
1602 W Franklin Street· Boise. Idaho 83702 
(206) 344-1355 
Bill To 
John Janis 
POBox2582 
Boise, ID 83701 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH PAYMENT 
Date Description 
1213112007 Balance forward 
06/3012008 INV#68107. 
.HEPWORTH, lWAJ;! 
&JANiS\ 
JUL U 72tlOO 
9OI$I,1D 
Statement 
I Date I 
6/3012008 
Balance Due Upon Receipt 
Amount Due Amount Enc. 
$120.00 
Amount Balance 
0.00 
120.00 120.00 
D~~ 
~~ 
\~ 
Current 1·30 Days Past Due 31-60 Days Past 61·90 Days Past Over 90 Days Past Amount Due Due Due Due 
120.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
You can make payments online. see our website at www.wilsonharris.com. 
and click on the credit card images 
$120.00 
11/2% per month finance charge which Is an annual rate of 18% will be added to past due accounts. 
\, I WILSON, HARRIS & COMPANY 
~ - ()It,. 02·0.:L~ 001100 
P.02/02 
rl If 
I, TRSR ) Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys • .ASAmed • TAScons~lting 
\ , GIH)IJ~ . ,.... ~ 
To: 
N: 
Headquarters: 1166 OeKaJb Pike· BlUe BeIl.PA 19422·1853 • 610-275-8212· 800-523-2319· Fax: 800-119-8212 
explm@tasanet.c:om • www.wanet.com • United Kingdom: 080()..89 .. 1292 
Please make parmenl to ne TASA Group. lac. and rerum with one copy to the abovo addrus. 
John Janis, Esq. 
Hepworth. Lezamlz & Janis 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise. ID 83701 
Invoice Date: 
R. Draw Thomas v. [ Ron & Elaine Thomas 1 
Jan·14-2009 
Phone: (208)343·1510 
Fax: (208)342-2P27 
Fed.I.DoI: 23-1569'731 
Expert: John H Moulton .---===0 __ 
Tenna: Payable Upoll Preseatado. PLEASE WRITE THIS NUMlIER ON YOUR CHECK 
Description 
"·***··***·_·*****.*·*·"·"·"*·*****··*.·ADVANCE INVOICE··*··** .. • .... ..,.······· .. ·**······ .. ·····*·_**** 
Initial reView .......... This is an estimate only-· ...... • 
3.00 Hour(s) 300,00 
Subtotal for Profe88lonal Servlc:es 
AdministrWve charge 
Total Amount DUe (USO) 
JSR DEPENDINO UPON THE TIME &: COST EXPENDED. WE WILL BILL ADDITIONALLY. 
900.00 
900.00 
115.00 
1,075.00 
Page 1 of1 . 
CooilsDmt wUh the Expcn's apc=e .. wilfI T ASA, IAJ filnhcr swy;c.e, of !hi Expc:n bereIa nllDCd. on !hit DlIII)' 0ItIc:r maIht. II1IISt bI\ Jtq1IeSfed IIuoush TAM 
WE AP .. RICIATI YOOR 8tlS1NE$S. PL£AB! CALL "'AGAIN THE N£XTnME YOU NEED AN EXPERT. 
TOT~ P.92 
• v .1 00110<, I 
Hooper Cornell, P.LLC. 
250 Bobwhite Court Suite 300 
Boise, 10 83706 
Phone: (208) 344-2527 FAX: (208) 342-0030 
Hepworth, Janis & Brody 
JAN 19 2009 
Boise. JO Invoice Date: December 31,2008 
Invoice Number: 00139456 
Hepworth lezamiz - Thomas 
c/o John J. Janis, Esq. 
PO. Box 2582 
Boise. 10 83701-2582 
For professional services rendered for the period ending December 31.2008 
Assistance with analysis of dispute, including value of Thomas 
Motors. Inc. as detailed on the accompanying schedule 
Total 
Client Number: 
Beginning Balance 
Current Activity: 
Billings 
Net Due 
63330001 
$5,15625 
$5,156.25 
$000 
5,156.25 
$5,156.25 
OOli00 
Page 2 
DetaD Descrll2tion 
Date Stall Invoice Description Hours Amount 
11/25/08 Dennis Reinstein Meet wllh John Janis to discuss requirements of analysis on 050 $12750 
Thomas Motors 
11/25/08 Peter Buller Reviewed documents Analyzed new and used car 150 36000 
industry 
11/25108 Dennis Reinstein Meel with John .Janis to discuss requirements of analysis on 050 000 
Thomas Motors 
11/26/08 Peter Buller Downloaded private !ransaclion databases RevIewed 200 48000 
valuation guidance for car dealerships 
12/02/08 Peter Butler Reviewed legal documents 050 12000 
12/02/08 Karen Ginnet! Summary of tax returns 1997·2006 300 45000 
12/03/08 Peter Buller Analyzed data Created charts Calculated ralios 200 48000 
12/04/08 Peter Butler Reviewed industry Informallon Compared results to RMA 225 54000 
data 
12/05/08 Peler Buller Asset approach Research Markel approach 350 84000 
12/0B/08 Susan Bloom 150 11250 
12I08I08 PelerButler Market approach usIng Pralts Slats and BizComps 175 42000 
12109/08 Peter Butler Asset approach, markel approach and income approach. 325 78000 
Reconcillallon of values Conversation with allorney 
12/28/08 DennIs Reinstein Preliminary review of valuation analysis developed by Peter 175 44625 
Buller 
Services 5,156.25 
Total 2400 $5,156.25 
Summary by Employee 
Employee Hours Amount 
Dennis Reinstein 225 $57375 
Dennis Reinstein - No Charge 050 000 
Karen Ginnett 300 45000 
Peter Butler 1675 4.02000 
Susan Bloom 1.50 112.50 
TotaJ 2400 $5,156 25 
Payments received aHer December 31. 2008 do not appear on this invoice 
00110G 
Hooper Cornell, P.LL.C. 
250 Bobwhite Court Suite 300 
Boise, 10 83706 
Phone: (208) 344·2527 FAX: (208) 342·0030 
Hepworth, Janis & Brody 
FEB 11 2009 
Hepworth Lezamiz - Thomas 
c/o John J. Janis, Esq 
PO Box 2582 
Boise, 10 83701-2582 
For professional services rendered for the period ending January 31, 2009 
Assistance with analysis of dispute, including value of Thomas 
Motors, Inc as detailed on the accompanying schedule 
Total 
Invoice Date: 
Invoice Number: 
Client Number: 
Beginning Balance 
Current Activity: 
Billings 
Payments 
Net Due 
OIL 
Boise, 10 
January 31, 2009 
$8,34250 
$8,342.50 
$5,15625 
8,34250 
(5,156.25) 
$8.342.50 
00139758 
63330001 
Delail Descri~lion 
Date Stall 
1105/09 Peler Butler 
1105/09 Dennis Reinste!n 
1/09/09 Karen Ginnelt 
1/09/09 Dennis Reinstein 
1/12109 Karen Ginnet! 
1/13/09 Karen Ginnet! 
1/14/09 Karen Glnnelt 
1/15/09 Karen Ginnett 
1/15/09 Dennis Reinslein 
1/15/09 Dennis Relnslein 
1/16109 Dennis Reinstein 
Employee 
Dennis Reinstein 
Dennis Reinstein· No charge 
Karen Glnnett 
Peter Butler 
Invoice Description 
Mealing with Dennis Reinslein to go over preliminary 
opinions Teleconference with allorney 
Review fllas. Including income lax returns and valuation 
analysis Place calls 10 John Janis & James Warr 
Mealing with Dennis 10 discuss issues related to case 
Conference with James Warr and follow up with ·John .Janis 
Obtain documents from James office and discuss review of 
those documents during my absence wilh Karen Ginnetl 
Review/copy/analyze information provided by James Warr 
Anancial summaries to separale Thomas Motors 
Financial analysis 10 summarize and separate financial 
activily of entitles 
Review analysis with Dennis 
Meet with Karen 10 discuss documents provided by James 
Watr Go Ihrough selected doucments and sOO oul 
operations by enlily Work on updales 10 value analysis 
Meet with Karen to discuss documenls provided by James 
Warr Go through selected doucments and sort oul 
operalions by enlily Work on updates to value analysis 
Review vallous documents Conduct call with Ron Thomas 
Develop expert repor1 Review report wi1h John Janis & 
finalize 
Summary by Employee 
Total 
Hours 
2000 
200 
1300 
1.50 
3650 
Payments received alter January 31. 2009 do nol appear on Ihis invoice 
Hours 
150 
325 
050 
275 
800 
150 
225 
075 
675 
200 
725 
Services 
Total 36.50 
Amount 
$5.90000 
000 
2.01500 
427.50 
$8,34250 
Page 2 
Amount 
$42750 
81125 
1.24000 
23250 
34875 
11625 
1.99125 
000 
2,138 75 
8,342.50 
$8.34250 
001100 
Hooper Cornell, P.l.LC. 
250 Bobwhite Court Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83706 
Phone: (208) 344-2527 FAX: (208) 342-0030 
Hepworth Lezamiz - Thomas 
c/o John J Janis, Esq 
POBox 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Invoice Date: 
Invoice Number: 
Client Number: 
For professional services rendered for the period ending February 28. 2009 
Assist with the analysis of dispute as detailed on the 
accompanying schedule 
Total 
Beginning Balance 
Current Activity: 
Billings 
Payments 
Net Due 
February 28. 2009 
$1,16500 
$1.165.00 
$8.34250 
1,16500 
(8.342.50) 
$1,165.00 
00140231 
63330001 
()OllOS 
Delail Description 
Dale Stall 
2110/09 
2110/09 
2/11/09 
Employee 
Peter Butler 
Dennis Reinstein 
Dennis Reinslein 
Dennis Reinstein 
Peter Buller 
Invoice Description 
Reviewed opposing experfs report Research 
Conversation wilh Dennis Reinstein Conversation with 
allorney Wrote outline 01 affidavit 
Review 01 report of Christensen & call 10 ,John Janis 
Review report of Carl Chrislensen and develop response 
Iherelo 
Summary by Employee 
Hours 
250 
1.50 
Total 400 
Payments received aller February 28, 2009 do nol appear on this invoice 
Hours 
Services 
Totat 
Amount 
$73750 
427.50 
$1.16500 
150 
075 
1 75 
400 
Page 2 
Amount 
$42750 
22125 
51625 
1.165.00 
$1.16500 
OOlllG 
, 
I. 
EXHIBIT-B.. 
00111--'. 
AttoI'ney 11 JOHlf J. JANIS 
62023000 04IIIJ21l1l& 12 A 
62023000 04112J21l1l& 12 A 
62023000 04I17J2006 12 A 
62023.000 0510812006 12 A 
62023.000 O5Ill112OO6 12 A 
62023000 05l1lll2OO6 12 A 
62023000 061221200II 12 A 
62023000 0812312008 12 A 
62023000 0612812006 12 A 
62023000 08I27J2006 12 A 
62023000 O6I2f112OO1S 12 A 
62023.1lOO 0612912008 12 A 
62023000 0712412008 12 A 
62023000 0112612006 12 A 
62023000 0713112008 12 A 
62023000 08/1412006 12 A 
62023000 0811512006 12 A 
62023000 081'612001 12 A 
62023000 08l3III2008 12 A 
62023000 081311200II 12 A 
62023000 100000/2OOll 12 A 
62023000 11(1312008 12 A 
62023000 111211.20011 12 A 
62023000 11r.1012OO11 12 A 
62023000 1210112006 12 A 
62023000 1210812008 12 A 
nii'A ---_. 
.. _--_. 
22500 
22500 
22500 
22500 
225.00 
22500 
22500 
225.00 
22500 
225.00 
22500 
225.00 
22500 
22500 
225.00 
221500 
221500 
22500 
22500 
22500 
22500 
22500 
22500 
225.00 
225.00 
22500 
Detail Fee Transaction Flle Uet 
HepworI/I. Janls & Brody. CIIId. 
H ...... 
to BIll 
100 
400 
100 
050 
180 
100 
100 
020 
6.00 
650 
350 
450 
150 
300 
100 
150 
250 
150 
200 
080 
0.50 
050 
200 
100 
500 
5.00 
225 00 Canr.,. wi1I1 Charll& Hepworth: nMew agreemenls and file 
dot:uments 
900 00 RIIVIIIW /lie: attend meaUng wi1I1 Charlie Hepwor1h. Ron BjOlkmart. 
ami Ron and ElaIne Thomas; draft response 10 damamlleller: Q)fl(er 
willi Challle HepWOl1h; hllaphone call wIIh Ron B/orfanan. 
22500 Telep/Qle call willi Bal Motrow; I.lephone cal with Ron B)odtman; 
telephone ca. willi Ron Thcrnas: prepare ItlIler w\lll enclosures 10 
BlIMomIw 
112.50 Conierwl!h JOhn Kluksdal: draftlatler \0 I<alhletln ElIott 
40500 Telephone calls wIIh Bill MomIW. Ron B/orfcman. Ron Thom ... and 
Kal/1leen EIIIoIl: confer wllh CluIIIIe Hepworth. 
225 00 Te/epl1ooe call wIIh Ron BJottman: telephone call wlih Rob WIde: 
telephone call wlih J<alhleen I!JlIoIt 
225 00 Telephone calls wIIh Ron 8jorlcman; review camp\8Inl and tlalmS 
made; confer with Charlie Hepwo/1h 
45.00 Telephone catl wIIh Ron Thoma 
1.350.00 ldeel wIIh MI: and Mrs. Thomas; re1llew file documenIs; telephone 
calli WIIh Ron Bjarltman; WOIk on al1SMt 
1.462 SO Work on _10 complaint lalephone caa. wIIh Ron BJatltm8n: 
legal fII4.IIIIIdI t8 sla\ll\e or frauds; WOIII on motion For summaty 
judgment. 
187 50 ConIInue wolfe en answer 10 complaint and mollon for ~m., 
judQmenl 
1.012 50 Work on _10 QltIIjlIaIrII; work on brIeI III summaty judgmenl 
33750 T...,one cab wilt Shillay Young5l/Uln; waIfC on ~ 
resp_s 
67500 Prepare for and attend meallng with Mr. and MtI. Thomas; 
teIaphone o::aII wIIh Ron Bfollcman; conllnue WQtk 011 discovery 
response. 
22500 Ra1IIew d1scovety fIIsponsn and produc:ad dDGUnltlflb from plalnll/t; 
conler willi John IQJksdei re WIIge hIIIocy or plalnll/f 
337 50 RtWiItW lellet from dala".. counsel; WQtk an dlSCOVIIIY responses; 
confer will! John Kluksdel; /IIVIIIW lie 
562 50 Telephone caa willi Ron Thomas: conllnue work on discovery 
responses; draft 'eller 10 Ron Bjarlumln. 
337 50 R.l'Iseand Ilnalm dllI1:tWaty respome.: ~ caa willi ROIl 
BjcI1cman: IaIep/Ia(Ie C8II will! ShIdey 'f0lJn9$ll0lll: draft 1eIl., 10 
pfalnllfl'scounsel 
450 00 Re1IIew dtItaIed dIIIcovery leller from COU/lllel; begin draIIlrtg 
response: conf.r w\lll John Kluklldal 
180 00 F1na1Ize rasp_ 10 pfelnUI'. _II t8 discovery Issues 
112 50 relep/lamr c:aIII ,. daposlllon III:heduI1ng ,. SIndy MIll: ,l<Change 
e-mab willi pllllnllft'l _ltII 
112 50 eonfer will! John KlUk8d1~ IeIep\1on8 tails wIIh Ron and elaine 
ThomP. 
450 00 MellI willi elaine Thoma. ,. dapoelllon preperel/111 
225.00 Rtview IllllIatfaIs In ptapMlllon for EIa/na 'TlIotnal's deposlllon: 
telephone caft with Ron Briniunan 
I. 12S 00 Meal will Elelne TIlomas; a/land daposlllon of Saine Thomas: 
conf., with Charltt Hepwct1h end John I<Iukldal; re-rewew 
~
'.125-00 Meet will Ela/na Thomas: conl.renee. wilt delanse counsel: aIIend 
Page: , 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
AACH 
ARCH 
ARCH 
O()1112 
.- -_._.- -- .. _ .. --- ._-- ------.---- WDctn.,".,y d5f2ii.1QQi iD~D .. -
Dale: 0512012009 Detail Fee Transaction File List 
HapwoI1h. JIIl1Ia & Brady. Chid 
page:'J. 
TAn_ H Ho_ 
CUolII ~ AI4'!: !:!! .'!!.!! !!.!!! ~ ~ 
AHomo\, 12 JOiiii J -IAHIS 
depolllllon 01 t.II1I Thomas; lela~ cd willi Ron 8jo1kman: 
relifaw file materials In follow·uplo depO"<ftlon: conler wllh Charlie 
HepwD<lh 
62023 000 0211612007 12 A 22600 030 117 50 Review c:orrespondance frOIl'l plalntlll.· counsel; conler wIIh John ARCH 
K1uksdal. 
62023000 0&10612007 12 A 22500 400 900 00 Revlaw Elllln. Thomes· depoalllon: meet willi Ron and Elaine ARCH 
Thomas re Ran Thoma,' deposJIlon 
62023 000 06J2Di2007 12 A 22500 200 450 00 Meal willi Ron and Elaine Thomas: confer wIIh .jaM K1uksdal; ARCH 
coni_ncaa willi plainl1li's counsel 
62023000 0612112001 12 A 22500 100 22500 Telephone cal wi'" Ron Thomas; conler willi John KklI<sdai re Drew ARCH 
Thomas daposllion 
62023000 0612512001 12 A 22500 S50 1.462 50 R8'IIew enIInt ilia; prepare lor daposlllon 01 Drew ThorneS; conler ARCH 
with ctIaIIIe Hepworth and John Klulcsdal; draft outline /or 
deposlllon. 
62023000 D612612OO7 12 A 225,00 B.DO 1,800.00 Travel to Ni!IIIIp8; lake dapOllllon 01 plalnUlf: relum travel; conIer ARCH 
willi CharlIe Hepworlh and John KlUksdai I. dapotl1lon: lelephone 
can willi Ron Thoma; . 
62023000 0612112007 12 A 22500 150 337 50 Talaphone cal wIlh Ron II/01kman te plaln\lII'a daposillolr. \alaphone ARCH 
calls wJIII Roo and Eleln. Thomas: prellmlnlll)' lesearch lor 
SIII1\lIIIIt}' )lJdgmenl Il'1011011. 
62023000 0710212001 12 A 225.00 300 61500 Review Ron Thoma. deposlllon lor summary jUdgmenl purposes; ARCH 
conIer willi John KIukadaI 
62023000 OTI06I2IlO1 12 A 22500 300 &75 00 Begll\ teIIIewIng plainl1li's deposlUon for lummery judgmenl ARCH 
putpDHS; final revi_ 01 deposJllons 01 Ron and Elatne ThomeS; 
leI~ cell willi Roo B/OIIcman 
62023000 07l0lII2007 12 A 22500 300 675 00 ConIlnue ravtewtnv deposJ!lon and I'. documenls for summary ARCH 
Judgment purposes; legal I&SUrdl em SUmmlll)' Judgment inues; 
begin dralllng BUmIl'llll)' judgmenJ briaI 
62023000 0711012001 12 A 22500 7.00 1.575 00 WDIk on summary judgmanl motion ARCH 
62023000 07lf112OO7 12 A 22500 600 1,350 00 Conllnue wocldng 011 brief In support 01 moIIon lor IUlllmlll)' ARCH 
judgmenl 
62023.000 0711212007 12 A 22500 600 '.350 00 Legal reeaJCh allaw IIbrIIIy re quasi-conl1llCl. and lraud Issues; ARCH 
conrer with John Klukldal r. stelUla or frauds lcsueS; conllnue wolk 
on briaf In support of moDon for summery Judgmenl; leI~ cals 
With Ron Thomes; telephon. call willi Ron BJCfItmon 
62023000 0111312007 12 A 22500 700 1.575 DO TravellD EmmeIt: mael willi Ron and Elaine Thomas as well al ARCH 
Shllfey VOUIlgaltorn; relum tnwal; conllnue wocldng 011 brief and 
suppoIIIng documents far summal)/ judgmenl motion 
62023000 07/1612007 12 A 22500 450 1.01250 ConIlnueWllfk on sIImmat)' /IIdgmenI moQon and supportlng ARCH 
dOtIJIII8fIts 
62023000 0711712007 12 A 22500 500 1.12500 CorItInIJe WOI\Ilng on brfel and suppOl1lng dOcumenlS fot sumrnaoy ARCH 
/udgmanl mOllon; begtn dralllng affidavit of Ron Thomas; rew .... 
documenlS prevlously !>foWled by Shirley Youngslrom: !lIlaphonl 
calls wilh Sblriey Youngstrom; lerephone calls wIIh Ron Thomas: 
confer willi John KklI<sdal 
82023000 0711812007 12 A 22500 600 1.350,00 ConIlnue f8YIewIng dDCUmanI bor •• previously proyIdeII by ShIrley ARCH 
Youngstrom; conllnua WOfkIng on sumtn8l)llUd9mani brief and 
suppotlfng doeumenls; Ielephone call wilh Ron Thomas nt meetlng; 
_all Ron 8Jot1cman willi drall 01 proposed briaf. 
62023000 0711912007 12 A 22500 650 1.462 50 FInalIze allldavil 01 Ron Thome.; e-mail drallio Ron 8jotkrMn; meet ARCH 
wIIh Ron and EleIne Thomes: ntvlew all new doc:umenls provided by 
Ron and ShIIIey; finalize bIlelln support 01 moIlon lor aummlll)' 
~ lelephone cell Willi Ron BjoIIcmen 18 summary judgment 
submlllela: a~ for hearing; draft mollon and nola 01 helllin!l 
62023000 0712512007 t2 A. 22500 100 22500 Telophone call wIIb SI*Iey YounglllrDm; confer willi John KluksdaI; ARCH 
lelephone call willi plalnIlII's counsel 
62023000 D8IIl8I2OD7 12 A 22600 500 1.125 00 Prapere lor meeting willi sttIrIay Youngstrom; lravel 10 EmcneU; meat ARCH 
willi ShIrt.y YoungsItom: telephane calli wllIl Ron Thomas; 
lalephone calls willi Ron 8jo1kman 
62023000 0811312007 12 A 22500 400 !1IlO 00 BegIn reviewing .. pleadings fles by p\aInIIII on mollon lor SUf'llf!lllly 
Judgment: conrer wilh ·John Kluklldal 
ARCH 
62023000 0811412007 12 A 22500 8.00 1 .BOO 00 Continue reY\eWIng plafntlfr. brie' opposing mOllon for SUII'II1IIIIy 
judgment and all allklevlls In support; review moDon for artenslon; 
work on reply brI"'; legal research: lelephone colis willi Ron and 
ARCH 
ElaIne Thoma: telephone cell wIIh Ron BJorkmlln: conler With John 
Klukedal 
62023000 08I1512DD7 12 A 22500 liDO 1.1100 00 Work an Iep\y briaf: legal res •• II:h: maeI wllh Roo and Elalne ARCH 
Tnomel; draft second allklavil 01 Ron Thome.: teYlew doc_Is; 
lelephone call wiIh Ron BJorkman; lelaphone cal willi ShIrley 
Youngstrom. 
62023000 08111112007 12 A 22600 800 1 ,/100 00 Work 011 reply IlrIeI re summery Judgment: meal with Ron end Ellilne ARCH 
ThDm8a 18 allldavll; review file do_nil; con/or willi Charlie 
Iiepwor1b and John KklI<sdai re summel)/ judgmentllaues 
62023000 0811712001 12 A 22500 650 1.462 50 FInalize reply brfel on moIIon lor summary judgmenl; begll\ WOfk on ARCH 
briaf opposing tnoIIon far .",.nslon: lelephQnl cds willi Ron 
Bjortanllll 
82023000 08/2012007 12 A 22500 400 900.00 FlnaIze moDon 10 strik. allidmt 01 Orew Thomas: nna'ZlI brI" ARCH 
opposing moIIon for extension 0I11rn11; .. mati aU Slings to plainllII'. 
counsel: lelaphona calls wl/fl Ron BjorkmIIII: eltCllange .. mala With 
62023000 0812112007 12 A 22500 200 
Ron r. new 1lIIngI: draft l8\lar 10 .Judge 
450 00 RevIaw Shlfley YOtInIPtrom deposlilon ARCH 
62023000 0911012007 12 A 22500 100 225 DO Review plalnlllfs moIIon 10 sttlte second allkMl 01 Ron Thomas and ARCH 
bdef In SIIppoIt; con(er willi ·John KlukJdaI 
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1,360 00 R81iIaw new submission by plaintiff on summmy judgmenl: research 
addIlIonaf legal 8\llIlodty offered by plalnlllf; work on brief In 
apposlllon 10 rnallon 10 slrtke; review case law prOYkfed by John 
Klukcdel; addIIIonllllegal rllJ8llrc:h 
9<JO.00 Work on brief appolllng mellon to slrilte affIdvll; conler wlllt ChatIle 
Hepwor1ll end Jllhn Klubdal; telephone calls willi Bill Mcnew; 
lellIJIhane ClIII wilh Judge's cIetk; draft stipulation 
450,00 Alland maallll\J In Court re heallrlg dala: draft leller; IIxc:hange 
e·1l\IIIIs with plalnllll'l counsel ' 
22500 Ralliew nllYl subpOenas bY plalnUlra counsel; leleph_ call with 
Ron 1IJOIk1ll8n; Ielep/Ione cell wIlh CoUl1's clork 
112 50 Telephone cal wIlh Mark BOIII8$; telephone call IIIllh CoUl1 
112 50 R8\IIaw laHar report from pIIIlnIlII's counsal Ie original agreemenl, 
1,01250 Travalto MerIdian; meet willi Matle BOitles al his olliee; lelum \ravel: 
Ielephone cell wlih Ron Sjoflcman: leview IlIIWIy-liled lenowed 
moIIOIIto compel deltvery 01 ortglnal agreemenle and Ilflel and 
allldllVllt In aupport. 
1,237.50 Work on raply memorandum to lenewed moDon 10 compel: con/er 
willi Cllat'e HepWOltl\ !SlId John KluksdDl 
1,125 00 ConIlnue WIllI! on reply brief 10 renewed mollon to compel; confer 
wlih John KIukIdaI: axc:henge .maDs with Ron Blorlunan; prepare 
Ieller ID Judge KertIclI: 
45000 Work OIl reply brief to renewed mellon 10 compel; excllanga a-malic 
wIlh Ron Bjorkman 
787 50 Review second supplernanlal btlat by plalnllll opposing motion lor 
summary JudgrnenI; nrsearch procedural rules 18 summery 
JudgmlJnI; c:onIar with John K1uksdal; lagal resealc:h on cases clIad 
In pIaInIIft's naw brtor 
1462 50 Conllnue work on lind frnallze brief opposing renewed mollon to 
compel lUlIng: I .. 1aw e-mall eocc:hanges wllh ,Judge's law clerk Ie 
8s1 and onI8f 01 mDllons 10 b. haald 
900 00 Telephone call wIIh Ron 1!joIIunan; review and 0f!J8n1%e at maIIon 
pIUdIngt r. heatlngs naxt YIIIek; conlar with John K1uksda~ ,evlew 
nlsean:ll on accountanl privilege Issue: lelephone caD willi 
ac:cmmtanI Ken Reagan re prIvIIel/lllssues wlllt Mr Wade; rDIIIIIYI 
resean:lll8 cpedlcUy 01 land dellGripllon Issues 
goo 00 R8\IIaw and analya pllllnDIh naw ntply brief on mellon to sItb 
second allldllVlI 01 de/anden! and renewed molkln to c:ompaI; rmaw 
record ra iIlIIse filings and new briefs; c:onf&rwilh Chatlie HepWOr1b 
and ,John KIulcadaI Ie Ialellllngs: begin preparing for summa/y 
judgment hearing. 
t .800 00 Review ell briars Ind pleadings /tom bolh pal'\les 10 Plepare for 
he8l1ngc on all pending mallen, Iomorrow; confer wlllt Ch.t1. 
Hepwor1II end John Kluksdal; dratl outline 01 OIal argument on all 
moIlona. 
1,800 00 Travel 10 Caldwell: aUend hearings on mollons, Includfng OUt molien 
lor summary Judgrnenl; relUm lra .... l; Ielephona cab wllh Ron 
BJorkrun: lefaphone call wilt! ROil Thomas: confer willi Chatlle 
Hepwor1b and ,John Kluksdal 
67 50 RelIIaw new dl;COY8/y raqueslc 
180,00 Review new dlscavmy reque$ls form plain ""; conler wlih John 
l<luUdlll 
675 00 Review leiter from pIaInIIlh counsel; dreII responsive .. ,let; 
~ call and 1IXCh8ll\J8 .. mads IIIlth Ron B/orlcmlIn; lelephone 
call with Ron Thoma.; telephone caR wIIh ShlrlllY Youngsltom, 
225 00 Review CaIIII's decision on mollon for summary jUdgmani and to 
sIrIke 
900 00 Confer wIlh Chade Hepworth and John Kluksdal .. lagallssuet! 
lelaphana cars and eIIdlange a·malls Wilh Ron Bjarkrnen; Ielephone 
call wIlh Ron and Elaine Tham .. ; legal research .. aqullable 
eslappDl: IaIephone ca. willi 8an Clull 
450 00 R8\IIaw dDcumenIs IlUbpoenaed from Key Bank: lelephone can and 
exchange .malls willi Ron !ljorkman; confer wlill CharSe Hepwor1ll 
Ie motion tor _I)' judgment; review leoal,.search on equllable 
estoppel delense 
225 00 Telephone call willi OIlMll WIlkinson; conler wllh John Kluudel; 
tevI&W lie documents 
1,350 00 Telephone calls wiIh plainl1li's counsel; !egal res8tlrc:h Ie ell conIract 
Iflllll: rll'lltw SUIMI8I)' judgmerl! briefs and CDlIIflr priat decision; 
draft/Iller agtllllmen\ re original conll'llcls; lelep/lone calli willi Ron 
SJortcmar>; lelepllOna call wlih Ron and Elaine Thomas 
1,237 50 Telspl10ne cars Ind IIlII:henge .. mah wIIh pllllntllI'a COtJ/'ISaI; review 
revised ptDPOIad lell8, 8gJo8111eniltorn plalnU,,: telephone cars and 
exchange .",... wIIh Ron 8)oIf<man; wotlt on t.- summary 
ludgl1lllnt moIIon; confer wIlh Charlie Hepworlh and John KIIlkSda~ 
telephone call wIIIt Ban CIuII 
1.350 00 Rav/aw proposed laller ag_ment .. original conlracls; lefephana 
caR wIIh expert Or Aglnsky .. !nII dallng Issue.; Inlemeltesearch on 
Ink deIIng; llllephone ca. willi Ron Bjorkman; exchange e-mlllls willi 
plainl1li's c:ounset .. leller agreemenl and c:haIn of CUSlody Issues; 
WOIlt on pstllallummary judgtnenl ra land I.eue; conl.r wIIh ·John 
K1u1tlldal 
1.350.00 ElcI;/Iange .. malls wHh plalnlllfl counsel: legal resestc:h a"aw 
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library: wotk on b!lel supporting mallon lor pallIal summary 
jUdgment. 
62023000 03l12l200ll 12 A 225.00 
" 00 90000 Telephone calls wtIh Ron Thomas: work on brill suppOr1ing moUon lor summary judgment; legal reaearch Ie equitable e.toppet defense: 
ARCH 
lel.phone ca •• with Ron Bjorkman 
62023000 0311312008 12 A 22500 350 787 50 FlnafII:e brier In suppol1 of mellon lor partial summery Judgment: ARCH 
lelaphene calls ami exchange a-malls wllh Ron BJolknum 
62023000 0311412008 12 A 22500 100 22500 FlnaIZII moUon lor parllal summery Judgment documents; prepare ARCH 
leUer 10 JuClge Kerrick 
620231lOO 0312012006 12 A 22500 080 18000 Telephone calls and exchange ,-malls with plalnUlrs counset dlall ARCH 
liflpulallon fe he.ring. 
62023000 0411412008 12 A 22500 0.40 90 00 Telephone call wlih plalnlllrs counsel: conference wtIh ·JOIIn Kluksdal ARCH 
and Ron BjorIcman Ie status 
62023 000 0412312008 12 A 22500 150 337 50 Telephone cal wIIh Ron 8jotftman; confer wllh John I<hlksdal: ARCH 
tetsphene cal wIIh Ron and Elaine Thomas; draft lellar 10 plalnll/l's 
counsel re original conlracls. 
62023000 0412412008 12 A 22500 400 90000 RevIew plain,,",. brill and affidavits appalling mollon lor pallial 
summary Judllmenl: talephone ca'ls and exchange e-mal. with Ron 
ARCH 
BJotkmlln; lalilaw legal raseatch provIded by Ron B)or!unan: lll'tIIaw 
prior IIlmmery Judgmenl mes; conIlit' wIIh John I<tuksdal 
62023000 0412512008 12 A 22500 450 1.012 50 Legal ,"arch on equllebla estoppel; WOfk on teply bllel r. moHon ARCH 
for pelflalllt/lllln8ty judgmem: telephOllIl cd wIIh Ron BIOIlunan 
62023.000 0412512008 12 A 22500 450 1.012 50 Work on reply brill r. moOon lor partial summery Judgment; ARCH 
lelephona calIS and "xchange e-mail. with Ron BJotkman; confer 
with JOlIn I<Iuksdal re summary judgment 
62023.000 05I071200ll 12 A 225.00 3.00 675 00 Ralilaw briefs and prepara for dIscovary 011 mallon lor panlal ARCH 
summary judgmenl; confer wIIh Jdm Kluksda/lo pr"parll 0I'III 
argument: draft ouutn. lor argumenl 
82023000 0510812008 12 A 22500 4 00 900 00 Flna8za preparallon for hearing; travet 10 Caldwell; a!land heamg 01'1 
moIIon for parilallltlmmary judgmal1l: relurn !ravel: confet with 
ARCH 
Charlie Hepworth and JoIm l<Juksdal; lelephone calls wlih Ron 
B/OIIcmen and Ron Thomas re heating 
62023000 0511312008 12 A 22500 030 67 50 Telephone call with Ron Bjotkman. ARCH 
62023000 05/1412008 12 A 22500 050 112 50 Talephone call wlih Ron Bjorkman: Ielephone caR Wlih plalnllft's ARCH 
COUll'" WIlIdnson. 
62023000 0512212008 12 A 225 DO 200 450.00 Telephone calls wllh Ron Bjorkman: tetaphone c:ab wllh Ron ARCH 
Tllomas; dnioft new dIscovery requesla: review plalnftrrl dlaco1l8ry 
files: dniollleller 10 plalntlrr, couMaI 
62023000 0512712008 12 A 225.00 080 180 00 Telephone call wIIh JiiIIlIas Warr: 8l<Change a-malls with Ron ARCH 
BJorkman-
62023000 0512312008 12 A 22500 150 33750 Review COUIfs lrlal orders: telephone cal with plalnUlh counsel; ARCH 
62023000 0710712008 12 A 22500 
lalephone celwIIh Ron Thomas: axctlanga a-malts Wilh aU counsel. 
200 450 00 Ralilaw IlnalsUpulallon and ScheduUng order; t8\1iaw all documents ARCH 
provided by Ron Thomes til whe1e aI salas proceeds wen/Isllles 
62023000 0712912008 12 A 22500 1.00 225 00 Rllvlaw dlsCOY8lY ftl8II; conler wilh John l<Juksdlll; lalaphena can Wllh ARCH 
Ron Sjorkman ra mollon 10 compllllssllllS 
62023.000 D713012008 12 A 22500 200 450 00 DreII and IlnaIlZll mollon 10 compel and allldavtlln SlIppotI: ARCH 
lelephone call \ViI/1 Ron ThDllllPl 
62023000 06120/2008 12 A 22500 030 6750 Telep/lona call with Dennis WIlkinson ARCH 
62023000 0910812008 12 A 22500 080 180 00 Review discovery responses: conler wllhlohn Kluksdal ami Char.a ARCH 
Hepworth. 
62023000 0912912008 12 A 22500 080 /80.00 ExdIanga _DIIs willi Ron S/orkman ARCH 
!l2023ooo 0913012008 12 A 22500 100 225 00 RevIew rasearch provkIed by Ron Bjorkman: confer wIIh .John 
1<JuksdaI: review motion 10 c:ornpeillos 
ARCH 
62023000 1012312008 12 A 225«1 2.00 450.00 Revlew dIecovary and motion m8ll; begin draft 01 renewed moUon 10 ARCH 
compel; telephone call wllh Ron Bjorkman: confer w.1h .John 
I</UksdII 
62023000 10/2412006 12 A 22500 150 337 50 F1naIIza re~ moUon 10 compel and aIIIda'illln suppoll. including 
IIlIhIbIIs 
ARCH 
62023000 /111712008 12 A 22500 0.80 180 00 ExcIIange o-malls Wlih plelnllfl'll counsal re mollon 10 compel status; ARCH 
telephone cal wIIh Ron BJolkman 
62023.000 1 tlt812OO8 12 A 22500 200 450 00 Tetep/Iona call with Oennls Wllkeraoll: conler wIIh John KMsdal; ARCH 
lalephons cab with Ron BjoII!man; letepllona calls with ROil and 
Elaine Thomas la slatus and value 01 bUslnau Issue: review mao 
including check regls1ars and closing slalemen/ me 
62023«10 11120/2008 12 A 22500 150 337 50 RellleW new dlsc:overy lesponsa; conler wllh Chat •• Hepworth and ARCH 
John l<IuksdaI; taItIphona ean wIth Ron Bjorkman 
62023.000 1112112008 12 A 22500 250 58251 Confer with Chattla Hepwol1h and ·John I<luIcsdal: draIll10llca 01 ARCH 
vacating hearing; review scheduling order. lelephOne calls Ie 
retU1lng VIllous experts. including banker and aa:ounlanl 
82023000 1112412008 12 A 22500 3.00 675 00 Prep_ for maallng with _nlanl experts ami allend meeting al ARCH 
!heft oftlce; lelephone calls with Ron Thomas and Ron BJorkmlll\; 
loIlow up til e-matI 8lIchangaa 10 experts; review previously filed 
wllness elldavlls. 
62023000 I2ID5I2008 12 A 225.00 040 90 00 Telephone call wIIh Ron BjOlklnen ta benk loreclosure ARCH 
62023000 1211012008 12 A 22500 700 1.575 00 Prepare lot meellngs. lncIudfng reviewing ilia documents: /ravet 10 
Emmell; meet wllh Ron and Elaine Thomas and Shkfay 
ARCH 
Younglllrom; masl wIIh Rob WIlda al coo(;ounsel's oillte: meal and 
62023000 1211112008 12 A 22500 
telephone caR wIIh Ron Bjorkman 
050 112 50 Conler Wlth·1ohn Kluksdel and Chatlle Hepworth; lelepI10ns caD will! ARCH 
Ron BjorJunan. 
82023 000 12112/2008 12 A 22500 450 1.01250 Relilaw Rob Wilda lormer oflldavns: begin WOlk on proposed Rob ARCH 
Wilde alnda""; taItIphona ca's wIIh various banking peopla 10 try 10 
.-;s;:;- _ ... --
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IlIId an elCpeli on lending Issues; Ielephone calls WIth vadous 
sourcas 10 locale lranchlse approval expel! 
62023000 12115J2D08 12 A 22500 4.50 1.0 12 50 Telephone ca. with .Iames Watr: review lInanelal stalemenls 101 ARCH 
TItoInal MoIor1; ""duIng. e-mals with expell wllnesa Pater BuUer. 
ckaft and revise proposed aIIldaYit of Rob Wltde; lalaphone calls and 
exd1anga .-malls with Ron Bjorkman. 
62023·000 1211812008 12 A 225.00 250 562 SO RtlvIIlW bank sal. documents r. payollio Key Sank; el«:hange ARCH 
a·mlllls with Ron 8jorknutn and Peler BUilon; lelephone cal wIIh 
elCpell on l"rlInchlses: revIew Idaho's deblOl siaM •• 
62023000 1211712008 12 A 22500 130 292 SO Talephone call with Ron Thomas; lelephone call with Dawna Meckel; ARCH 
el<Changlt e·mIIlIs with axp811 Pater BUlIon 
62023000 12119/20(18 12 A 22500 1.80 40500 Telephone cal wllh MIke Spence "' aeNlce on exp8ll: lelephone call ARCH 
and exchange ... malls wIlb Ron Bjorkman: lelephone call with Ron 
Thomas fe InrormallonJdacuments r8CGlved I,om CluysJer re 
CSIIMSR. 
62023000 0110512009 12 A 250.00 050 125.00 Telephone can and e.u:hange e-malls with Ron 8jo11<man ra slalUs 01 ARCH 
eRldavlt and axpell dlsclosum. 
62023.000 01106/2009 12 A 25000 0.30 7500 Telephone calls wIIh bank .. ra posslbltt expelf WIll1esSIlS ARCH 
62023.000 01107/2009 12 A 250.00 600 1.50000 Teleph_ eels and exc:llllnge e-malls wIIh exp811 Dennis ReInstein; ARCH 
lelephone call fa expert Iranchlse/dealershlp Issues: research 
Idaho's vehicle dealer slarutes; drall motion 10 compel and motion 
lor proIeC\l'le order, lelephOl1ll call with James Wa" 
62023.(1)0 0110612009 12 A 25000 080 200 00 Telephone cals with Ron Thomas and Ron BJlllkman rlt !efllemanl ARCH 
slrategles: review a·maR from plalnl"rs COIInsel. 
62023.000 011l3I2DD9 12 A 25000 100 250.00 Telephona calls wllh vllrious banking expalla; Welk on 1/ltp811 ARCH 
wifn_ dIseIosute; lelephone calls with Ron Bjorkman 
62023000 01114/2009 12 A 25000 2.00 500 00 Telephone calls wIIh elCpelf Mr Moullon lrem CaIiIDmIa: fC'llew his ARCH 
resuma~ IeIaphon8 caQ with Ron BJorkman; WDfIt on expell 
dlsclasURI; lelephone cal with Oennls WUklnson te slatus and 
selllemenl posslblUlles. 
62023000 0111512009 12 A 25000 150 375.00 Telephone calls end exchange a·maIIs wilh exparf Dennis Relnllte/n; ARCH 
I"ICIk 0II1llcp811 wines. dlsclosunt 
62023000 0111612000 12 A 25000 300 750 00 Telephone calls with [)ennis ReJnsleln: review rapor1s end charlS ARCH 
lram Mr Reinstein: dtall and 8naHze expalf witness disclosures; 
send e-maDs 10 plalnlill's counsel and Ren BJorkman: confer with 
Chatlltt Hepwor1II re t:35e Slralegies. 
82023000 0111912009 12 A 25000 300 750 00 TelephOl1ll call with 8111 MOtraw and Dennis WilkInSon: lelephone call ARCH 
with Ron BjOIkman; lelephone all wllh Ron Themas; conler with 
John Klukad8l; review /alC relUrn Dies; lelephone cal with Dennie 
Relllflle/n.. 
62023000 01I20I2009 12 A 25000 200 500 00 Telephone ca. with Ron BJotkman re slalus: lelephone call wllh ARCH 
James Warr Ie IIIl< Ionns tequlred by ptalnUlrs counsel: conIe, with 
Charlie Hepworth Dnd .John Kluklldal ra stalue 
62023000 0112612009 12 A 25000 100 1.750 00 Review pleadings end disCOvery Illes 10 prepare lor hearing: draII ARCH 
ollUlne IClf lIVumenl; Ilave/to Emmllll: maol with Ron Bjorkman te 
heallng on mollens: a/lend heeling on otlr _owed molfcn to 
compel and motion lor prDlllCllva order, lelaphone cal wUh Ron 
Thomas ,. stalus and hearing; relurn lravel: tonier wIIh Charfllt 
Hepwol1h end .Iohn Klultsda/ 'e resUlts of hearing; begin work on 
menlOfandum of Ie. 
62023000 0112612009 12 A 25000 250 62500 Telephona calls and exchange e-mels with Ron 8/Or1<1nan: work on ARCH 
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INTRODUCTION 
All of the plaintiff s remaining claims in this case have been resolved in favor of the 
defense with the Court's "Order on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment," which was 
filed on May i8, 2009. The defendants have accordingly moved the Court for an order awarding 
them their attorneys fees and costs incurred in the defense of this case, which Motion is accompanied 
by a detailed Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees required by I.R.C.P. 54 and its 
various subparts. The costs issues are quite straightforward and addressed in the defendants' 
Verified Memorandum of Costs. 
This Memorandum is intended to address the various legal standards and analysis 
attendant to the attorneys fees issues. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
A. Legal Standards re: Awarding Attorney Fees. 
The legal bases for the defendants' Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees is IdallO 
Code § 12-120(3) and/or 12-121. The latter of these carries the stricter standard or burden of pro of, 
since it requires a showing that a case was "brought or pursued frivolously." While the defendants 
believe that standard can be met here, it will not be addressed in this brief since Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) is entirely dispositive. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies to any civil action involving a "commercial 
transaction" and provides that "the prevailing party shal1 be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." Idaho Code § 12-120(3)(emphasis added}. 
The statute goes on to define the term "commercial transaction:" 
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The term 'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all transactions 
except transactions for personal or household services. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3). It has often been repeated that this statute applies whenever the 
"gravanlen" ofthe claims made by the plaintiff involved a commercial transaction. See eg , Brower 
v EI DuPont De Nemours & Co, 1J7 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345, (1990). Kelly v. Silverwood 
Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 903P 2d 1321 (1995), Dennett" Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 936P 2d219 (Ct. 
App 1997) It is also very well settled that when a defendant successfully defends against the 
attempted enforcement of an alleged contract, such a defendant is entitled to attorney fees even 
though the Court has effectively ruled that no contract exists, or that such a contract is unenforceable 
as a matter of law. See, e g, Lawrence l' Jones, 124 Idaho 748. 864 P.2d 194 (Ct App 1993), 
Clement v Franklin Investment Group, LId, 689 F Supp 1575 (D Idaho 1988). 
There are cases where there can be a legitimate debate about whether the "gravamen" 
of a plaintiff's case involves a "commercial transaction" or not. See, e.g., Blimka v. lvfy Web 
Wholesaler. LLC. 143 Idaho 723, 152 P 3d 594 (2007) City of McCalll' Susan E Buxton, Idaho 
Supreme COliri Docket No. 34609 (2009 Opinion No 8, Jam/Oly 22, 2009). There is no such room 
for debate here, however, as there is simply no doubt about the fact that everything about the 
plaintiff's claims in this case arose out of an alleged commercial transaction. In fact, the only claim 
left at this point, that was the subject of the Court's recent Decision, was a breach of oral contract 
for the alleged sale or tr'ansfer of a commercial business to him. The plaintiff's claim here, in other 
words, is the quintessential definition of a commercial transaction.. AU of the claims that were 
previously dismissed in this case likewise arose out of that very same alleged commercial transaction 
in which the defendants supposedly agreed to transfer the business to him in the future. 
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The bottom line is there is no question about the fact that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is 
squarely applicable here. The defendants are the prevailing party since all claims have now been 
effectively dismissed as a matter oflaw, and the gravamen of all of the plaintiffs claims in this case 
have involved an alleged commercial transaction. The defendants thus respectfully submit there is 
no question that they are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defense of this 
action. 
B. Legal standards Ie: Ampunt of attorneys fees. 
J R. CP 54(e)(3) is the rule governing the "amount ofattomeys fees" to be awarded 
in any case. It provides a list offactors the trial courts "shall consider" in determining the amount 
of attorneys fees to be awarded to a prevailing party. 
Before addressing the factors listed in I R. C P. .54(e)(3), it is important to note that 
the Idaho Appellate Courts have held that a trial court must make a record indicating that all of the 
factors under the rule were considered, for proper appellate review. As stated by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, for example: 
A detennination of the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded is 
within the discretion of the district court .. Absent a showing of abuse 
of discretion the award will not be overturned. 
However. the district court under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) is required to 
consider several factors in determining the amount of such fees. OUf 
review of the court's discretion in the award of attorneys' fees is 
based upon the proper application of these factors. The district court 
must, at a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court 
considered these factors 
BUilding Concepts, Lid v. Pickering. 114 Idaho 640, 645. 759 P 2d 931 (el. App J988) By the 
same token, however, the Idaho Appellate Courts have made it equally clear that a District Court is 
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not required to make specific findings regarding how it employed each or any of the Rule 54(e)(3) 
factors in reaching the fees award amount.. See, e.g. Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. ]v!urphy, 122 
Idaho 270. 833 P 2d 128 (0 App. 1992). Empire Fire & Marine Ins Co. v. North Pacific Ins Co, 
127 Idaho 716, 905 P.2d 1025 (1995), Perkins v US Transformer W., 132 Idaho 427.974 P2d 73 
(1999). Smith 11 Millon, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P 3d 367 (2004). 
In summary, the appellate case law ofIdaho provides that while district courts do not 
have to make a record of specific finding regarding each of the twelve factors listed in Rule 54( e)( 3), 
the district court is required to make a record at least summarily indicating the court gave 
consideration to all of the factors under the rule. 
With regard to the twelve factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3} it would seem likely that in 
any given case a number of the factors listed would have some direct applicability, while others will 
have only some applicability, and yet others will have no applicability at all. That would certainly 
be the case here as well. Nevertheless, and in any event, the defendants would offer the following 
on each of the listed factors in J.RC.P. 54(e)(3): 
A The time and labor reguired. This is one ofthe primary factors under the Rule, 
which has direct applicability here. The attorneys fees requested are exactly commensurate with the 
"time and labor required" in the defense of this case. This case is approximately 3 years old at this 
point, and has been very time intensive. Thousands of documents have been exchanged in discovery, 
lengthy depositions taken, and quite a number of experts have needed to get involved in the case. 
In addition, there have been a number of hotly contested summary judgment motions, which has 
generated voluminous briefing and affidavits being submitted to the Court In addition, besides the 
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documents that have been exchanged in discovery which includes documents from various banking 
institutions, there have also been numerous other documents that have been dealt with, to investigate 
what relevance they mayor may not have. The defendants have a warehouse full of Thomas Motors 
business documents generated throughout its approximate 9 year history. It is also worth mentioning 
that the plaintiff introduced a subject area of forensic expertise that is extremely unique and 
complicated That is, because the plaintiff was making rather unusual claims about when contract 
documents were actually signed, the parties dealt with the subject of "ink. dating" and other similar 
testing 011 documents, which the undersigned had frankly never even heard of until this case. The 
bottom line is the time and labor required in this case was extreme. 
B. The novelty and difficulty ohhe questions. There were many thorny legal issues 
presented throughout the various summary judgment proceedings in this case, but the defendants 
were not certain they would amount to "novel" or particularly "difficult" questions or not As 
indicated above, they required significant amounts oflegal research and briefing, but it is not entirely 
clear what is meant by the rules reference to presenting novel and/or difficult questions. As also 
pointed out above, however, there was at least one novel subject raised in this case which involved 
a subject of ink dating, a very specific and unusual area of forensic science. 
C. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and 
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. The undersigned is also not certain how much 
consideration should be given to this particular factor. The primary attorneys involved in the case 
were experienced litigatols. and it is likely true that the issues involved in this case required some 
level of experience in commercial litigation. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A WARD OF 
A TTORNEY FEES - 6 
D. The prevailing charges for like work. As referenced in the affidavit of counsel, 
the hourly charges for the defense of this case ale commensurate with the normal and usual rates 
charged by the law firm representing the defendants for a number of years. These are also charges 
that are commensurate with customary and usual rates charged by lawyers practicing in Boise, Idaho, 
with commensurate levels of experience. 
E. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. This was of course a fixed fee arrangement 
to represent the defendants who had been sued in this lawsuit, based upon the applicable hourly rates, 
as referenced above. 
F. The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. The 
defendants do not believe this is a factor worthy of much consideration here. There were no time 
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case generally. 
G. The amount involved and the results obtained. The amounts involved in this case, 
at least according to the plaintiff, was substantial. In fact, the plaintiff was making claims for 
multiple millions of dollars in damages, according to him. The potential exposure to the defendants 
was correspondingly extreme. The "results obtained" were completely favorable to the defense, 
since all ofplaintifrs claims have now been dismissed as a matter oflaw 
R The undesirability of the case. The defendants do not believe this is a factor that 
has much applicability here. While this was a family-involved lawsuit where emotions ran high, 
there is nothing particularly undesirable about the case. In fact, the defendants as individuals are 
exceptionally nice people that, if anything, represented very desirable clients. 
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1. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. The 
defendants submit that this is likewise a factor that has little if any applicability here. Defense 
counsel had not previously known the defendants individually, prior to this case. 
J. A wards in similar cases. The defendants are not certain what consideration could 
be given to this factor. Defense counsel is not aware of any attorney fee awards that have been given 
in what could be fairly classified as a "similar" case. Defense counsel is aware of attorneys fees 
being awarded in cases, where the fee awards are commensulate with the amounts that were actually 
billed and paid by the client in defense of the case. That is what is in substance being requested here 
and submitted as fair and appropriate. 
K. Reasonable cost of automated legal research, This is a factor here as defense 
counsel employed use of automated legal research, and billed the defendants such costs. The 
defendants also paid fOI such costs. Specifically, defense counsel in dealing with the various 
summary judgment motions, and legal issues presented. incurred a total of$660.20 of research with 
the WestLaw Research Group. 
L. Any othel factor which the court deems appropriate in a particular case. The 
defendants are not aware of any "other" factor that would provide any significant contribution to the 
attorneys fees considerations here, other than those addressed above. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the defendants respectfully request that the COUlt award them their 
attorneys fees they actually incurred in defense of this lawsuit. 
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~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this).! day of May, 2009. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
H. Ronald ~jorkman 
Attorneys for Defend 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 2l.th day of May, 2009, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
I N, Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
[ xl u.s. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ J E-mail 
[ x] U.s. Mail 
[ J Hand Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ J E-mail 
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John.1. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.o. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 8370)~2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
T eJephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No (208) 365-4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their 
attorneys, Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and pursuant to Rule 54 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and its various subparts, as well as Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3) and/or 120-121, respectfully 
move this Honorable Court for an order awarding defendants all reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in the defense of this action. 
This Motion is otherwise based upon the pleadings and records on file with the Court 
in this action, together with the Memorandum of Law in support ofthe Motion for Attorney's Fees 
and the Verified Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs by defense counsel, both filed 
contemporaneously herewith" 
~ 
Dated this23 day of May, 2009. 
-it.... 
Dated this 2.a day of May, 2009. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
By l~ 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this.;? i.ts:dayofMay, 2009, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
I09N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
[ xl U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivered 
[ 1 Overnight Mail 
[ J Telecopy (Fax) 
[ 1 E-mail 
[ xl u.s. MaH 
[ 1 Hand DeliveIed 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ I E-mail 
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William A Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER., PLLC 
332 N, Broadmore Way, Ste. 102 
Nampa.,. Idaho 83687 
Telephone: (208) 47S-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201 
ISB No. 2451 
wmorrow@mofrowfischer.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS~ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAJNE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
-------------- ) 
CASE NO. CV. 2006-492 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
PAGE 04/f 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through the undersigned counsel of 
record, the law firm of Morrow & Fischer, PLLC, and hereby submits his Motion for 
Reconsideration of the COUT'fs May 18, 2009 Order on Defendants' Second Motion for 
MonON FOR RECONSTDERA TJON • 1 
~ __ •• ............. v.&., MURROWDINIUS PAGE 05/05 
Summary Judgment. 
This motion is made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2) and is supported 
by the affidavits and pleadings on file, together with the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration, which 'WiII be filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
7(b)(3){C). 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this ~ day of June, 2009. 
MORROW &, FISCHER, PLLC 
By:W.Q" .. ~ 
William A. Morrow 
Attorneys for the P1aintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Ju..", 
r hereby certify that on this _l_ day of~ 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & Brody 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise~ ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. {-lays 
P,o. Box 188 
Emmett~ ID 83617·0188 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
f'acsimile No. 342-2927 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 365-4196 
~1'h'Jw¥k for MORROW & FISCHE ,PLLC 
rmttr:\Clicnt~\T\Thom8.~. ~ Orcw 2197'\Thoma~ Mo(ors.lnc,0001.PlcadingsIMot tbr Rcconsidcrlltion,doc 
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599) 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510 
Fax No. (208) 342-2927 
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765) 
Attorney at Law 
109 N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136 
Fax No. (208) 365-4196 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH COURT'S ORDER - I 
ORIGINAIOOl13v 
COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action. by and through their 
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & Brody. and pursuant to Rule 37(b) and 37(e) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure hereby move this Honorable Court for an order of additional sanctions 
against the plaintiff for complete failure to comply with the Court's Order of February 27, 2009, 
requiring plaintiff to pay the amount of$5,259.50. The Court's Order of February 27,2009, gave 
the plaintiff 9 weeks to make the payment ofthe sanction award of$5,259 .50, specifically, until May 
I, 2009. No such payment has been made of any kind, however. despite a couple of phone call 
reminders about this, as well as a letter to plaintiff s counsel, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "A". The plaintiff and'or his counsel are thus indisputably in contempt of this 
Court's clear and unequivocal Order of February 27, 2009. 
This Motion is accordingly based upon the records and pleadings on file with this 
Court in this action, and is made for the reason that the plaintiff and/or plaintiffs counsel have 
completely ignored and blatantly refused to comply with the Court's Order. Defendants thus 
respectfully request that additional sanctions be awarded against the plaintiff specifically including 
the sanction of outright dismissal of this case [See. IR.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C)]. This would and should 
have the result of no other motions being heard or decided that relate to the legal or factual merits 
of plaintiff's claims, such as the plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, and leave the only motion 
for determination left in this case the Defendants' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. 
DA TED this 2nd day of June, 2009. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH COURT'S ORDER - 2 
00113 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attomey of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 2nd day of June, 2009, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A. Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER 
5680 E. Franklin Rd .. Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
l ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ xl Telecopy (Fax) 
r ] E-mail 
'- ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ xl Telecopy (Fax) 
[ J E- '1 
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WORTH, JANIS & BRODY, (208) 343-/510 
Fax: (208) 342-2927 
537 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, ID 83701-2582 
J. Charles Hepworth' 
JohnJ.Janis 
John W. Kluksdal 
'Member CA Bar 
VIA FACSIMILE - 475-2201 
William A. Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
LAW OFFICES 
- ESTABLISHED 1952-
May 15, 2009 
Re: Thomas v. Thomas 
HJ&B File No.: 06-2-023 
Dear Bill: 
.. fD. 
TWIN FALLS OFFI. 
(208) 734-75 
Toll Free: (877) 343-75 
Fax: (208) 734-41 I 
133 Shoshone Street Nor 
P.o. Box 3! I 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-03E 
Robyn M. Brod 
Benjamin J. Clul 
JoelA. BecJ 
John C. Hepworth, OfCounsei I 
I am writing as another follow up to the Court's Sanctions Order in the above-
referenced matter. I have spoken to both you and Dennis Wilkinson about this, and that the Court's 
Order required payment on May 1,2009. We are, of course, two weeks beyond that date at this 
point, and I have heard nothing about when we can expect payment. 
Please give me a call, or otherwise let me know when we can expect the compliance 
with the Court's order. Thank you. 
JJJ/sf 
pc: Ron Bjorkman 
Very truly yours, 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
By __ ~~~~ ____ ~ ____ _ 
Reply to Boise office 
EXH1BITA 
()[li , 
William A. Morrow 
Shelli D. Stewart 
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
332 North Broadmore Way, Suite 102 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201 
ISB No.: 2451,7459 
wmorrow@morrowfischer.com 
sSlewart@morrowfischer.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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MEMORANDUM IN S{JPPORT OF 
MOTTON TO DISALLOW COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS. INC., an ) 
T daho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
--------------------------) 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas. by and through his attorneys of record, 
the law finn of Mon-ow & Fischer, PLLC and hereby lodges this Memorandum. in Support of 
}\;[Olion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. 
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BACKGROUND 
On May 7, 2009, Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment was heard and, 
pending further review, the Court reserved its ruling. On May 18 l 2009, the Court entered its 
Order on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment granting such motion. On May 
28. 2009. Defendants med their Motion and Memorandum requesting attorney fees. For the 
reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion should be denied in its entirety. Alternatively, the 
Court should exerc1.se its discretion to reduce the attorney fees requested by Defendants. 
A. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants Are Not Entitled To Fees Punuant To Idaho Code § 12~120(3) Because 
No Commercial Transaction Took Place. 
Defendants request an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 
12-121.1 Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides in pertinent part: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account ... and in any commercia) 
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shaH be 
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and 
collected as costs. 
The term, ··commerc.iaI transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. 
Idaho courts use a two part test to determine whether attorney fees are proper under this 
section: (1) there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the 
commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought. Brooks v. Gigray 
Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 78, 910 P.2d 744. 750 (1996). Indeed. "It has long been held that '[t]he 
critical tcst is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the 
commercia} transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party is 
attempting to recover. '" Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp. 136 Idaho 
I A It hough Defendants provide Idaho Code § 12·121 as a basis for obtaining fees, they provide no leeal argument or 
supporting such assertion as thoy believe fces will be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Accordingly, 
Plaintiff will not refute a non-existent argument other than to state his disagreement that Dofendants arc entitled to 
fees pursuant to idaho Code § 12.121. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 2 
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466, 471~ 36 PJd 218~ 223 (2001)l citing Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 
at 426~ 987 P .2d at 1041 (1999). 
In this case, Defendants argue that although the Court determined there was no contract 
between the parties, they are nevertheless entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
Plaintiff disagrees. Even if this case were based on a commercial transaction, which it is not, 
Defendants are not entitled to fees because no transaction ever occurred. Although the Court of 
Appeals in Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748. 752, 864 P.2d 194, 198 (Idaho App.,1993) found 
that attorney fees may be warranted even where the underlying commercial transaction was void 
or deemed unenforceable, such holding is limited to situations in which the transaction actually 
occurred. As specifically stated by the Court of Appeals in Idaho Branch Inc. of Associated 
General Contractors of America., Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No, 1, 123 Tdaho 237, 244~ 846 
P,2d 239,246 (Idaho App .• 1993): 
Our Supreme Court has ruled that "[a]ttomey's fees are not appropriate under I.C. 
§ 12~ 120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and 
constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover,". Moreover. 
we have recently held that '(under the most expansive view of the statute [I.C. § 
12-120(3) J a lawsuit still must seek resolution of a dispute arising from a 
commercial transaction between the parties." In the case before us, the 
resolution sought by the contractors is 91 a dispute arising from a 
cgrnme[daJ transaction that did not take place; and.. thererore. there is no 
commercial transaction between tbe parties that can be the basis for an 
,Homey fee a}yard under I.e. § lZM1l0(3.l. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Brower v. E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co .. 117 Idaho 780. 784, 792 
P.2d 345, 349 (1990); Idaho Newspaper Foundation v. The City o.lCascade, 117 Idaho 422,424, 
788 P.2d 237.239 (Ct.App.1990)). 
In the present case. Plaintiff sued Defendants based on his father's promise that if he 
managed and operated his father's business for a highly reduced salary, he would inherit the 
business when his father retired. The fact that this case is dealing with a family business that 
was to be inherited by Plaintiff demonstrates the non-commercial nature of the suit. Instead of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT or MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES· 3 
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this being a business deal gone awry, this is a case about a son dedicating his life to a family . 
business based on a promise that he would someday inherit such business. Plaintiff gave up his 
job and dedicated his life to a family business that he was to inherit. Clearly the gravamen of 
Plaintifrs lawsuit was to reso]ve a dispute over all inheritance he was promised,not to resolve a 
dispute over a commercial transaction. 
Further~ as was the situation in Idaho Branch inc.. no commercial transaction ever 
occurred between the parties. Although Plaintiff's claim was based on his father's broken 
promise to leave Plaintiff the business, there was no transaction from which the dispute atose. 
Instead~ Plaintiff was suing based on a transaction that did not take place. Had Plaintiff actually 
received the business from his father and then sued, Defendants may have an argument with 
respect to their entitlement to fees however without a transaction there is no basis for fees. 
B. The Attorney Fees Requested By Defendant.\! Are Not Reasonable. 
Although Plaintiff strongly contests Detendants' entitlement to attorney fees, should the 
Court determine some fees are awardable. the amount requested is excessive and must be 
reduced. In determining the amount ofattomey fees, the court is vested with discretion. DeWills 
interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288, 678 P .2d 80 (t 984). When considering the amount of 
attorney fees to be awarded under Idaho Code § t 2~ 120. the court must consider the factors set 
forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857. 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986) . 
. The Rule 54(e)(3) factors include: 
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) 
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and 
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; (4) the prevailing charges for 
like work; (5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (6) the time limitations 
imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; (7) the amount involved 
and the results obtained; (8) the undesirability of the case; (9) the nature and 
length of the professional rclationsrup with the client; (10) awards in similar 
cases; and (11) the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if the court finds 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF M0T10N TO orSALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 4 
O()114~ 
MORROWDIN PAGE 138/: 
it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case. 
The court may also consider any other factor it deems appropriate in the particular case. I.R.C.P. 
54(c)(3)(L). 
BccaLl.')e the court'g discretion to award attorney fees is limited to awarding fees which 
are reasonable, and because in determining a reasonable amount of fees the court must consider 
the specific factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3), a party seeking fees must present the court with 
sufficient information from which to determine a reasonable fee award ba5ed upon the Rule 
54(e)(3). See Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra at 769. 483. In other words. the party seeking 
fees has the burden to supply the court with sufficient information from which to determine the 
reasonableness of the fees requested and a reasonable amount to be awarded. See Sun Valley 
Potato Growers, supra~ Leuunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005). 
Tn Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra, the Supreme Court of Tdaho addressed the moving party's 
burden to supply information to the court: 
If we require the trial court to consider the enumerated factors in rule' 54(e)(3)~ 
then ;t logically follows as a corollary that the (ourt must bave sufficient 
inrormation at its disposal concerning those factors. Some information may 
corne from the court's own knowledge and experience, some may come from the 
record of the case, but some obviously can only be supplied by the attorney of the 
party who is requesting the fee award .. , 
We believe it is incumbent upon a partt seeking attorney fees to present 
sufficient information for the tourt to consider factors as they specificalJy 
relate to tbe prevailing party or partie.III seeking fec.!. 
Sun Valley Potato Growers, supra (citing Hackell v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261. 264~ 706 P.2d 
1372, 1375 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added) (affinning the district court's denial of a fee award 
on the basis the moving party failed to present sufficient infonnation for the court to consider the 
Rule 54 factors). Further, am.ong the factors the trial court should consider in determining a 
reasonable fee award i.s whether the moving party~s counsel has made a good faith effort to 
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exclude from the fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or othern.ise unnecessary. See 
Green v. Baca, 225 F.RD. 612, 614-15 (C.D. California 2005) (applying the same factors as 
those sct forth in l.R.C.P. S4(e)(3) to determine a reasonable attorney fee award pursuant to 
F.R.C.P. 37(a)(4)(A)).2 
Defendants seek an award of attorney tees in the amount ofS1l5,749.20. Defendants are 
attempting to coHect fees for over 500 hours of attorney time, 461.5 of which were billed by a 
partn.er at $200!hour. Applying the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, it is clear that Defendants' request is 
excessive and, given Defendants' colossal fee request, it is incumbent upon the Court to 
scrutinize carefully whether Defendant..;' fee request includes charges for excessive time spent or 
redundant efforts. 
Although there were multiple issues involved in this case, it cannot be said that the issues 
involved-breach of contract and quasi-contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing and fraud-·~were particularly novel or complex. As demonstrated by Defendants' 
fec records submitted as Exhibit B to Defendants' Ver~fied Memorandum o.lAttorneys Fees and 
Cost.'i~ Defense counsel spent in excess of 50 hours between 6/27/2006 and 7/18/2007 compiling 
Defendants' first summary judgment motion. Not to mention the more than 30 hours spent 
between 8/13/2007 and 8/17/2007 reviewing Plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment and 
preparing Defendants' reply. Even after expending more than 80 hours on the first motion tor 
summary judgment, Defendants spent another 20 plus hours drafting a second partial motion for 
summary judgment between 3/7/08 and 3114/08 (not including the 9 hours spent drafting the 
rr:ply brief on 4/25/08 and4!28/08) and approximately 9 more hours on Defendants' Second 
2 See RonI' v, Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692, 800 P.2d 85, 88 (1990) ("It is well established that OUT adoption ofthe idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedl1fe is presumably with the interpretation placed upon similar language in the: Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure by the federal courts. [Citations omittedJ."); see also Hoopes v. Deere & Company, 117 Idaho 386, 
389, 788 P.2d 201. 204 (1990). 
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Motion for Summary Judgment on 413/09 and 4/6/09 (not including the 10 plus hours spent 
drafting the reply brief from 4/23/09 to 4/30/09). Clearly such amount of time is excessive 
considering the Umitcd legal issues and the repetitive nature of the summary judgment 
memorandums. Further, the fact that such summary judgment memorandums. as well a.~ the 
numerous other motions an~ responses and hearing notices, were drafted and redrafted and 
reviewed by a partner billing at $200Ihour, rather than an a.~sociate or paralegal billing at a lesser 
rate) is demonstrative of the excessive and unreasonable fees incurred by Defendants, 
In addition to the time spent drafHng the motions for summary judgment, defense counsel 
John Janis spent 8 hours on 1011 0/2007 reviewing pleadings and preparing his argument for the 
summary judgment hearing the following day.3 Not to mention the additional 8 hours he spent 
the following day attending the hearing and then discussing the case with co-counsel and the 
clients. Clearly 16 hours for preparation and argument at a motion hearing is excessive. 
Defendants have also failed to show that this was a particularly undesirable case, thereby 
justifying the exorbitant amount of attorney fees sought. Although Defendants claim the "ink 
dating" was something that made this case "unique and complicated," the ink dating issue wa.-; 
fairly minor and does not justifY the huge amount of fees being claimed in this case. It is also 
unclear how what relevance the ink dating .issue ha.!Ii to do' with the novelty of issues or the 
amount of time spent on such issue "",;th respect to Defendants considering Plaintiff is the party 
who hired an expert to examine the documents. Defendants wcre not overly involved in the ink 
dating issue considering they merely were required to provide Plaintiff with the original 
documents in order that Plaintiff could provide them to his expert. ClearJy the ink dating is not 
justification for awarding exorbitant fees on a fairly straightforward case. 
J This does not include the hours spent on 10/05/07 and 10/09/07 reviewing and organizing the motion pleadinss 
preparing for the summary jUdgment hearing. 
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Further, as admitted by Defendants, the legal issues invo.lved in this case were not novel 
or particularly difficult. Clearly the legal issues in this case, breach of contract and quasi-
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud, were standard to 
many litigation cases and do not support the excessive fees being requested. Defendants have 
not met their burden to supplying the court with sufficient information from which to determine 
the reasonableness of the fees requested and a reasonable amount to be awarded. Clearly 
requesting fees for over 500 hours of attorney time must be supported by much more than an 
assertion that ink dating made this case novel. Accordingly, if the Court dctennines fees are 
awardable, Defendants' exorbitant fees must be drastically reduced. 
C. The Costs Requested By Defendants Are Not Reasonable. 
Under Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of CjviJ Procedure, the court may award only a 
limited number of costs as a matter of right. See LR.C.P. 54( d)(l )(C) which sets forth costs 
which may be claimed as a matter of right. Any items of costs not enumerated in or in an 
amount in excess of that listed in Rule 54(d)(1)(C) are discretionary costs, which the court may 
award ~ "upon a showing that said costs were neccss_rv and exceptional costs reasonably 
inc'Qrred. and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party.'l LR.C.P. 
54(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added); Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alco,.n~ 141 Idaho 307, 
314~ 15, 109 P 3d 161, 168-69 (2005) ("A trial court may, in its discretion award a prevailing 
pa.rty certain costs where there has been 'a showing that the costs arc necessary and exceptional, 
reasonably incurred. and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse 
party·"1 Costs are "exceptional" only when the nature of the case itself is exceptional or when 
the cost is exceptional for a particular type of case. See Jiayden Lake. supra. 
In the present case, Defendants have included $553.85 tor a videographer used at 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO D!SAU .. OW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 8 
1 
PAGE 121 
Plaintiffs deposition as part of their costs as a matter of right. As discus~ed above, Rule 54(d) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure details a limited number of' costs that are to be awarded as a 
matter of right. Choosing to hire a videographer for a deposition is not a c(')!:\t covered in Rule 
S4(d)(1)(C). The fact that Detendants chose to hire a videographer for Drew Thomas' deposition 
does not mean that such expense is automatically passed on to Plaintiff. Video depositions are 
not required and are merely an extra expense that must be borne by the party choosing to incur 
such extra expense. 
Further, the $18,747.41 in expert witness costs included in Defendants' discretionary 
costs, are not necessary and exceptional costs awardable pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(C). Neither 
the nature of the case itself nor the expert costs are exceptional for a particular type of case. This 
is a standard litigation case in which Plaintiff claimed his father promised him the business in 
exchange for his management and operation of the business for a meager salary. Clearly this is a 
straightforward case in which hiring accounting experts to vaiue the business would be 
considered highly ordinary, rather than exceptional. Accordingly. Defendants attempt to collect 
$18,747.41 for accounting experts in a breach of contra.ct matter dealing with the sale of a 
business must be rejected as an ordinary expense that is in no way exceptional under Role 
54(d)(l)(C). 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Defendants are not entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12· 
120(3) because (1) the Court specifically found that there is no contractual relationship; (2) the 
gravamen of the lawsuit wa.c; inheritance of a family business in exchange for management and 
operation of such business; and (3) no commercial transaction ever occurred. Moreover, there is 
no evidence or finding that Plaintiff pursued his claims against Defendants frivolously. 
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unreasonably or without foundation, thereby entitling Defendants to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-121. Accordingly, Defendants' request for costs and attorney fees should be denied 
in its entirety. Alternatively, the Court should exercise its discretion to reduce the amount of 
attorney fees and costs sought. 
DATED this 11th day of June~ 2009. 
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DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
AND A TTORNEY FEES - I 
The plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees is entirely without merit 
and should be denied. 
The plaintiff first seeks to have the Court deny any attorneys fees in this case on the 
grounds that the mandatory fees provision ofIdaho Code § 12-120(3) are inapplicable in this case 
TIlis argument is frankly inexplicable and defies credibility. 
To begin with, the plaintiffs own Verified Complaint in this case claims he should 
be awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120. It is entirely inconsistent for the plaintiff to 
now try and argue that I.C. § 12-120(3) is n2! applicable to this case when his own pleadings on file 
for the last three years of this case have claimed otherwise. 
In addition, the newly concocted premise that 1.c.§ 12-120(3) does not apply to this 
case is "because no transaction ever occurred." (Plaintiff's Brief in Support of lvIolion 10 Disallow 
Attorney Fees at p 3) (emphasi5 in original) Here again, this factual "argument" is entirely 
inconsistent with everything the plaintiff has been claiming over the last three years. In his 
pleadings, and in his various depositions and affidavits on file with the Court. he has been 
consistently claiming throughout this litigation that there was an actual agreement in place with the 
defendants which involved the transfer of tlle Thomas Motors business and land to him at the time 
his father retired, and that the defendants breached that existing agreement. As a result of the 
defendants' alleged breach ofthis agreement, the plaintiff was seeking to recover millions of dollars 
from the defendants. Otherwise stated, the plaintiff has been claiming for over three years in this 
lawsuit that he had entered into this particular "transaction" with the defendants and the defendants 
allegedly failed to comply with their part of this business deal. The plaintiff makes no effort to 
explain how he or anyone else can claim they entered into an oral agreement with someone regarding 
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a commercial business, and that somehow does not amount to a "transaction." This defies common 
sense, and if anything the exact opposite is true. An agreement between parties involving the 
transfer of a commercial business would look more like the very definition of a "commercial 
transaction" . 
The only legaJ support offered for this argument by the plaintiff is the Idaho Court 
of Appeals Decision in Idaho Branch, Inc. v. Nampa Hwy. Dis!. No.1, 123 Idaho 237, 8446 P.2d 
239 (et App 1993). That appellate decision has absolutely nothing to do with this case, however, 
and if anything serves to illustrate why the plaintitrs argument here makes no sense .. In the Idaho 
Branch case, the Nampa and Canyon Highway Districts had entered into agreements relating to the 
purchase of a rock crusher and related equipment which could be used to supply the gravel needs of 
these two highway districts. Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho at 238. The lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was 
a non-profit cooperative association of construction contractors, along with three of its member 
contractors. These plaintiffs sought to have the financing agreement between the Nampa and 
Canyon County Highway Districts invalidated. Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho al 238. The plaintiff 
alleged that the agreement violated that part of the Idaho Constitution that dealt with limitations on 
county indebtedness. They specifically claimed that as taxpayers they were harmed by the action of 
the districts, and as gravel producers they were deprived of the right to bid on future possible 
contracts to supply the gravel needs of the districts. Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho at 238-239. The 
Complaint did not seek to recover any financial damages at all, but only a declaratory judgment 
holding that the financing agreement between the highway districts was void and unenforceable. 
Idaho Branch, J 23 Idaho at 239. The District Court had dismissed the case on the basis that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing. Id a1244. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed this decision. but found 
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that the plaintiffs had failed to show the Idaho Constitution provisions in question provided them 
with a "protective legal interest and accordingly ruled that the plaintiff's claim for relief failed on 
its merit." Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho al 244. On the attorneys fees question, the Court of Appeals 
did rule that there was '"no commercial transaction between the parties that could be the basis for an 
attorneys fee award under I.C. § 12-120(3):' Idaho Branch, 123 Idaho at 244. 
The Idaho Branch case is thus hardly helpful to the plaintiff here. In the Idaho 
Branch there was in point of fact no agreement or transaction between the parties involved in that 
lawsuit, nor was anyone even claiming there was an existing agreement between the parties in that 
lawsuit that was breached. That is the exact opposite of the situation pIesented here where the 
plaintiff in this case has been claiming for over three years that there was an agreement between the 
parties to this lawsuit that the defendants breached. 
In short, the plaintiff's reliance on the Idaho Branch case here is seriously misplaced. 
For the plaintiff to argue there was no commercial transaction involved in this case is not only 
inconsistent with what he has been claiming for the last three years, it is simply incorrect. It is 
exactly what has been the primary subject of this lawsuit from its inception. 
The plaintiff also goes to the length of suggesting the gravamen of his lawsuit "was 
to resolve a dispute over an iobedtance he was promised, not to resolve a dispute over a commercial 
transaction." (Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion 10 Disallow Attorneys Fees at p. 4), This 
argument or factual assertion is equally inexplicable. The plaintiff has never claimed tluoughout the 
three years of this lawsuit that the Thomas Motors business was supposed to be part of an 
"inheritance." As a legal term, "inheritance" generally contemplates property descending to an heir 
upon the death of another. In any event, there is no credible way to try and distinguish this case as 
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involving some kind of inheritance as opposed to a commercial transaction. There is simply no 
doubt about the fact the plaintiff has been claiming throughout the three years of this lawsuit that he 
had engaged in a business transaction with the defendants, and that alleged transaction served as the 
basis for all the claims he has been making in this case. 
In summary. the defendants respectfully submit that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is 
squarely applicable to this case and attorney fees be awarded on that basis. 
I<J~ RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 1...12.- day of June, 2009. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
/Q+ ..... 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this ~ day of June, 2009. 
BY"}! (2~&~ 
H. Ronald Bjorkman - ( 
Attorney for Defendants 
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DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF ON MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS - 1 
---
The Plaintiffs response to the Motion for Additional Sanctions is as much notable for 
what it does not offer, as what it does, The Plaintiff acknowledges the Court's Sanction Order in 
question, which required him to pay $5,259.50 by no later than May 1, 2009. He was given about nine 
weeks to make this payment, fwm the date of the Order- The Plaintiff further acknowledges that it has 
not yet been paid. Notably, the Plaintiff offers no indication of any intention to comply with the 
Court's Sanction Order at any point in the future either. In other words, the PlaintifT is ultimately 
acknowledging he is wilfuUy disregarding this Court's Order, and indicating his intention to continue 
wilfully and/or intentionally violating the Court's Order for the indefinite future. The Plaintiff also 
offers absolutely no explanation or attempted justification for his blatant disregard of the Court's 
Order. 
Ignoring this pwblem altogether, the Plaintiff goes on to argue the Court basically does 
not have any enforcement power for an order that sanctions a party in the form of an attorneys' fees 
award. That much is simply untrue, as the language ofthe rule itself makes clear. Rule 37(b)(2) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as follows: 
If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or penn it discovery, .. the 
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to 
the failure as are just, and among others the folJowing: 
"'*'" (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof .. or dismissing the 
action or proceeding on any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by 
default against the disobedient party; 
(D) In rule of any of the foregoing olders or in addition thereto, an order 
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders .... 
IRe? 37(b)(2) (emphasis added)., In addition, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) entitled: "General 
Sanctions - Failure to comply with any order," provides in pertinent part as follows: 
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In addition to the sanctions above under this Rule for violation of 
discovery procedures, any court may in its discretion impose sanctions 
or conditions,," against a party or the party's attorney for failure to obey 
an order of the court pursuant to these rules. 
The point that is apparently not being understood by the Plaintiff is the order granting 
the attorneys' fees to the defendant in this case was a sanction order arising out of Plaintiffs repeated 
failure to comply with the discovery nIles andlor the Court's Scheduling Order. In short, the court 
found that the Plaintiff andlor his counsel had abused the discovery process and sanctioned them for 
that behavior, requiring them to pay attorneys' fees in the amount of$5,259.50. The Plaintiff is now 
in contempt ofthat Court's finding. As indicated above, the Plaintiff is ultimately acknowledging its 
contempt of the Court's Order and is further acknowledging that it fully intends on wilfully 
disregarding it in the future as well. The Court's Order of sanctions was,just like the order requiring 
them to supply the long overdue expert witness report, a discovery order issued as result of continued 
discovery violations by a party. Clearly the Court has the power to enforce its orders that arise out of 
discovery abuses as the language of IRCP 37(b)(2) and 37(e) quoted above make clear. 
The power of the trial court to enforce an order requiring a party to pay money as 
sanctions for discovery abuses, and order additional sanctions, is further corroborated by Kleine v 
Fred At/eyer, Inc, 124 Idaho 44, 855 P 2d 881 (CI App 1992). There, the defendant moved to dismiss 
the case on the grounds of the plaintiffs "failure to comply with the district court's prior order 
requiring [the plaintiff] to pay the costs associated with the prior missed IME and to participate in the 
IME arranged for August 12." Kleine, 124 Idaho al 47. The basis of the defendant's motion to 
dismiss, in other words, was the plaintiff's failure to pay the sanction ordered costs for missing the first 
IME, and then for missing the second IME appointment as well. Addressing the applicable legal 
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standards on such an issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
The imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders 
is governed by 1.R.c.P. 37(b). A district court's decision to dismiss a 
case for failure to comply with pretrial discovery orders under I.R.CP. 
37(b)(2)(C) and (e) is discretionary and will not be overturned on 
appeal unless an abuse of that discretion is shown. 
Kleine, 124 Idaho a149. Ultimately, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the district court's additional 
sanction of dismissaL Again, one of the reasons for this was the Plaintitrs failure to pay the sanction 
order requiring him to pay some $1,500 associated with causing the initial IME not to take place 
Kleine, 124 Idaho at 46. 
There is simply no question that the Court has not only the inherent and necessary 
power to impose additional sancti ons for a party's failure to comp1y with a Court's standing Order, the 
Court is given the explicit power to issue additional sanctions under Rule .37(b) and (e) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as quoted above. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this (g ~ay of June, 2009. 
an is 
eys for Defendants 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this lL day of June, 2009. 
By l.f.. 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney for Defendan s 
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The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W. 
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the 
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this iflay of June, 2009, he caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William A. Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER 
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attomey at Law 
109 N. Hays 
PD. Box 188 
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188 
[ ] U,S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[X] T elecopy (Fax) 
[ J E-mail 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[Xl E-mail 
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William A. Morrow 
Shelli D. Stewart 
MORROW & FISCHER, PT...LC 
332 North Broadmore Way, Suite 102 
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Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201 
ISB No.: 2451,7459 
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sSlewart@morrow/ischet.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
VB. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) ) 
CASE NO. CV. 2006-492 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH COURT'S 
ORDER 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his attorneys of record, 
the Jaw firm of Morrow & Fischer, PLLC and hereby lodges this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant.v J .Motion for Additional Sanctions jor Plainr~ff's Failure to Comp~v with Court's 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFBNDANTS' MOTTON FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS FOR 
PLAINTIFF"S FAILURB TO COM'PLY wrTH COURT'S ORDER - I 
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the Court decline to hear all other motions filed by Plaintiff. Clearly Defendants must follow 
proper procedures for collecting fees, including seeking a writ of execution. 
Based on Defendants' failure to follow proper procedure for collecting a.ttorney fees 
awarded by the Court, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny Defendants' Mofion for 
Additional Sanctionsfor Plaintiff's Failure to Comply with Court's Order. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 2009. 
By:~,.£..i.~IJido!!~""';';;=:;;;""~~~~ 
Shelli D. Stewart 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise,ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
l09N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett, ID 83617-0188 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 342·2927 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 365·4196 
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Shelli D. Stewart 
MORROW & FISCHER~ PLLC 
332 North Broadmore Way, Suite 102 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Telephone: (208) 475~2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201 
ISB No.: 2451) 7459 
wmorrow@morrov.flscher.com 
sstewart@morrowfischer. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE 5T ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS. 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. 
-------------------------------
) 
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CASE NO. CV.2006-492 
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff. R. Drew Thomas, by and through his attorneys of record, 
the law finn of Morrow & Fischer, PLLC and pursuant to Rules 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6)~ hereby 
moves this Court for an Order Disallowing Costs and Attorney Fees requested by Defendants in 
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connection with Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings and affidavits on file, together with the Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, filed herewith. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED thjs 11 th day of June, 2009. 
~yO~O?SCHE~ PLLC 
~~ewa 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 11 th day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the m.ethod indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ &:. JANIS 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise,ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box l88 
Emmett,ID 83617-0188 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 342-2927 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 365-4196 
cl~m~4J~ for MORROW & FISCH R, PLL 
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RONALD 0, 'UfOMAS, ELA1NB K. 
'I (lOMAS mid 'JlJOMAS MOTORS, 
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) 
) .JlmGMENT 
) 
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) 
P. 02 
Based nponlhc Com1's O"cleT on Plt'lintiff's Motiol110 Disallow Costs and Fees dnlcd 
th(.! ~ ",I day ofJlIly, 1009, (ll1d good c811'le app\!aring therefore, 
IT IS I IE FtEBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 3ud DECREED that Judgment is hcrehy 
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IT lS SO ORDERED This !.1.day of Atlgll~t, 2009. 
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/ ION. JUNEAL C. KERRLCK 
District Judge 
,ftfl)(iMENT - 2 
00116, 
." ........ nil m:.rwuKIH LAW FIRM FAX 422927 P. 04 
r • 
, J ,_ .. 
CEHTfFICAT1': OF SERVICg 
Tho undel'sign0d certifies that on this ~L day of Augu~t. 2009, she caused to be 
smvcd a tme Clnd conccl copy of th~ above and foregoing by the m~lhod indicated hdow, and 
(~ddr~~;s;:\llo the: following: 
Willifwl A. tvfol"l'('\\1 
MORROW & FlStHm. 
3.n N. Bco.:ldrll(){C Wr.ty. Stc. 102 
Nmnp:i, ld:lllo lD687 
II. It~)ntlld Bjofkm:..m 
AlloTm::y at Lnw 
lor> N. lJays 
P.O. Box 188 
Fmlllcf1, Id:lho B3617~O lSg 
.fohn J. J;mis 
I IEPWORTrI. JANIS &. BROf)Y 
5J1 West Hanni)ck. Stt!. 200 
P.O. Box: 25&2 
Bois!.', fdilho 83701-2582 
JUJ')nMENT - 3 
llhll.S. Mail ( J J ffllld Dclivcl'cd 
r ] OvC'might Mail 
r 1 Telocopy (Fax) 
r ] E-mail 
[KJ. U.S. Mail 
l 1 Hand Delivered 
r ) Overnight MuH [ 1 Tctccopy (FftX) 
I 1 E-mail 
[j4.u.s. Mail 
f 1 Hand DolivCI¢d 
[ ] OvcmiL~ht Mail 
[ ] Telccopy (Fax) 
t } E-mail 
0011G 
rr ~ [L ~ ~~~~ 
JUL ;3 1 2009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
) 
R. DREW THOMAS, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS, ) 
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC.) an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
INTRODUCTION 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS AND FEES 
CV-2006-492 
In this action, Plaintiff sought judgment awarding damages for the alleged breach by 
Defendants, his parents, of an oral contract to transfer an automobile dealership, on a date certain 
or to be detenninec:i,in consideration of Plaintiff undertaking to manage operation of that 
dealership in the interim periQd. 
By Order filed May 18,2009, this court granted Defendants' Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiff's remaining breach of contract claims. On May 28, 
ORDER ON PLAINTJFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES 
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2009. Defendants filed their Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, a Verified 
Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs, and a Memorandum in Support ofthe Motion. 
Defendants seek the award pursuant to I.e. 12-120(3) and/or 12-121 and IRCP 54. 
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees and Memorandum in Support 
on June 11,2009. Plaintiff objects to the award of any discretionary costs as both unexceptional 
and not reasonably incurred. Plaintiff o~.iects to an award of attorney fees on three (3) grounds: 
1. Since the court found that no contract existed between the parties) there was no 
"transaction" pursuant to IC 12-120(3); 
2. To the extent this case concerned a "transaction," it was not a commercial tran.saction, but 
a promise of an inheritance; and 
3. The fees claim.ed are not reasonable. 
The court heard argument on Plaintirrs Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees on June 22, 
2009. 1 Mr. William A. Morrow presented argument in support of Plaintiff's motion and Mr. 
John 1. Janis, on behalf of Defendants, argued in opposition to the motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND .FEES 
Defendants seek an order awarding $2,888.66 in costs as a matter of right, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(C)) $15,858.75 in discretionary costs, pursuant to l.R.C.P. S4(d)(1)(D), and 
$115,749.20 in attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3) and 12-121 and J.R.C.P. 
54(e). Plaintiff objects to one item of the costs as of right claimed by Defendants, all the 
IOn the same date, the court also beard argument on Defendants' Motion for Additional Sanctions and argument 
Veith respect to the Motion for Reconsideration tiled by Plaintiff on June 2, 2009. On July 10, 2009, the court tiled 
its Order on the motion for additional sanction5 requiring Piaintifi'to pay the outstanding discovery sanctions before 
the cqurt would entertain any motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff filed his Notice of Payment of Attorney Fees and 
Costs on July 16.2009. Since Plaintiff has not filed a notice of hearing on the motion forreconsideratron, there is 
no need to address the issues raised with respect to that motion at the June 22, 2009 hearing. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES 
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discretionary costs claimed. by Defendants, and both any award of attorney fees to Defendants 
and, if sucb fees are awarded, to the amount of fees claimed by Defendants. 
t. Costs 
A. As a Matter of Right 
As noted above, Defendants seek an award of costs as a matter of right, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54{d)(l)(C). in the amount of $2,888.66. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' claim of 
$553.85 for a videotape of Plaintiff's deposition. The court finds that the cost of the videotaped 
deposition is not authorized by Rule 54(d)(l)(C). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to an 
award ofS2,334.81 for costs as a matter ofrlght. 
B. Discl"etionary Costs 
Defendants seek an award of discretionary costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(D), in the 
amount of$15.858. 75 for three experts. Plaintiff objects to an award of any such discretionary 
costs, for the teason that the expert costs at issue are not exceptional in the context of the issues 
raised in this case. 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1)(D), the court may, in its discreti.on, award a prevailing party 
certain costs, not recoverable as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 54( d)(1 )(C). where there has 
been a showing that the costs are: 
1. Necessary; 
2. Exceptional; 
3. Reasonably incurred; and 
4. Assessable against the adverse party in the interests of justice. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES 
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Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314 (2005) (quoting Rule 
54(d)(1)(D)). Discretionary costs may include additional costs for expert witnesses (in excess 
of that allowed in Rule 54(d)(1)(C). [d. The trial court must make express findings as to why a 
party's discretionary costs should or should not be allowed. ld. The court complies with the 
Rule if it makes express findings as to the general character of requested costs and whether such 
costs are necessary, reasonable, exceptional, and in the interest of justice. ld. This means that 
the district court need not evaluate the requested costs item by item. Puckett v. Verska, 144 
ldah.o 161, 170 (2007) 
A cost may be "exceptional" within the meaning of the rule when incurred because the 
nature of the case itself was exceptional. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 314. 1he Supreme Court 
has recognized that certain cases, such as personal injury cases, generally involve copy, travel, 
and expert witness fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather than exceptional. Id. 
Defendants seek discretionary costs for experts in the fonn of accountants and an expert 
in banking. While the court .finds that the fees incurred for such experts were necessary, 
reasonably incurred, and assessable against Plaintiff in the interests of justice, given the 
substantive claims and the procedural history of this case, the court cannot help but conclude that 
the costs incurred by Defendants in securing those experts were not exceptional in a case such as 
this involving the alleged breach of an agreement to transfer a business. In light of this, 
Plaintiff's motion for an order disallowing the discretionary costs claimed by Defendants is 
granted. 
n. Attorney Fees 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIQN TO DISALLOW COSTS AND FEES 
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Defendants seek attorney fees in the amount ofSl15 l 749.20, including $660.20 for 
computeriz.ed legal research tmder Rule 54(e)(3)(K), pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120(3) 
and 12-121. .Plaintiff objects to an award of any attorney fees on the ground that there is no basis 
for such an. award pursuant to either statute. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the gravamen of 
this action did not involve a commercial transaction, pursuant to Section 12-120(3) and that there 
is no evidence that Plaintiff pursued this action frivoJously, as required to support an award of 
fees pursuant to Section 12~12L Alternatively, in the event the court decides to award attorney 
fees to Defendants, Plaintiff argues that the amount claimed by Defendants is not reasonable. 
Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendants were not the prevailing party in the action. 
A. Applicability of Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) 
Plaintiff first asserts that Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code Section 12"120(3) because there was no commercial transaction in this case. 
Plaintiffs argument on this issue involves essentially two claims: (1) there was no ·'transaction~' 
in. this case; and (2) ifthere wa..~ a transaction, it was not a commercial transaction. 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) authorizes the court to award a reasonable attorney fee to 
the prevailing party "in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law." 
1. Exjsten~e of a transsc:tion 
.. 'Where a party alleges the existence ofa contract that would be a commercial 
transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute and 
the prevailing party may recover attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is 
established. '" Peterson v. Shore, 197 P.3d 789, 794-95 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Lexington 
Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287 (2004». The court finds that Peterson is 
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factually equivalent to this case for purposes of applying Section 12~ 120(3). In Peterson, the 
plaintiff brought a breach of contract action against his landlord for breach of an alleged oral 
contract permitting the plaintiff to purchase the property. The district court, affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals, found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of the alleged oral 
contract 197 PJd at 794. Based on this finding, the district court denied the defendants' 
request for attorney fees pursuant to 12-120(3), because there was no transaction. ld At 795. 
The Court of Appeals reversed this determination as "inconsistent with the applicable legal 
standards established by the Idaho Supreme Court." ld 
Plaintiff relies on Idaho Branch, Inc. o/the Associated General Contractors of America 
v. Nampa Highway Distr. No.1. 123 Idaho 237 (Ct. App. 1993), for the assertion that no 
transaction exists here for purposes of 12-120(3). In A Ge, a group of contractors who produced 
gravel for use in highway projects brought a declaratory judgment/injunction action seeking to 
prevent the highway district from financing the purchase of a rock crusher over a six year term. 
123 Idaho at 238-39. The contractors asserted that the financing agreement violated certain 
limitations on indebtedness and expenditure of highway funds in the Idaho Constitution. Id In 
arguing that they had standing to maintain. tbe action, the contractors asserted that they would be 
harmed by the district's action, in part, because they would be deprived of "their right to bid on 
contracts to supply the gravel needs of the districts. causing them to suffer business losses. j; Id 
The district court found that the contractors did not have standing. The Court of Appeals 
reversed that determination, finding that the threatened harm to the contractors as potential 
bidders to supply gravel was sufficient injury to support standing. ld at 242. However, the 
Court of Appeals also determined that tbe claimed injury - based on the alleged right to 
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competitively bid on contracts to supply gravel to the districts - was not protected by the 
constitutional provisions at issue. Id at 244. Accordingly, the contractors were unable to prove 
a necessary element to obtain the requested injunctive or declaratory relief. On appeal, the 
districts contended that the district court had erred in denying their claim for attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). Id The Court of Appeals held that the distri.cts 
could not recover fees under 12-120(3), because "the resolution sought by the contractors is ofa 
dispute arising from a commercial transaction that did not take place." ld In other words, the 
only commercial transaction to which the contractors could have been a party, and thus put at 
issue in the action, was a contract with the district to supply gravel. Since no such transaction 
ever occurred - the gravamen of the suit was that the contractors were bcing deprived of the 
opportunity to engage in such transactions with the district - 12-120(3) didn't apply. The 
present case is readily distinguishable from ACG. because PJaintiffwas not seeking relief for 
having been denied th.e opportunity to engage in a hypothetical transaction, but, instead, sought 
damages for Defendants' alleged breach of an enforceable oral agreement. 
2. Commercial Nature of the Alleged Agreement 
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), because "the gravamen of Plaintiff s lawsuit was to 
resolve a dispute over an inheritance he was promised, not to resolve a dispute over a 
commercial transaction ... 2 
2 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attmney Fees, p. 4. The court notes, for the 
r~ord. that this claim by Plaintiff further illustrates the fluid nature of the oral agreement al1cgcd by Plaintiff. 
During various stages of this action, the agreement has been characterized as a contract to convey a business and 
real property, a joint venture, and, now, for the first time, as a contract to make a testamentary disposition (despite 
(he fact that Plaintiff has consistently maintained that Defendants promis~d to transfer the business when Defendant 
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Section 12-120(3) provides that the term "commercial transaction" means Hall 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Even if the court were to 
accept Plaintiff s latest characterization of the transaction as an agreement to make a 
testamentary disposition, Plaintiff has not established that the transaction wa..c; for his personal or 
household purposes. 
In light of the foregoing, the court finds that Defendants, as the prevailing party, arc 
entitl.ed to an. award ofattomey fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). 
B. Amount of Attorney Fees 
I. Appli~able Legal Standards 
Th.e calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within th.e discretion of the trial court. 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749 (2008). A trial court properly exercises its discretion 
when it: (1) correctly perceives the issue at hand as one of discretion; (2) acts within the outer 
boundaries of that discreti.on. and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. ld. 
When awarding attorney fees, the court must consider the applicable factors set forth in 
Rule 54(e)(3): 
1. The time and labor required; 
2. The novelty and difficulty of the issues; 
3. The skill requisite to perfonn the legal service properly and the expe.rience and 
ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 
4. The prevailing charges for like work; 
R.onald O. Thomas reached a stated age or .retired, not when he died). If nothing else, the changing nature of the 
alleged agreement illustrates its indefiniteness and unenrorceability. 
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5. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
6. The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; 
7. The amount involved and the results obtained; 
8. The undesirability of the case; 
9. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
10. Awards in similar cases; 
11. The reasonable cost of automated legal research~ if the court finds it was 
reasonably necessary in preparing the party!s case; and 
12. Any other factor the court deems appropriate in a particular case. 
Jd. at 749· 750~ Rule 54(e)(3). The rule does not require the court to make specific fmdings in 
the record, only to consider the stated factors in detennining the amount of the fces. Letlunich, 
145 Idaho at 750. When considering the factors. the court need not demonstrate how it 
employed any of the factors in reaching an amount awarded. ld. 
Th.e party seeking an award of fees bears the burden of convincing the di.stri.ct court of 
the reasonableness of the amount claimed for attorney fees. Jd. The party seeking an award of 
fees may satisfy the in.ltial burden of production by submitting affidavits itemizing and 
explaining the basis for the claim and the amount. Jd. The party objecting to a claim for fees 
must file a m.otion stating with particularity the objections to the claimed fees and provide any 
other info.rmation the party wishes the court to consider in support of the objections. ld. 
After considering the record .in this action and applying the factors set forth in tR.C.P. 
54(,')(3), the court awards Defendants attorney fees in the amount of $115,749.20. Althougb 
Plaintiff objects to the reasonableness of the attorney fees, Defendants were in the position that 
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they had to respond to and defend against the litigation driven by the Plaintiff. A very 
significant amount of time and labor had to be expended by Defendants to conduct discovery; to 
respond to the activity of Plaintiff's counsel, and to raise the matters Defendants believed were 
important. From the Court's own perspective, this case bas demanded a significant amount of 
time on a myriad of matters. The Court certainly cannot fInd that Defendants were wasteful in 
their approach to this litigation, caused unnecessary expense, or were not reasonable in the way 
they conducted this lawsuit. The Court finds that the attorney fees claimed by the Defendants 
are reasonable. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing. pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)~ the 
court awards Defendants costs in the amount of $2,334.81 and attorney fees in the amount of 
$115,749.20. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
. ;:;z."J <.>7-
Dated this _---.;_'I_day of July, 2009. 
~-~~ uneal C. Kerrick ~ 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the 
following, either by U.S. Mail, PQstage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse basket; or by 
facsimile copy: 
William A. Morrow 
Morrow & Fischer, PLLC 
332 North BroadIDQte Way, Suite 102 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
John J. Janis 
Hepworth, Janis & Brody 
537 W. Bannock St., Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
Dated this _..".2""--__ My of or 
SHELLY GANNON 
Clerk of the Court 
,2009 
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JUL 1 2009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV 2006-492 
) 
) ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
) FOR ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * 
This Matter came before the Court upon the Defendants' Motion for Additional 
Sanctions. among other motions. The Defendants' Motion for Additional Sanctions was based on 
the plaintiffs failure to pay the sanction amounts reflected in the Court's Order of February 27, 
2009, which required the plaintiffto pay to the defendants the sum of$5,259.50 by no later than May 
1, :2009. The hearing on this and other motions occurred on June 22, 2009. The Court took the 
various motions under advisement. but on the Motion for Additional Sanctions ruled that the 
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Plaintiff is precluded from going forward on his Motion for Reconsideration or any other motions 
at the very least until the sanctions award of$5,259.50 is paid in full to the defendants. 
IT IS SO ORDERED Thl-LO/ d~y r (r}:.] 
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CERTIFICATE OF SE~CE fl~ fI,,1 
The undersigned certifies that on this 17 day 0~09, she caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
William A. Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER 
332 N. Broadmore Way, Ste. 102 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett. Idaho 83617-0188 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582 
~] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ ] E-mail 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
fxJ Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ ] E-mail 
[)qU.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Telecopy (Fax) 
[ ] E-mail 
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William A. Morrow 
Shelli D. Stewart 
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
332 N. Broadmore Way, Ste. 102 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Telephone: (208) 475-2200 
Facsimile: (208) 475-2201 
ISB No.: 2451, 7459 
wmorrow@morrowfischer. com 
sstewart@morrowfischer.com 
Attorneys for Appellant R. Drew Thomas 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. ) 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an ) 
Idaho Corporation, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2006-492 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS, RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. 
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, 
JOHN 1. JANIS AND H. RONALD BJORKMAN, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ORIGINAL 
on ~ ~'i (J' 
1. The above-named Plaintiff/Appellant, R. DREW THOMAS, by and through his 
attorneys of record, the law firm of MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC, hereby appeals against the 
above-named Defendants to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final order entitled Order on 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, which was entered in the above-entitled 
action on the 18th day of May, 2009, on the Defondants J Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding. 
2. Plaintiff/Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment described in Paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1) of 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Plaintiff/Appellant 
intends to assert in his appeal, is as follows: 
(a) Whether the District Court erred in failing to reinstate Plaintiffs quasi-
contract claim (which was dismissed in the Court's November 26, 2007 
decision based on its determination that there was an enforceable 
contract), despite the Court's later determination in its May 18, 2009 
decision that there was not an enforceable contract; 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in its May 18, 2009 decision by 
determining there were no issues of material fact as to whether a material 
term of the agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors required Plaintiff 
to pay a monetary price to Defendants for the business. 
(c) 
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Whether the District Court erred in its July 31, 2009 decision by awarding 
attorney fees, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) and 
Idaho Code §12-120(3), and costs as a matter of right to Defendants. 
( d) Plaintiff/Appellant hereby requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 3S(a)(S) and 4l. 
As a Result of the District Court's errors, this Court should grant the 
Appellant attorney fees expended in obtaining reversal of the District 
Court's decisions. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
S. Plaintiff/Appellant requests preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcri pt: 
(a) The entire hearing on Defondants' Motion for Summary Judgment held on 
October 11,2007, the Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding; 
(b) The entire hearing on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
held on May 7, 2009, the Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding; 
(c) The entire hearing on PlaintifFs Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees held 
on June 22,2009, the Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick presiding. 
6. In addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, Plaintiff/Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record: 
(a) All documents filed with the Court applicable to the October 11, 2007 
hearing referenced in paragraph S( a) above; 
(b) All documents filed with the Court applicable to the May 7, 2009 hearing 
referenced in paragraph S(b) above; 
(c) All documents filed with the Court applicable to the June 22, 1009 hearing 
referenced in paragraph S(c) above; 
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O(]118~ 
(d) All Exhibits admitted into evidence during any of the hearings referenced 
in paragraph 5 above. 
(e) All affidavits filed by Plaintiffs in this matter. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the court reporter; 
(b) That the court reporter has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of 
the reporter's transcript; 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 11tl--day of August, 2009. 
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MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
illiam A. Morr 
Shelli D. Stewart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff! Appellant 
DOll 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this -lflay of August, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below to the following: 
John J. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200 
P.O. Box 2582 
Boise,ID 83701-2582 
H. Ronald Bjorkman 
Attorney at Law 
109N. Hays 
P.O. Box 188 
Emmett,ID 83617-0188 
Katherine Klemetson 
Court Reporter 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
z 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 342-2927 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 365-4196 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile No. 454-7442 
for MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
ImtiT:\ClientsITIThomas, R Drew 2 I 97l1Thomas Motors, Inc.OOO\Pleadings\Appeal\Notice of Appeal.doc 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, ) 
) Supreme Court No. 36857-2009 
Plaintiffl Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS, ) 
And THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
) 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, SHELLY GANNON, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certifY: 
That there were no exl!ibit~which were offered or admitted into evidence during the course 
of this action. "'~~~~"~~_c~""~~~~ 
In addition to the above listed exhibits, the following will be submitted as exhibits to this 
Record on Appeal. 
• Transcript on Appeal [odged September 30, 2009 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court at Emmett, Idaho this A I~.!- day of October, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
SHELLY GANNON, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Gem, 
Deputy Clerk 
00118 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM 
R. DREW THOMAS, ) 
) Supreme Court No. 36857-2009 
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vs. ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS, ) 
and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
DefendantlRespondent. ) 
) 
I, Shelly Gannon, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record, in 
the above entitled cause, was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, full, and 
correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
including all documents filed or lodged as requested in the Notice of Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
at Emmett, Idaho, this ,AI ~ day of October, 2009. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
SHELLY GANNON 
Clerk of the District Court 
By(JAAill 
Deputy Clerk 
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R. DREW THOMAS, ) 
) Supreme Court No. 36857-2009 
Plaintiff! Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) 
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS, ) 
And THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ) 
) 
DefendantlRespondent. ) 
I, Shelly Gannon, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Gem, do hereby certify that I personally mailed, by United States 
Mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their 
Attorney of Record as follows: 
William A. Morrow 
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
332 North Broadmore Way, Ste 102 
Nampa, ID 83687 
John 1. Janis 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY 
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste 200 
PO Box 2582 
Boise,ID 83701-2582 
This is to advise each party that pursuant to I.A.R. 29 they have 28 days from the date of 
the mailing of the record, including any requests for corrections, deletions, or additions with the 
District Court, together with a Notice of Hearing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this dJ ~ day of October, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SHELL Y GANNON 
Clerk of the District Court 
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